'The right believes it is in a holy war, on a crusade,' assesses professor.

Rafaella Dotta, Brasil de Fato | Belo Horizonte (MG) - They blocked highways, camped in front of military barracks, and, more recently, carried out acts of vandalism in Brasília. The Brazilian far-right movement remains in the streets based on facts that are closer to a dream, or a nightmare, than to reality.

“In the minds of the people who are in the streets, the world is ending and evil is dominating. They believe they are in a holy war, a crusade.” This is the assessment of Professor Dimas Antônio de Souza, from the Institute of Social Sciences at the Pontifical Catholic University (PUC) of Minas Gerais, who has dedicated himself to studying the ideological basis of Bolsonarism.

The movement, the professor states, creates its own mythology, complete with a villain, a conspiracy, and a savior. These would be, respectively and in summary: Lula, the São Paulo Forum, and Bolsonaro. Far from being a bad joke, the structure of this narrative has historical foundations.

Brasil de Fato: Should we really classify the far-right movement as "Bolsonarist"? Is it really that closely linked to Bolsonaro?

Dimas Antônio de Souza: It's far-right Bolsonaro supporters. What was worse was calling him "bozo." To call someone of such gravity and seriousness a clown, something that some sectors have been doing from the beginning.

I saw this discussion about whether it should be called Bolsonarism, since it doesn't have "Hitlerism," but I don't think it makes much sense in the Brazilian context. It's necessary to always emphasize the connection between Bolsonarism and extremism. Furthermore, if we dissociate them, we run the risk of them, one way or another, managing to separate what is inseparable: Bolsonarism from right-wing extremism.

What can be said today about the composition of this movement? Is it still the so-called "hard core" of Bolsonaro supporters, or has that expanded?

I don't have research to support this with numbers, but the movement tends to become increasingly smaller. Extremism, whether right or left, tends to be a minority group in democratic societies. The street movement, which is at the gates of the barracks, is not an extremely large movement, worrying in terms of numbers. It doesn't reach 100 people across Brazil, in rotation.

The Brazilian right – which is not the extreme right – voted for Bolsonaro, but not all voters will fall into extremism. Bolsonarism grew in the vacuum left by the PSDB. Aécio Neves did a disservice to Brazilian democracy and to his party. By betting on a very radical discourse, which was not typical of the PSDB, he opened the party's electoral base to the extreme right, and the extreme right rode that wave.

That's why it's so important to associate Bolsonaro with extremism, so that the more sensible people on the right leave that camp and return to the democratic field. The signal from the elected governor of São Paulo, Tarcísio, goes very much in that direction. He says: "I'm not a hardcore Bolsonaro supporter." In other words, I'm not going to fight with the Supreme Court, I'm not going to want to shut down the Legislative Assembly, that's what he meant.

What has kept Bolsonaro's supporters in the streets?

Some time ago, shortly before the Vaza Jato leaks came out – which revealed the Lava Jato conspiracy – I had written an article. to Brasil de Fato pointing out that the Bolsonaro movement has many similarities to Nazism. And this similarity lies in the context of the narrative itself. The Nazi narrative and the Bolsonaro narrative have in common conspiracy theories that infantilize and drive people crazy, placing them in a veritable parallel world.

People talk about conspiracy theories, but the correct term is conspiratorial mythology, which generally has an apocalyptic character. In the minds of the people in the streets, the world is ending and evil is taking over. Their idea is that Lula is a demon, that the entire left is linked to the forces of evil, of hell, to banditry, to drug trafficking, to kidnapping.

They simplified the game of politics into a struggle between good and evil, and, as they put it, evil is incarnate and ready to win and conquer the whole world. Because communists, LGBT people, black people, the poor, thieves, and also large corporations, including Banco Itaú, are this "communist" spectrum, the axis of evil.

The group that's in the streets believes they're in a holy war, on a crusade. At the gates of the barracks, praying, begging God, sending signals to extraterrestrials, because they're out of touch with reality. This group has lost touch with reality. They're crossing the desert, led by a kind of Moses, who is Bolsonaro, seen as a savior.

People comment: "But Bolsonaro, the savior? Such a ridiculous guy?". He's ridiculous to me, but for those who follow him, his place in this imaginary world is that of a prophet. Apocalyptic mythology goes like this: there's a struggle between evil and evil, evil is almost winning, and God sends the savior, who emerges from among the people. An ordinary man, just like everyone else. Bolsonaro embodies this mass man, the average man, and projects himself to part of the population as the savior.

This movement is messianic, it has the same characteristics as Nazism because its basis is conspiracy theory. The main narrative is the São Paulo Forum, as a communist conspiracy. And the great narrator of this mythology was Olavo de Carvalho, who managed to convince the middle class. The narrator of a mythology has to have credibility. Olavo assumed this role of "Olavo is right." He became that being who speaks with reason. And all this mythology gave rise to the prophet, the savior. 

 Does this situation change with Bolsonaro leaving the presidency?

This movement is like Nazism; it's a mass movement, and to survive, it has to be constantly mobilized. When Bolsonaro was in power, there was some control, but now, for this group to continue, it has to remain active.

They will continue to stir up this group with "72-hour" messages, renewing the hope that something will happen in 72 hours and producing fake news to keep the movement going and see if they can keep the leader in position. The prophet was defeated, and that will weigh heavily, because these movements cannot survive without a leader; otherwise, they fall apart.

Based on your research, what will be the mobilization strategy of the far-right movement?

Bolsonaro is silent, playing the victim. But there's a scheme in the hate cabinet. The pro-Bolsonaro press will hammer away at lies and, based on those lies, provoke mobilization. In general, the aim of lies is to instill fear. Cornered and afraid people do something to protect themselves. And what happened before matters little, because there's a narrative. It's as if they're living a dream, or a nightmare.

It's no use showing what Bolsonaro did in government, the corruption and vote-buying scheme, it's no use showing that the government's coffers are empty, because everything will be blamed on the communists, on the coup-plotting Globo network, and Bolsonaro will always be forgiven. The argument to protect the leader reaches all of Brazil very quickly.

They have a very professional communication and distribution network. To counter this, we need to start studying their mechanisms and install a network for the rapid dissemination of fake news.

We saw during the election that engaging in dialogue with Bolsonaro voters is very difficult. Left-wing activists report having tried many times, presenting numbers, evidence, and arguments, but nothing worked. In your opinion, how can the elected government engage in this dialogue?

Communicating with a hardcore Bolsonaro supporter is nearly impossible. They are completely consumed by mythology, immersed in the narrative. Rational argumentation and numbers are highly unlikely to work. What can create a rift is when you engage in dialogue through mechanisms the person doesn't expect, say, when their mind is "resting."

In other words, if you arrive wearing a red shirt, it already sends a signal. Our minds are full of defense mechanisms. If something appears that could harm the core of the idea, the defense kicks in and the narrative structure remains.

It's easier to communicate with them through art, through comics... for some it might work, but for the vast majority, it's likely they will remain true to their faith.

For those who are close to Bolsonaro but not part of the "core" group, a little more time and patience, the Lula government acting and bringing the country's reality to light, taking actions that benefit the people, and also strengthening some right-wing figures who are in this broad government front, things might work. With the strengthening of some right-wing and center figures, this group tends to lose strength.

But in truth, what led to this situation was the Brazilian mainstream media. It constantly treats political issues in a depoliticized way. It treats political negotiation as if it were theft. A political negotiation involving the Bolsa Família amendment, in the voice of reporters, becomes the "Waste Spending Amendment." It's a whole media game to disqualify, depoliticize, and generate hatred towards politics, and all of this favors extremist narratives.

In this new context, it is very necessary for Brazilian journalism to reflect on its professional commitment. Ultimately, if extremism is growing, it is because there is fertile ground for it to thrive, both in the press and in conservative Catholic and evangelical churches.

Our work must be slow and continuous.

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