2022 and the elections: the focus will be on Lula and Bolsonaro, who, according to researchers, could attack democracy if defeated.

By Rafael Oliveira, Public Agency - Brazilians began 2022 with a series of doubts about the country's political, economic, and health future, but also with a definite date on the calendar: the October elections. This event—which every four years triggers a series of major changes in Brazil's direction and the lives of its population—has taken on unprecedented dimensions: it will be the first national election since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, which will inevitably be a factor in the public's assessment of Jair Bolsonaro's four years in government.

Aside from the pandemic, 2022 will solidify what 2018 "was and wasn't": the contest between Lula and Bolsonaro. Despite being a central factor in the past elections, Lulaism, anti-Lulaism, Bolsonarism, and anti-Bolsonarism arrived at the polls in an adapted version, so to speak. With Lula's imprisonment triggered by the Lava Jato operation led by former minister Sergio Moro, in 2018 voters were divided between the PT and Bolsonaro, but only one of the two leaders was a real option at the ballot box.

With the possibility of 2022 achieving what 2018 never was, new uncertainties arise: what will be the role of anti-PT sentiment this year? How will Bolsonaro behave in his first election as both candidate and president? Will he accept defeat if the opinion polls correctly predict the result? Will he confront the Electoral Court? Is a third candidate still viable in the race? 

To answer these and other questions related to this year's election, Agência Pública spoke with two experts on the subject: Pablo Ortellado, researcher at the Monitor of Public Debate in the Digital Environment and professor of public policy management at the University of São Paulo (USP), who maintains a column in O Globo, and Carolina Botelho, researcher at the Laboratory of Cognitive and Social Neuroscience at Mackenzie Presbyterian University, associate researcher at Doxa (Laboratory of Electoral Studies, Political Communication and Public Opinion — Iesp/Uerj) and columnist for Jota.

Both agree: the most likely scenario is that the election will center between Lula and Bolsonaro, and the electorate's main concerns will be the effects and possible solutions to the economic and social crisis, largely related to the pandemic. Both researchers fear that the current president will not accept a possible defeat, and this could lead to a violent event and attempts to disrupt democracy.

Will the 2022 election be between Lula and Bolsonaro? Is there still room for a third option?

Ortellado: Initially, if things remain as they are, it seems to be a contest concentrated on the Lula-Bolsonaro opposition. But this trend could collapse at any moment. A scandal affecting either of them, a very serious event, could take one of these players out of the race, and then this would reorganize the entire dynamic of the competition. 

Furthermore, there's another fact: Bolsonaro is gradually losing support. This process might be reversed with the boosted "Auxílio Brasil" (Brazil Aid) program, but if it continues at the same pace, someone else might take Bolsonaro's place as the leading figure on the right. I think the most likely scenario, in which the election isn't concentrated between the two of them, is Bolsonaro's continued decline and someone else taking his place. It's unclear whether it would be Moro or Doria, but some more right-leaning candidate would assume that position. 

Even so, it is less likely than having an election focused on the Lula-Bolsonaro polarization, which is by far the most probable scenario.

Botelho: First, we have to try to understand how this idea of ​​a third way was constructed. It was much more a demand from certain sectors than a result of the facts, than what the available data has shown us. The election has consolidated with two figures who are practically isolated. Then we see a lot of candidates who have some intention of running, but we also don't know if all of them will actually run. When you look at the polls, you don't see a potential vote-getter capable of taking first or second place. 

It's clear that we're a few months away from the election. But we also have some different things happening. When we analyze political polls, we have to understand that a lot can change before the election. That's almost a cliché. But we're also experiencing an atypical type of electoral contest because we have a candidate seeking re-election who is completely out of the ordinary and forces people to take a position early on. And, on the other hand, we have a pandemic. These are factors that didn't exist before and now exist in the scenario. And then people start wanting to decide.

It's already January, it's an election year, things are already somewhat up in the air. People will be deciding on parties soon. The parties are already working on their campaigns. It's difficult to change the situation for a number of reasons, including the very poor economic and social outlook. I don't foresee any drastic changes in the scenario. I tend to see these actors maintaining their positions with little room for a third alternative.

What will the electoral debate in 2022 focus on? What factors will decide the election?

Ortellado: If we look at the 2018 election, it was very, very, very atypical, in the sense that sociocultural issues—feminism, conservatism, defense of the family, gun ownership—played a very central role in the campaign. This had never happened before, at least not in recent times.

We don't know if this phenomenon was a parenthesis, an exception, or if it represents a structural change from which these issues gain new centrality. Opinion polls that have asked what the most important issues are have highlighted the economy. So, if we follow these opinion polls, these elections would return to normal, placing 2018 in parentheses, as an exception, as an outlier.

Now, it's possible that once the electoral process properly begins, around May, with the candidates defined and the pre-campaign already heated up, things might change and we might see, I wouldn't say a repeat of 2018, but that effect of amplifying the centrality of these socio-cultural themes. I think it's difficult to say now what will happen, since 2018 was so atypical.

Botelho: Historically, elections deal with the economy and the living conditions of the population. This election has extraordinary issues. Although the economy remains a factor in this discussion, as does the social issue, you get into more specific details, such as the issue of health, linked to the Covid pandemic. As it is a variable that did not exist before, it becomes very important because voters are paying attention to who worked and who did not work to promote vaccination and reduce the spread of the virus. 

And there's another issue. Education is always a variable that influences voters' choices, but we have to understand that a large segment of the population, a segment that candidates pragmatically compete for votes against—a poorer population—had their right to education completely curtailed because they didn't have, for example, remote learning. We're talking about a group whose children were out of school for almost two years. 

These people saw their jobs being lost, their income reduced, their relatives suffering more from the consequences of Covid. And their children were out of the classroom. So this creates a catastrophic effect for that guy who might want to be re-elected. And it also creates extra help for that opponent or that candidate who comes with an alternative.

One of the topics dominating political news is the potential Lula-Alckmin ticket. Do you believe this will materialize? What would be the impact of this hypothetical ticket, both on the electoral race and on a possible Lula government?

Ortellado: I think the formation of this ticket has two effects: an electoral one and a programmatic one. The electoral effect is that it broadens the appeal to centrist voters. Lula faces resistance [in this segment of the electorate], and I think having a vice-presidential candidate with Alckmin's profile increases his appeal and reduces resistance. Perhaps it's even more important in a second round than in a first. [The programmatic effect is] that the alliance with Alckmin can pull Lula's government program more towards the center. We saw this in the recent debate about revising the labor reform, which indicates something of that.

[Regarding whether it will materialize,] I don't know any of the behind-the-scenes details. Looking only from the point of view of electoral convenience, it seems like a combination that makes a lot of sense. I think it brings many benefits to Lula's campaign, which is why it's being considered. And it points, it signals an attempt to overcome polarization. I say it signals and it's not an actual attempt because the polarization is no longer centered on the PT-PSDB dynamic. It's in the Bolsonaro dynamic, of a new conservatism, against the PT and the left.

However, since there was a very strong antagonism with the PSDB before this polarization, the alliance between the former PSDB leader and Lula is a gesture in that direction. It carries that symbolism, and I think in that sense it's positive, leaving aside other considerations about programmatically shifting towards the center.

Botelho: We don't know if it will materialize, but it seems—and here I can say that I've read more about it in the press than in political analysis itself—that this partnership will happen. It depends on the actions and interests of various political actors.

But I see it in a very positive light. Beyond the electoral gain, Lula and Alckmin, historically opponents, are important political leaders in sectors of the Brazilian economic and political elite. And the idea of ​​uniting these two groups to win an electoral contest against Bolsonaro is of enormous importance to our democratic system.

The signal they are sending is that there is something far more important than partisan disputes and public agendas, than government agendas that may have been opposed over these past 30 years. There is something there that is the political system, the democratic system, which we must preserve. And this union points to that.

I think it's extremely important, I think society benefits from this partnership. And, if the winning ticket is Lula and Alckmin, this opens up a possibility for negotiation between parties that is fundamental to what we call coalition presidentialism in Brazil. They will have a wide range of parties and support in Congress—which will be Lula's biggest challenge—capable of helping to approve the agendas that are urgent demands today.

From a historical perspective, the public agendas of the PSDB, Alckmin, and Lula are very similar. There are some differences regarding the economy, but overall they are very alike. 

What impact will misinformation have on the 2022 election? What issues will it focus on? And what can be done to mitigate its effect?

Ortellado: Disinformation is going to be rampant. It's a very useful electoral weapon, and in this 2022 election I'll be very, very surprised if it's not as dirty as the one in 2018, if it's not worse. 

What we could have done, what we could have done, was regulate private messaging. The problem of misinformation is very concentrated in private messaging: WhatsApp and, secondarily, Telegram. This was being discussed in the so-called Fake News Bill, but it was postponed, and I don't think there's any possibility of it being regulated before the elections. The debate was stalled in the Chamber of Deputies; a regulation had been approved in the Senate, which I think was moving in the right direction. In the Chamber of Deputies, things stalled for a number of political reasons. There's no more time before these elections, so I think we're going to live with this problem, and it's going to be serious. 

Platforms [like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube] are aware of their power; they have mechanisms to curb [disinformation], and the Electoral Court has mechanisms to pressure the platforms. But private messaging is completely unregulated. In the case of WhatsApp, we can't find out where the viral messages came from, and we can't hold people accountable. In the case of Telegram, it doesn't respond to the Brazilian courts, it never has. The harshest possibility would be to shut down Telegram. But that would be a very extreme measure; I don't believe it will happen. We have no instrument whatsoever to regulate private messaging, and for that reason, the game will be ugly there.

Botelho: What could be done is for institutions to work together to curb the spread of false information. Informing the public immediately—and that's a real challenge, because it's a matter of geometric progression. So you have to have a team constantly analyzing, reviewing posts, seeing information in newspapers, and at the same time punishing those who spread it.

You can spread false information once in a while as a citizen, obviously. People are prone to making mistakes. But we know there's a machine that systematically does this. Their job is to generate disinformation. This should have been stopped. Already. Prevented from spreading. Somehow, public institutions should have already been able to identify—and in a way are doing—and punish.

I think there will be a lot of misinformation. And this has a greater impact with the current government because they have structured themselves, from the campaign until now, on a foundation of lies. 

On the other hand, 2022 will not be 2018. And I say this from an educational point of view. People already know that fake news exists, they already know how it operates, and they are more aware. At least most of the people and groups that suffered an avalanche in 2018 and didn't know where it came from now do. Of course, technology is constantly changing, so we don't have control over all the information, over all the innovations, including in the realm of lies. But in a way, we are more prepared than in 2018. Both civil society and the public authorities.

Throughout his entire term, Bolsonaro has questioned the elections, giving indications that he will not respect the 2022 election results if he is defeated. Do you believe this is a real possibility? Could we see scenes in Brazil like those that occurred at the Capitol in the US last year? Or even a more serious rupture?

Ortellado: I'm expecting this scenario. If Bolsonaro loses, he will contest the election results. He's already contesting them beforehand, with his discourse about the vulnerability of the ballot boxes. He's been rehearsing how to mobilize the police forces and the truck drivers. Last year's September 7th protests were a test. I think everything is prepared for this.

Unless his defeat is very blatant, for example, losing in the first round, which would demonstrate that the difference between him and Lula would be so great that it would be very implausible to contest the election results, aside from that more extreme case, any closer result, in which the dispute goes to a second round and remains more or less even, if he loses, I think he will surely contest it. It's very obvious that he has these plans. He's not hiding it from anyone.

Botelho: I think it's irresponsible not to see that possibility. He spent 30 years in Congress as a legislator, saying that the ideal would be a coup d'état. His entire direction, from the campaign until now as president, is aimed at weakening Brazilian public institutions. It's about moving in that direction of institutional rupture. There hasn't been any mention, appeasement, or any kind of movement showing that his intention isn't that.

From an analytical point of view, not having that possibility up your sleeve is irresponsible. I've been dealing with that possibility since the day he was elected, because nothing has changed in his discourse and, especially, in his actions. Bolsonaro's ideal is institutional rupture. Everything has been done in that direction, everything. To destroy what was achieved in the 1988 Constitution and to destroy the democratic institutions built in 1988. 

I also can't ignore that his most radical supporters want this. But, on the other hand, we're seeing that it's a much smaller segment of society that supports the president's radicalism; it's not a majority. Now, it's a very violent, aggressive minority, willing to do either what happened at the Capitol or something even worse. We've been seeing this.

In 2018, Bolsonaro's electoral success helped elect dozens of conservative or far-right congressmen. Could a similar effect occur in 2022, either in favor of Bolsonaro or Lula? What kind of Congress will Brazil elect in 2022?

Ortellado: Again, the question arises: how exceptional was 2018, and whether it inaugurates a new era or was just a parenthesis? I can't say. In the 2020 elections, conservatism – and I'm not talking about Bolsonaro's alliances, the candidates he supported – didn't perform very well. But municipal elections have other characteristics; they are traditionally more local, with issues of urban maintenance, more day-to-day city life. So it's impossible to know if what we saw in 2020 will be repeated in 2022.

I think that's the big question. Will conservatism, the so-called socio-cultural agendas, the culture wars, feminism, gun ownership, drug legalization, same-sex marriage—will these issues set the tone for the elections as they did in the 2018 elections? And if they do set the tone, will they bring together a conservative bloc as they did in 2018? I think it's a very open question and it has to do with how exceptional 2018 was. 

On the other hand, I don't think these issues will disappear. Because this phenomenon started earlier. Back in 2010 and 2014, we saw the growth of a conservative and evangelical bloc. I think this phenomenon is well established; it's already had at least three electoral cycles. What I think is at stake is whether the peak of this conservative activism—beyond the evangelical blocs we saw in 2018, with conservative YouTubers, not necessarily evangelical, getting elected and having very significant vote counts—will repeat itself in 2022 or not. I think it's very difficult to predict because we simply don't have parameters. 2018 was an outlier, and we don't know if it's something that broke the rule or if it's inaugurating a new rule.

Botelho: That's the crux of the matter. First, regarding the question from Bolsonaro supporters. I don't think it's likely that we'll have the same profile of Congress that we elected in 2018 because that was an election in which the discussion was against the political system. These guys came to fulfill the quota of political outsiders. Those who reject the political system and want to change everything that's there.

But, throughout their term, they didn't deliver. It's very unlikely that this scenario will repeat itself, because voters want competence, they want to improve their lives. When they vote for a representative, a senator, their expectation is that that person will bring improvements. And these people didn't bring improvements. 

Some jumped ship because they realized it would be bad for their professional future, let's say, in the more pragmatic sense. So they argued with the president, they saw that things weren't going to work that way. And those who stayed with him are being very poorly evaluated. If some of them are re-elected, it won't be the same wave we saw in 2018. 

[Regarding the other part of the question], beyond a wave of support for Lula, I see a wave of reclaiming values ​​that were lost in the 2018 election, which voters have noticed. I think voters will be much more inclined to vote for the legislator who will help to rebuild those lost public policies. The one who will get their children into school or who will, perhaps, create mechanisms for remote learning, so that children can have classes in some way. The one who will fight for vaccination, and especially fight for jobs, for income, for the minimum conditions for survival that this population is losing. 

Beyond whether someone will be a Lula supporter or not, I think voters are paying attention to this. The machine we saw activated with Bolsonaro's rise isn't going to return in the same way, with the signs reversed. I don't think it's Lula's political movement itself. We saw that Lula's political movement can even be destroyed with another election if it doesn't deliver. The legacy of Dilma's government showed that people wanted change, so it's not forever. I think what's being discussed now is the reconstruction of basic policies.

What will be the main challenges for whoever takes over the Presidency in 2023? What will be the priorities?

Ortellado: I think we have a very serious economic problem that Brazil has been experiencing for at least eight years, and will complete nine years by 2023. We have very poor economic performance, with very high unemployment. And, with the change from Bolsa Família to Auxílio Brasil, we don't have a regular social policy; Auxílio Brasil has a one-year budget. It's a precarious program. 

We need to reorganize the economy and have a well-organized, well-structured, well-thought-out social safety net. I can't see anything more urgent than the problem of unemployment or the resurgence of hunger. I can't see anything more of a priority than that in the short term.

In the long term, we have the environmental problem. It was already a chronic Brazilian problem, but it had been addressed. We experienced a very significant decline in our environmental protection and care policies during the Bolsonaro administration, which needs to be quickly recovered. I imagine that these two issues, one short-term and the other more, let's say, medium-term, are the two most urgent problems I see.

Botelho: The top priority is defending the 1988 Constitution. Defending the political system and removing from the map, or at least from institutional influence, people who want to end democracy. One has to start there. Then begins the reconstruction of a State that provides citizens with what they need, which is food, employment, health—now with the added variable of COVID, with the demands that this pandemic has brought—and education.

It's a reconstruction that we did in 1988, with all its mistakes and successes. I'm not saying we did it in the best way, no, nor that we had wonderful governments. But we had much better governments, committed to a public agenda for the population. What we are seeing now is a government that benefits privately and only benefits and privileges those sectors that are more radicalized and are with it. It completely ignores the rest.

We need to rebuild people's lives. And we need public policy for that, we need a government, people committed to this interest. Beyond electoral interests, it's about first rebuilding the democratic system, severely punishing anyone who wants to attack it, as has not been done.

Ever since Bolsonaro was elected to the City Council, our political system should have been wary of this type of politician who destroys the democratic system. We allowed him to operate on the fringes. That was the big mistake, because he is detrimental to society. He hinders everyone.

After rebuilding this institutional democratic foundation, the next step is to create public policy mechanisms aimed at the most vulnerable populations, those who are unemployed, without income, without food, without education, and without healthcare.

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