Zeballos, Assange's Argentine "great-grandfather"

By Dario Palhares

Nothing against the Australian Julian Assange, who has amassed enemies worldwide in diplomacy, politics, and the business world, but his famous website WikiLeaks (http://213.251.145.96/) could well be called WikiGossips. Yes, that's right: instant gossip. After all, how else to classify the content of telegrams exchanged between employees of the American State Department – ​​and leaked by WikiLeaks – in which the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, is considered "irresponsible and reckless," his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and the current president of the land of Dostoyevsky, Dmitri Medvedev, are compared to Batman and Robin, and former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso is accused of calling the governor of São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin, a hick – a condition, incidentally, of which this son of Pindamonhangaba (SP), in the Paraíba Valley, is proud? Assange's work has well-known and undeniable merits, but so far, as far as is known, it has not caused the mobilization of armies, the overthrow of any government, or the condemnation of a single transnational corporation. In this respect, the journalist from Oceania is still oceans away from his "great-great-grandfather," the Argentinian Estanislao Severo Zeballos, who almost led Brazil and Argentina to war in 1908 by leaking a telegram.

Born in Rosario on July 7, 1854, Zeballos was a political, cultural, and intellectual figure in Argentina from the 1880s until his death in 1923. Author of numerous books – including “La Conquista de Quince Mil Leguas”, “Viaje al País de los Araucanos”, “Relmu: Reina de los Pilares”, and “Payne y la Dinastia de los Zorros” – he worked as a journalist, anthropologist, jurist, historian, geographer, diplomat, and politician. Among his many works, the magnificent “Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras” stands out. Published from 1898 to 1923, the publication brought together texts by the leading thinkers, politicians, and scientists of the Southern Cone, including several Brazilians.

A radical and ardent nationalist, the Rosario native defended the massacre of indigenous peoples carried out in the Conquest of the Desert, a military campaign of 1879 that enabled the Buenos Aires government to dominate the Pampas and eastern Patagonia. In foreign policy, he always had reservations, often both, regarding Chile and, especially, Brazil. His greatest adversary in diplomacy, in fact, was precisely one of Brazil's most illustrious figures: José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, the celebrated Baron of Rio Branco.

The first clash between the two occurred back in 1875, after Carlos Tejedor, the Argentine government's plenipotentiary envoy to Rio de Janeiro, returned home without bidding farewell to Emperor Pedro II. The incident, which caused indignation among the monarch's subjects, was downplayed by Rio Branco in the Rio de Janeiro newspaper "A Nação": "In the event that has aroused so much commentary, there was, in our view, no international offense to Brazil. There was only a gaucherie (a term used in Brazil to describe a gaucho-like or awkward situation)."

Zeballos, then editor of “Nacional,” Tejedor’s newspaper in Buenos Aires, freely interpreted the Gallicism – meaning gaffe, lack of tact – as “gaucharia,” “gauchada,” and unleashed a tirade, displaying a racial prejudice that would tarnish relations between the two countries from then on: “One of the most important newspapers in Brazil called Mr. Tejedor’s retreat ‘gaucherie.’ This way of expressing oneself is nothing more than a bunch of bad monkey business. It’s better to be a gaucho than a monkey!” Juca, as Rio Branco was known, did not fail to reply, albeit in a mild tone: “If the writer who wrote these lines had learned French, he would know the meaning of the word ‘gaucherie’ and would not naively believe that it has any relation to what we would say in Portuguese, ‘gauchada.’”

After this "rehearsal," the two would duel again between 1893 and 1895. This time, the confrontation involved the Missões region, also called Palmas, an area of ​​approximately 30 square kilometers in western Santa Catarina that, due to inaccuracies in the demarcations made by the Portuguese and Spanish, ended up being claimed by Argentina. Zeballos had already celebrated the division of the disputed territory, negotiated with the first chancellor of the neighboring Republic, Quintino Bocaiúva (1889-1891), and formalized on January 23, 1890, by the Treaty of Montevideo. His joy, however, did not last long: with the veto of the agreement by the Brazilian deputies on August 10, 1891, the dispute was referred to the mediation of the American president Stephen Grover Cleveland, who in 1893 began his second term in the White House.

To fulfill the mission, Rio Branco remained in Washington for eight months, away from his family. His team, which already had ample ammunition, patiently and tirelessly searched for old maps and documents in Spain and Portugal. Juca thus assembled a solid argument and obtained Cleveland's endorsement in February 1895. He prevailed in the endeavor, but gained an enemy for life. In the assessment of historian Miguel Angel Scenna, author of “Argentina-Brasil: Cuatro Siglos de Rivalidad” (E. La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1975), Zeballos was “driven by a primary, aggressive, naive nationalism, and by his unbeatable aversion to the Baron of Río Branco”.

The Dreadnoughts

The Argentinians elegantly lost the dispute over the territory of Misiones, a result sealed by the arbitration ruling of November 11, 1895. A few years later, however, relations between the governments of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro were severely strained by the Brazilian Navy's rearmament program. After being surpassed in military leadership in the Southern Cone by Argentina and Chile – which had launched an arms race at the end of the 19th century – the young republic decided to recover its offensive and defensive capabilities. In this endeavor, it paid special attention to the Navy, which was obsolete and in shambles as a consequence of the Armada Revolt (1893-1894).

The Naval Program, drawn up by Admiral Júlio Cesar de Noronha, was sanctioned on December 14, 1904, by President Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves (1902-1906), in the form of Decree 1.296. Twenty-eight vessels would be ordered from foreign shipyards, forming an armada whose backbone would consist of three battleships with a displacement of up to 14.500 tons, equipped with 12 254 mm guns and 16 76 mm guns, and three armored cruisers of up to 9.500 tons, with eight 254 mm guns and 14 76 mm guns. In addition to these, six torpedo boat destroyers, six torpedo boats, three submarines, and one coal carrier were planned.

Everything was going according to plan until, between May 27 and 29, 1905, the Russian Baltic fleet succumbed to the large Japanese battleships in the naval battle of Tsushima. The confrontation resonated among military personnel and strategists worldwide. In Brazil, it provoked a radical revision of the Naval Plan announced in 1904. On November 23, 1906, eight days after succeeding Noronha in the Ministry of the Navy, Admiral Alexandrino Faria de Alencar celebrated the approval of Decree 1.576, which annulled Decree No. 1.296 and presented a new list of orders, with substantially greater firepower. If the fleet projected in 1904 would have a total of 162 cannons ranging from 47 mm to 254 mm, the 1906 fleet, with 26 ships, was expected to have 266 cannons ranging from 47 mm to 305 mm.

The battleships planned two years earlier were discarded in favor of three battleships designed in the image and likeness of the British Navy's HMS Dreadnought, the most powerful warship built up to that time. These were: the Minas Gerais and the São Paulo, both with a displacement of 21.200 tons, 12 305 mm guns, 22 120 mm guns, and 8 47 mm guns; and the colossal Rio de Janeiro, which would displace 30.200 tons and be equipped with 14 305 mm guns, 20 152 mm guns, and 10 76 mm guns. Each of these behemoths, in fact, would be even more intimidating than its own British counterpart, which, with a displacement of 21.845 tons, had 10 305 mm guns and 27 76 mm guns.

The cat had climbed onto the roof, according to José Figueroa Alcorta, who had assumed power in Argentina in March 1906, following the death of Manuel Quintana. For the new president, unwilling to relinquish military hegemony in the region, Brazil's true purpose in rearming, far from guaranteeing the security of its vast coastline, was to attack its old rival to the south. After all, reasoned the authorities in Buenos Aires, why on earth would the Brazilians need three colossal Dreadnought-class ships when the hegemonic British Empire, with interests to defend in practically every sea and ocean, possessed only one at the time?

To the delight of the major arms manufacturers, all from the northern hemisphere, a new military race was dawning on the horizon in South America. From 1906 to 1907, while the British shipyard WC Armstrong Whitworth & Company received orders from the Brazilians, the Argentine government, among other measures, extended compulsory military service by one year and announced the creation, within the Army, of seven battalions, an infantry company, a mounted artillery regiment, and a machine gun battery. Furthermore, it requested funds from Congress to reinforce the Navy.

Even before receiving the green light from parliamentarians, Alcorta reinforced his own arsenal: in November 1906, he placed Estanislao Severo Zeballos in charge of the chancellery. The appointment of the minister – who had already dictated the course of Platine diplomacy twice, between September 1889 and October 1892 – caused concern and fear, and not only to Rio Branco, who had headed the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1902. “A subject who for twenty-five years has been preaching war with the whole world, while there is no satisfaction in peace, and for the country's armament is a special question, because the country has the power to fight with someone, Chile, Brazil, or the devil – a subject with such conditions of mentality, can There will be the most ungrateful surprises”, said the opposition newspaper “El Diario”, from Buenos Aires, a few hours after Zeballos took office.

The editorial proved prophetic. In mid-1908, the chancellor was preparing a major surprise, momentarily leaving the Chileans and the prince of darkness in peace. Adhering to the thesis that the best defense is a good offense, Zeballos proposed a military action plan to the presidential cabinet on June 10, 1908. The idea was to turn a previously presented suggestion to Brazil into an ultimatum: Brazil would have to settle for only one of the ordered Dreadnoughts, sell a second to Argentina, and cancel the order for the third. If the response was delayed or negative, Zeballos foresaw, in extremis, the mobilization of 50 reservists and the dispatch of a squadron to take Rio de Janeiro, then the Brazilian capital. In this way, the government of Affonso Penna would have no option but to abandon its supposed expansionist and imperialist projects.

“In the case of formal resistance from Brazil, we would know that we were not willing to allow the incorporation of the great armored forces into its shield [...] we would give Brazil eight days of time to resolve its situation; and at the same time we would make efforts in Europe to explain to the great powers our action for peace and to ensure it for many years, even though we would have to pass a month of negotiations in this diplomatic negotiation in the occupation of Rio de Janeiro, which according to the Ministers of War and Marina, was a point studied and easy, due to the defenseless situation of Brazil”, wrote Zeballos to Roque Sáenz Peña, Argentine minister in Italy, on June 27 of that year.

The problem for the Argentine chancellor was that, as seen above, he also had powerful rivals in his own country. Starting with the groups of former presidents Bartolomé Mitre (1862-1868), who died in 1906, and Julio Roca (1880-1886 and 1898-1904), both advocates of an entente with Brazil and Chile. In a way, therefore, the leak of the ultra-secret proposal to attack Rio de Janeiro by the Mitre family's newspaper "La Nación" in its June 11, 1908 edition—that is, the day after its presentation at the presidential cabinet meeting—cannot be considered a complete surprise.

The scoop – which allegedly involved the “collaboration” of the Minister of the Navy, Onofre Betbeder, who had held the same post in Roca's second government – ​​made Zeballos's continued tenure untenable. On the 16th, he submitted his resignation letter to Alcorta, refusing the offer to assume the Ministry of Justice and Public Instruction. On June 22nd, he handed over command of the ministry to Victorino de La Plaza, who would govern the country from 1914 to 1916.

Telegram No. 9

Even after leaving the government, Zeballos continued to attack Brazil, targeting its foreign minister. And he caused damage. Since his resignation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had insinuated that he possessed documents proving the imperialist intentions of his large neighbor. In September, he returned to the attack in an article published in his “Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras,” reaffirming that he had proof that Itamaraty (Brazil's foreign ministry) intended to create intrigue between Argentina and Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay, taking advantage of this to extend its influence over these nations.

Rio Branco refuted the accusation on September 19th, through an official statement in which he accused his adversary of acting in bad faith. Zeballos then issued a challenge, published in the October 20th edition of “La Prensa”: “Review Baron Rio Branco’s secret archive of the Pacific and read the original document that exists there with the following information: June 17, 1908, at 6:57 AM. Number 9, Wednesday 17th.

The text in question was a coded telegram sent by the Brazilian diplomatic mission in Buenos Aires to the representation in Santiago, which was allegedly intercepted by the then-resigning Argentine Foreign Minister. In the version leaked by Zeballos, initially published by the newspapers "La Argentina" and "Diario del Comercio" on October 30, Rio Branco instructed Brazilian diplomats in Chile to "spread the imperialist pretensions of the Argentine Government in the political centers and its alleged advances of domination over Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay, and our Rio Grande." The final excerpt was devastating: “Demonstrar bien el hecho debido al cácter voluble de los Argentinos, ellos no tienen, en tiempo alguno, estabilidad internal y externa, y que la ambición de figurar las demoraliza, sacrificing el merit, como sucede en la actualidad, con discredito de sus estadistas, sin reparación los perjuices que irrogato the lack of seriousness that characterizes them so much. It is indispensable to seize the opportunity of this moment.”

To try to end the controversy and minimize its effects on the already strained relations between the two countries, Rio Branco acted quickly. Even before Zeballos's "bombshell" reached the presses, he asked the new Brazilian minister in Buenos Aires, Domício da Gama, to obtain a copy of the text and arrange with the Argentine authorities for authenticated reproductions of Telegram No. 9. The Brazilian ammunition was reinforced with copies of the message received by the diplomatic representation in Santiago, duly recognized by the Chilean telegraph service. All these documents were released by the chancellor, who also made public the cryptographic key used in the dispatch. Deciphered, the message concerned a treaty of alliance between the three main nations of the Southern Cone, the ABC Pact, which had begun to be discussed during Bartolomé Mitre's administration and gained momentum during Roca's second term.

“Regarding the draft political treaty, regardless of the modifications and additions we might have to propose, I must state from the outset, and it is appropriate to say this to this government, that we do not find public opinion in Buenos Aires sufficiently prepared for an agreement with Brazil, and we consider it inconvenient and impossible while Mr. Zeballos remains minister. Newspapers inspired by him have been conducting a campaign of false news, with the aim of stirring up, as they have done, old hatreds against Brazil. We cannot be considered allies of a government that includes a minister who, we have reason to know, is our enemy. His purpose, as he told close associates, was not to promote the triple alliance between Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, but rather to separate Chile from Brazil.” Rio Branco's tone in the final lines bore no resemblance to the arrogance and treachery present in the version circulated by Zeballos: “I have always seen advantages in a certain political intelligence between Brazil, Chile, and Argentina [...] but the idea is not mature in the Argentine Republic. There has even been a regression there, with all our best friends now excluded from the Government and facing hostility.”

The Baron accused the former Argentine minister of handing over the coded telegram to a "known charlatan" to be "deciphered," and of using the falsified version to deceive President Alcorta. All this with the aim of facilitating the approval, by the Argentine Congress, of the Executive's arms purchase project. The accusation and the documents presented by Brazil to the Argentine government and public opinion were well received in opposition newspapers in Buenos Aires, such as "La Nación," but were contested by pro-government newspapers, such as "La Prensa." The fear was that the verbal exchange would turn into a real shootout.

“There were certainly no missing premonitory incidents of an armed conflict like the famous Telegram nº 9, presented then by Zeballos as a test of the anti-Argentine policy of Rio Branco and which was classified as a vulgar 'faux', by our canciller”, wrote, in “Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales Argentinas” (Editorial Pleamar, 1978), the historian and chancellor (1962) Roberto Etchepareborda, who had his doubts regarding the text presented by the Baron. “The dark episode continues in darkness.”

From the beginning of the controversy, the Brazilian minister to Argentina, Domício da Gama, had been opposed to responding to the insinuations and accusations of the former Argentine chancellor. He discussed this with Rio Branco, without success: "Those who have known him [Zeballos] for a long time know that nothing disheartens and mortifies him as much as the silence surrounding his spectacular person."

Ironically, it was precisely the silence of the Alcorta government during the dispute that led the usually restrained Gama not to discouragement, but to anger. In the second half of November, the diplomat almost came to blows with Chancellor Victorino de La Plaza at a dinner hosted by the American minister, Spencer Eddy, at the Buenos Aires Jockey Club. Upon learning that La Plaza wanted to schedule a meeting to thank him for sending the documentation on Telegram No. 9, and nothing more, he became irritated and confronted his colleague: “Despite my insistence on the good that a more complete statement, less reserved than simple thanks, would do, he did not authorize me to make my words his own and remained with simple thanks. I then declared to him that this would not be telegraphed [to Rio de Janeiro], that it was insufficient, and we got up without reaching an agreement. Many people could hear the conversation aloud, and I raised my voice several times,” Gama wrote to Rio Branco on December 4th.

The Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) may have had the upper hand in the Telegram No. 9 episode, but the overall victory went to Zeballos. On December 16th, Argentine congressmen sanctioned Law 6.283/08, the "Armaments Law," authorizing the purchase of two battleships, six first-class destroyers for the oceanic fleet, and 12 second-class destroyers for the defense of the mouth of the River Plate and Bahía Blanca, which in 1896 had become the main naval base, Puerto Belgrano. The text also provided for the additional acquisition of one battleship, three first-class destroyers, and four second-class destroyers, if deemed necessary by the Executive, limiting the total investment to 32 million gold pesos.

Argentina was preparing to enter the era of Dreadnoughts. Ordered from American shipyards, the battleships Rivadavia and Moreno would displace up to 31.496 tons and each would have four 76 mm guns, twelve 152 mm guns, and twelve 305 mm guns. Their firepower would be equivalent to that of the Brazilian battleships São Paulo and Minas Geraes, which were already taking shape. In September 1908, while Rio Branco and Zeballos were engaged in a new duel, the Minas Geraes was launched in Southampton, thus beginning the final phase of its construction.

Until the delivery of the first battleship, which would still take several months, Brazil would remain in a very fragile position to defend its ports. Rio Branco even proposed to Affonso Pena the purchase of some English warships, "which would immediately give us a fleet superior to Argentina's, protecting us from any premeditated insult." But the idea, despite having presidential support, was torpedoed by Minister Faria de Alencar, who feared damage to his Naval Program. The only option was to hope that the "mad Alcorta government," in the Baron's words, would not open fire.

It didn't open. Relations between Brazil and Argentina, although tense, did not suffer any major setbacks the following year. The ABC Pact ended up forgotten in some drawer by the Brazilian government, which considered it contradictory and useless to discuss a regional policy of alliances while Alcorta remained in the Casa Rosada. The antipathy towards the Argentine leader, moreover, was more than evident in the absence of an official Brazilian delegation at the centennial celebrations of the May Revolution in 1910.

Of the three Dreadnoughts ordered by Brazil, two reinforced its Navy: the Minas Gerais and the São Paulo. In November 2010, shortly after their commissioning, the pair terrorized not the city of Buenos Aires, as Alcorta and Zeballos feared, but Rio de Janeiro, during the Revolt of the Lash. At the end of the First World War, in 1918, both battleships, as well as their Argentine counterparts, were considered obsolete. Besides the British and American shipyards, the only person who must have made any money from the animosity between Julian Assange's "great-great-grandfather" and Juca Paranhos was Eduardo Leite, director of the short film "Zé Bolas and the Famous Telegram Number Nine," a great success in cinemas during the 1909 season.