Celso Amorim, the worst choice.

If there were a presidential election in Brazil today, Dilma Rousseff could perhaps get 70% of the vote. Besides the Workers' Party electorate, she won, with her "clean-up," the sympathy of a good part of the middle class, the elite, and those who were already fed up with Lula's style. "Dilma has much more composure," is what people are saying. The starting point of this process of differentiation between creator and creature happened before her inauguration, when Dilma changed the leadership of Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Celso Amorim publicly pleaded to remain in the government and was replaced by Ambassador Antonio Patriota. More than a change of personnel, it was a change of style. It was the signal of a new foreign policy, less ideological and more pragmatic – and no less sovereign.

The return of Amorim to the government, in an area more sensitive than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself, brings back to the heart of power all that Lula-era legacy: gratuitous anti-Americanism, support for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iran, alignment with dictatorships, and blunders such as granting shelter to Manuel Zelaya in the Brazilian embassy in Honduras. Certainly, a good part of the left, especially the younger segment, is already celebrating the return of the former foreign minister. But experienced analysts predict that Dilma has just created a crisis with the Armed Forces – and also with public opinion. Especially since Amorim arrives at the Ministry of Defense as a direct appointment by Lula, who truly cannot let go of his past.

Some say that Amorim will know how to get along with the military because, like them, he is a nationalist. This is a crude view of the world, from someone who sees any uniformed man as a watermelon: olive green on the outside and red on the inside. These are distinct nationalisms. Both Amorim and many military men would like Brazil to possess an atomic bomb. But opinions diverge sharply on other issues, such as the demarcation of indigenous reserves and the blind support for the Chavista regime – which, incidentally, has serious military implications. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry and the Armed Forces are the most secular institutions of the Republic, and their differences should be respected. Why doesn't Dilma appoint a general to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs now, for example? It's worth remembering that the first ambassador to the Defense Ministry, José Viegas, was a fiasco.

Dilma is still enjoying a honeymoon period with public opinion, but her misguided choices could lead to future problems. In Political Coordination, she had a star at her disposal, Congressman Cândido Vaccarezza, and she preferred Ideli Salvatti. In Defense, she had Aldo Rebelo – a nationalist respected by the military – and she chose Amorim. There's a lack of good advisors in the Planalto Palace.