Who's afraid of a plebiscite?

President Dilma Rousseff launched the idea of ​​calling a plebiscite to decide whether to hold a constituent assembly exclusively to write the political reform. Presented in this way, it may not prosper legally, because there are already coherent positions, such as that of Minister Marco Aurélio Mello, showing that it would be technically impossible to create a partial constituent assembly, intended only to change one chapter of the 1988 text, which has been amended exhaustively. 

But, based on the password given by the president, to seize the idea of ​​a plebiscite and find out if the population, which is supposedly unhappy with "everything that's there," isn't like that? To find out if this population would like to, in the best spirit of democracy, change everything, rewrite the basis of its laws from scratch—that would be brilliant. That's what everyone says they want to clean up Brazil.

Unable, at this moment, to directly confront this idea, the opposition claims that Congress can resolve the political impasse by voting on specific measures. Most importantly, instead of plebiscites and direct consultations with the people, these would be economic and administrative decisions, such as halving the number of ministries, cutting positions, and other such measures.

The president did not give details, at this initial stage, about the format of this "exclusive constituent assembly" nor did she indicate a date for the plebiscite on whether to accept or reject the idea. But she used three magic words: plebiscite, constituent assembly, exclusive. Beware, those who didn't like it, because it could be enough to unite Dilma and the people, she who is the most popular politician in the country.

In 1988, before the transformation of Congress, by vote of Congress itself, into a Constituent Congress, the banner that united the democrats was that of a Free and Sovereign National Constituent Assembly.

There wasn't even time to clarify what a Constituent Assembly written by representatives beyond political parties, and not just their members, would actually look like. No one of importance in Congress embraced the topic. In 1985, a council of notables assembled by then-presidential candidate Tancredo Neves, tasked with writing the most detailed possible draft of a Magna Carta, had its work ignored as soon as it was finished. There is no record that Tancredo, who commissioned and received the work, delivered the brochure to Ulysses Guimarães before his death; Guimarães would later lead the Constituent Assembly as Speaker of the House.

Legal scholars like Raimundo Faoro and Gofredo da Silva Telles were among those notable non-politicians who wrote the draft Constitution for Tancredo. Wouldn't it be masterful to reclaim that same principle and bring together leading figures, direct representatives of popular organizations, and seasoned politicians, subjecting them to a fair and honest electoral process and delegating to the winners the power to refound the country in the name of the people?

What would an exclusive constituent assembly, like the one advocated by the president, really look like? Could the leader of a marginalized NGO be a candidate for the constituent assembly solely on the nomination of their organization? Would there be room for self-nominated candidates, independents, who would register for the constituent assembly elections in their own name, with their ID and tax identification number, waiting for votes to go to Brasília? Could a movement like the LGBT movement (Gays, Lesbians, Bisexuals, and Transvestites) nominate candidates to draft a new Constitution? And would the politically astute young people of the Free Fare Movement (MPL) have MPL candidates that people could choose to vote for without having to find them within the PSTU, PSOL, or Rede parties?

A free and sovereign National Constituent Assembly is what the streets are demanding, as dozens, hundreds, thousands of demands are read – and with ever-increasing scope – on posters, in chants, and in the shouts of marches.

But is that what's going to happen? It's difficult; never before in this country's history has it been like this. If, however, there is maturity among the leaders of the marches, with unity around the acceptance of President Dilma's proposal, and its necessary improvement, the historical delay can be overcome.

The risk, if the plebiscite and the constituent assembly are not understood as a fundamental set of solutions for overcoming the impasses so clearly demonstrated by the students in the marches, is proportional to the opportunity: destructive radicalization instead of democratic construction. An all-or-nothing game that obviously does not benefit Brazil, but pleases its adversaries around the world, starting with the United States. This is especially true if the opposition raises the tone of its criticism of the president to the point of seriously discussing impeachment or early elections. A fork in the road has appeared before Brazil.