Why did they decide to accelerate the political process?
We are in the preludes to 2013, but 2014 is already here and the hands of the clock have been moved forward; read the interesting analysis by Professor Luiz Werneck Vianna on the movements of Lula and Dilma.
247 - An interesting article, written by Professor Luiz Werneck Vianna, about the anticipation of the electoral debate was published this Saturday in the Estado de S. Paulo newspaper. Read it below:
2014 in sight - LUIZ WERNECK VIANNA
There's something strange in the air, because this acceleration of political time that we are witnessing is not normal. We are still in the preludes of 2013, without knowing what the rest of its days promise us, whether a good harvest or ominous times. However, far from the port, still in the high ocean, voices are already heard announcing land in sight and preparations for imminent landing. In one leap we would be arriving in 2014, the year of the presidential succession. The crew that guides us, veterans of ten years in the role, are they looking for shortcuts to shorten the time as a maneuver to avoid the approach of fearsome enemy ships, or do they fear mutiny on board within their coalition?
The opposition is barely beginning to gather strength, it lacks a unified leadership, and even the general outlines of its diagnosis of the nation's social state are not yet stated, especially its alternative government program to the current one. It is known, of course, that it is engaged in speculations on economic analysis, a trench in which it is a passive agent, a mere observer of events that, if the current course continues, particularly regarding inflation, could turn the wheel of fortune in its favor.
If the potential presidential candidates, not all of whom are linked to the formal opposition as we recognize it at present, prefer to act quietly, waiting for the ritual deadlines, what are the reasons for the haste in the hegemonic party in power, where preparations are already underway for caravans modeled after the electoral campaigns of former president Lula, now a supporter of President Dilma?
Duality in power is always a source of instability, as old lessons in political theory demonstrate. The constant pursuit of expansion is inherent to power. The transition from Lula to Dilma, an heiress without her own light, elevated to the leadership of a coalition of political forces without exercising command over the party that is hegemonic within it, in which she has neither roots nor significant influence, as if split the sovereign into two distinct bodies: the physical one, which she embodies, and the metaphysical, symbolic one, with which the former president is invested.
In this sense, the power emanating from the president is of a derivative nature, subject to the influence of external sources of power: on the one hand, the Workers' Party (PT), which owes its unity to the presence and actions of Lula, its effective leader; on the other hand, the allure of the former president's charisma over large segments of the electorate.
The solution of turning Lula into their confidant seemed judicious and, if well managed, could even continue. But an unexpected obstacle arose: Criminal Action 470, which concluded with the conviction of some leading figures of the hegemonic party. This fact, given the individuals involved, was destined to extend beyond the limits of the Judiciary, and its presence outside the court records continues to haunt politics and the very course of the presidential succession.
Before concluding his term as president of the Chamber of Deputies, Marco Maia (PT-RS) took the position that convicted parliamentarians could only lose their mandates through a decision by their peers, based on a process that guaranteed them the right to a defense, which, in practice, opens the possibility of the Supreme Court's decision being rejected.
His succession to the position by Congressman Henrique Eduardo Alves (PMDB-RN), in theory, could lead to an alternative understanding of the matter – there are records pointing in this direction, see his meeting with the president of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) – but there has been no shortage of pressure for his predecessor's understanding to persist. In this case, beyond the natural and expected turbulence stemming from the economy, it is to be expected that the presidential succession will begin under the dramatic sign of a conflict between branches of government, in the not-so-remote event that the STF does not delay the publication of the rulings and the judgment of the appeals to be filed by the defendants.
In that event, President Dilma's candidacy for re-election would be subject to a difficult choice, as her party might demand, along with its parliamentary allies, solidarity actions in favor of its leaders convicted by the courts, thus compromising itself in the difficult terrain of relations between the Legislative and Judicial branches, with evident damage to its republican image.
Faced with an emergency of such gravity, it would be plausible to imagine that voices within her own party – in which the influence of its imprisoned leaders is not insignificant – might turn to the candidacy of the former president, whose skills in the art of arbitration are well known and have not been lacking in words of solidarity from them, unlike the president. This heroic solution would be facilitated if the Dilma government were to experience a negative trajectory on the economic agenda, which, it is worth noting, could well serve both the opposition and those nostalgic for the Lula government, who dream of its imminent return.
The ambiguity surrounding the politics of the Planalto Palace, gravitating between the two bodies that represent sovereign power, conspires against the ample timeframe preferred by both the formal and covert opposition, who calculate their possibilities with their eyes fixed on economic indicators. It is not without reason, therefore, that the clock is moving forward in the Planalto Palace, as was clear in the president's last public address on national television, even though the profile of the adversary is not yet discernible in the arena. By everyone's calculations, barring extraordinary events, the ruling coalition, with the PT at the forefront, even if it loses the PSB, should win yet another succession race, provided, of course, that it has a candidate who unites it, including within the hegemonic party. At least, for now, that is the difficulty.