Blackmail as a political weapon.

Some harmful Brazilian political practices are so routine, so commonplace, that they end up being considered normal by many people who are not directly involved in them. It's fine that the protagonists of these practices think that's how it should be. They're profiting from it. But nothing justifies political scientists and journalists, for example, saying and writing that this is just how politics is.

These practices, which are hardly republican at all, are largely carried out openly thanks to the complicity of those who consider them normal. And they are usually criticized piecemeal, when the problem and the solution lie on a larger scale. Addressing the problem requires profound changes in the way politics is done in Brazil, but there is no indication that this will happen in the coming years.

Initially, President Dilma Rousseff seemed determined to confront the cronyism, patrimonialism, and corruption of politicians. In the first few months, she gave some indications that she would resist suspicious moves by parliamentarians who, in truth, are present in all 15 parties that support the government in the National Congress.

But then came the episode involving then-Minister Antonio Palocci, and this situation began to change. The lack of necessary dialogue and understanding with political forces, a real fact, was deliberately confused with the failure to address spurious requests and demands, as if they were the same thing. Under pressure, the president began to back down.

In recent days, the president had been making it clear that she would not yield to pressure from politicians to postpone the release of outstanding payments from the 2009 budget, amounting to R$ 4,6 billion. A victim of explicit blackmail, even from leaders within her own support bloc, the president showed herself determined to defend fiscal austerity and inflation control, even speaking of national interests that would oppose the clientelistic interests of parliamentarians.

But the blackmail intensified, with threats to not vote on what interests the government and to vote on what doesn't. Without the slightest concern for the financial consequences of what the political blackmailers would vote on. The leader of the PMDB, Henrique Alves, spoke of "unease" within the base. The leader of the PT, Cândido Vaccarezza, said he wouldn't be able to control the base. The vice-president of the Chamber, Eduardo da Fonte, of the PP, announced the implosion of the base.

Always the base. What is this base? A cluster of parliamentarians without political or ideological identity, scattered across parties that have representation and parties that represent nothing. The base is more concerned with electing mayors and councilors in 2012 and securing the political future of its members in 2014.

Dilma eventually backed down and extended the execution of parliamentary amendments for three months, thus giving mayors and governors more time to begin the projects they would benefit from. There was no other option, as the dissatisfied deputies could cause significant damage to public funds.

In the Brazilian presidential system, the president has considerable power, but not absolute power, which is a very good thing. However, for relations between the Executive and Legislative branches to be proper and dignified, and for the country not to be in the hands of parliamentarians more interested in their personal and private affairs than in the interests of the nation, many things need to change on a large scale: state reform, political reform, electoral reform.

The problem is that since all of this depends on Congress, nothing will happen. And political blackmail will continue to be a powerful weapon in the hands of the famous base.