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The dispute over who will succeed Dilma and Alckmin.

Regarding the power struggle within the PSDB party, involving members from São Paulo and Minas Gerais, I feel it's more of an offensive (or defensive attack) by those from São Paulo than an open conflict between two forces.

The race to succeed Dilma is already at a boiling point. The main factor is the "pendulum" of Eduardo Campos, but also the maneuvering of the parties in the federal government's allied base.

In São Paulo, speculation is also gradually increasing, but at a much lower level than the heated debate surrounding the federal election. This is possibly due to the hunger of the local press, which is the same press that is at the top of the rankings of the major national press.

This explains the absence of public speculation about the succession in other states, such as here in Minas Gerais.

Below, I reproduce Gaudêncio Torquato's projections regarding the succession of Dilma and Alckmin, published in the latest Porandubas Políticas. I will comment on them, but first, I will give my two cents regarding the succession of Antonio Anastasia, since the local press does little in this regard.

About MG:

The situation is far from comfortable for Aécio and his supporters. I've already commented on the fear among allied parties of losing appointed positions that sustain their existence. Finding a strong and reliable successor to Anastasia is proving difficult. The most favored name at the moment is that of the president of the Legislative Assembly. The name of Mayor Marcio Lacerda is also mentioned, with the drawback that he belongs to the PSB party, which could significantly diminish Aécio's influence in a future state government (should Lacerda win the election), since the possibility of Eduardo Campos running independently (or an alliance with Dilma) in 2014 would ultimately tie Lacerda down. Without a state government and with the possibility of losing the federal election, Aécio's fate is beginning to take on the contours of high political risk.

Regarding the notes below from Porandubas Políticas:

Gaudêncio highlights the power struggle within the PSDB, involving members from São Paulo and Minas Gerais. I feel it's more of an offensive (or defensive attack) by the São Paulo members than an open conflict between two forces. In other words, the Minas Gerais members of the PSDB seem passive. It's true that an open attack would further diminish the shine of Aécio Neves's image, but the maneuvers of Alckmin and Serra could ultimately cause similar damage. It has to do with opposing cultures and styles. But it also relates to economic power and the PSDB's paternity.

Gaudêncio also perceives a lack of substantive proposals among Aécio's supporters, including its most prominent leader. A problem for the entire opposition, I would add.

At the end of the notes I reproduce below, Gaudêncio details a scenario in which there is room for a third force in 2014. His analysis focuses on São Paulo. But I perceive that this possibility gains strength with each election, throughout the country. The party system is absolutely worn out, and what holds up appearances are the perverse schemes of alliances that run from the Presidential Palace to the municipalities, the income transfer programs, and the celebration (with a taste of revenge, on the one hand, and confirmation of power, on the other) that still surrounds every electoral period in Brazil. This celebration is one of the expressions of Brazilian political tradition, something group-based, of coronelistic origin, involving the entire "entourage" (colonel, henchmen, unsuspecting and unwary supporters, etc.). It is true that, considering the growing number of abstentions and null and blank votes in recent elections, this "youthful game" may be losing its appeal.

Let's hear some thoughts from Gaudêncio Torquato:

The campaign is on the streets.

In Brazil, the political landscape is always shifting. There are holes here and there, inlets and recesses for political actors to enter and exit. The turmoil is constant. Comings and goings, articulations and disarticulations occur according to circumstances. For this very reason, the 2014 campaign takes to the streets. President Dilma, in a televised address, announces a reduction in the cost of electricity for consumers and businesses, in a clear electoral move. The banner of cheaper electricity is popular. In the wake of the president's insinuation, the governor of Pernambuco, Eduardo Campos, of the PSB party, returns to the headlines and front pages of magazines. The leader of the PSB, Beto Albuquerque, announces: after Dilma's pronouncement, there is no longer any way to hide Campos' candidacy.

As for the toucans...

Meanwhile, the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) holds its party convention, a way to revitalize the morale of its base. José Serra reappears on the scene with his first speech after losing the São Paulo mayoral race to the PT (Workers' Party) candidate Fernando Haddad. And what are the supporters of Governor Geraldo Alckmin doing? They are launching Serra as a presidential candidate for 2014. Against Aécio. That is, São Paulo against Minas Gerais. No half-measures here. Coffee on one side, milk on the other. Aécio, in turn, speaks out and describes the paralysis of the federal government. His speech is merely a diagnosis. It lacks substantive proposals.

Where is the Brazil project?

In fact, that's the question that plagues the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party). Where is the project for Brazil? What could the country expect from the PSDB besides petty squabbles? The opposition is stuck in the realm of discourse. Talking for the sake of talking, denouncing for the sake of denouncing leads nowhere. Fernando Henrique supports Aécio. Alckmin would support Serra. Of course, even to be able to take him off his path, which is reelection as governor of São Paulo in 2014.

Division of power

In politics, anything is possible. Including handing over the mayoralty of the capital and the state government to the same party. But that's quite difficult. Voters tend to share power. They entrust the capital to be administered by one party and the state by another. Therefore, this consultant finds Lula's operation/intention to elect Health Minister Padilha as governor of the state complicated. A candidate from another party, not the PT, seems more viable. This party, incidentally, divides the electorate. One part engages with it, another distances itself. Rejection of the PT remains high in São Paulo. But the party undoubtedly has the conditions to get its candidate into the second round.

Material corrosion

Given this, the question arises: does this mean it's easier for the PSDB to win the São Paulo state government? In theory, yes. But there's a complicating factor. It's what political marketing calls "corrosion of material." Twenty years of PSDB power in the state of São Paulo. This timeframe is considered a limiting factor for noticing the first signs of identity erosion. Let me explain: Identity is the backbone of a political actor, whether a legal entity, a government, or a physical person, Governor Geraldo Alckmin, for example. Identity is the sum of discourse, actions, proposals, ideologies, attitudes, style of governing, alongside the aesthetic plan – the visual aspect of the government, personal gestures, etc. After a long time, this composition starts to take on shades of gray or faded yellow. The discourse becomes outdated. The voter wants to see a new color in the landscape.

Alckmin's way of governing.

Geraldo Alckmin is, as the middle class would say, a gentleman. Educated, refined, cordial, or, to use another image, the profile of the ideal father-in-law. Unlike Mario Covas, a impulsive, fearless figure who displayed authority in his speech and gestures. Covas was known for his courage in facing all obstacles. He confronted a group that was jeering at him at the entrance of the Caetano de Campos School. Alckmin, on the other hand, seems incapable of killing a fly. Style is the person, as the classics of literature used to say. I'm applying this observation to politics. The identity of the São Paulo government bears much of Alckmin's personal traits. Gentle, easygoing, without a firm trunk (a backbone) that could identify the administration. This is the crux of the matter, the obstacle, that will hinder Alckmin's re-election.

Alternatives

The PMDB party is expected to close ranks around Paulo Skaf, president of FIESP (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo). He is known for his activism and entrepreneurship. Skaf was unanimously re-elected to head the largest Federation of Industries in the country. He transformed the organization into a forum for daily debates, where ministers, former ministers, leading economists, and analysts from the Brazilian scene gather. He leads major causes, such as lowering energy costs, a FIESP campaign. Therefore, if he is the PMDB candidate and has ample television airtime, he could represent a middle ground between the continuity of the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) and the opposition of the PT (Workers' Party), which already occupies the municipal sphere. There is also the name of former mayor Kassab. He is a great strategist. However, he will have to overcome significant resistance to his candidacy and reshape his image. Furthermore, he could run for the Senate. That's another chance.

And Suplicy?

Well, in 2014, there will only be one Senate seat up for grabs. Will Eduardo Suplicy, the perennial PT senator, continue to be the preferred candidate? In this consultant's view, he's a profile that also crosses the corridor where materials corroded by time are found. Would Suplicy be willing to run for Congress? My impression is that the PT will divert him from the Upper House (Senate) and nominate him for the Lower House (Chamber of Deputies).