German military officials are planning an attack on the Crimean Bridge. Read the transcript of their conversation.

Sputnik - Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of the Rossiya Segodnya group, of which Sputnik is a part, published on the social network VK the complete transcript of a conversation from February 19, 2024, between high-ranking officials of the German Armed Forces.

The participants were Graefe, head of operations and exercises at the Air Force Command; Gerhartz, inspector of the German Air Force; and officers Fenske and Frostedte, from the air operations center of the Space Command. Read the full dialogue.

Gerhartz: Greetings everyone! Grefe, are you in Singapore right now?

Grefe: Yes.

Gerhartz: Great. We need to verify the information. As you heard, the [German] Defense Minister Boris Pistorius will study the issue of supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine. We have a meeting scheduled with him. Everything needs to be discussed so that we can start working on this issue. So far I see no indication of when these deliveries will begin.

The chancellor didn't tell him, "I want information now, and we'll make a decision tomorrow morning." I didn't hear that. On the contrary, Pistorius is evaluating this whole discussion that has unfolded. Nobody knows why. the Federal Chancellor [Olaf Scholz] It's blocking those deliveries. Of course, the most unbelievable rumors are surfacing.

I'll give you an example: yesterday I received a call from a journalist who is very close to the chancellor. She had heard somewhere in Munich that the Taurus missiles wouldn't work. I asked who had told her this. She replied that someone in military uniform had told her.

It's clear that this is a low-level source of information, but the journalist clung to these words and wants to turn it into a news story with the headline: "Now we know why the chancellor refuses to send Taurus missiles — they don't work."

The whole scene is idiotic. These topics are only accessible to a limited number of people. However, we see the nonsense that is being spread, utter rubbish. I want to wake up to this issue with you so that we don't go in the wrong direction. First of all, I now have questions for Frostedte and Fenske. Has anyone spoken to you about this? Has Freuding spoken to you?

Frostedte: No. I only spoke with Grefe.

Fenske: Same here, I only communicated with Grefe.

Gerhartz: He will probably contact you again. I will likely have to attend the Budget Committee hearings because problems have arisen regarding the price increases for converting the infrastructure for the F-35s in Büchel. I have already passed on my recommendations to Frank [Steinmeier, President of Germany] so that we have slides to visualize the material.

We showed him a test presentation where Taurus missiles were mounted on a Tornado carrier aircraft or another carrier required by the mission. However, I have little idea about this. Remember that this is a half-hour meeting, so you shouldn't prepare a 30-slide presentation. It has to be a short presentation. We need to show what the missile can do and how it can be used.

We need to consider the political consequences of transferring missiles as aid to Ukraine. I would be grateful if you could tell me not only what problems we have, but also how we can solve them, for example, regarding the methods of supply…

I know how the British do it. They always transport them in Ridgeback armored vehicles. They have some men on site. The French don't do that. They deliver the Q7s to Ukraine with SCALP missilesStorm Shadow and SCALP have similar installation characteristics.

How are we going to solve this problem? Are we going to put missiles [from the European manufacturer] MBDA with Ridgeback missiles in their hands? Will one of our employees be assigned to MBDA? Grefe, please inform us of our position on this matter. Messrs. Fenske and Frostedte, please report on your views on the situation.

Grefe: I'll start with the most delicate issues, with the current criticisms regarding the supply. Discussions are taking place almost everywhere. There are several very important aspects here. First, there are the delivery deadlines. If the Chancellor decides now that we should supply missiles, they will be transferred from the Armed Forces.

Okay, but they won't be ready for use for another eight months. Secondly, we can't shorten the timeframe. Because if we do, there could be misuse. The missile could fall on a kindergarten, and again, there would be civilian casualties. These aspects must be taken into account.

It should be noted in the negotiations that we cannot do anything without the manufacturing company. They can equip, rearm, and deliver the first missiles. We can accelerate production somewhat, but we shouldn't wait until 20 units have been accumulated; we can deliver five at a time.

The delivery time for these missiles depends directly on the industry. Who will pay for it? Another question is: to which weapons systems will these missiles be coupled? How should the interaction between the company and Ukraine be maintained? Or will there be some kind of integration?

Gerhartz: I don't think so. Because the manufacturer TSG said they can solve this problem in six months, whether on a Sukhoi or F-16 aircraft.

Grefe: If the Federal Chancellor decides to go that route, there must be an understanding that it will take six months just to produce the supports. Thirdly, theoretically, we could be affected by... training issueI've already mentioned that we're working with the missile manufacturer. They provide training on the maintenance of these systems, and we provide training on their tactical application.

This will take three to four months. This part of the training can be carried out in Germany. When the first missiles are delivered, we will need to make a quick decision regarding the support and training.

Perhaps we will have to turn to the British for these issues to use their know-how. We can provide them with databases, satellite imagery, and planning stations. Besides supplying the missiles themselves, which we already have, everything else can be provided by industry or by the [German engineering and analysis company] IABG.

Gerhartz: We need to imagine that they can use aircraft with mounts for Taurus and Storm Shadow missiles. The British have already been there and equipped the aircraft. The systems aren't very different; they can also be used for the Taurus. I can tell you about the experience of using the Patriot system. Our experts also calculated long lead times initially, but they managed to do it in a matter of weeks.

They managed to get everything up and running so quickly and in such quantity that our staff said, "Wow. We weren't expecting that." Now we are fighting a war in which far more modern technologies are used than in our good old Air Force. All this suggests that when we plan deadlines, we shouldn't overestimate them. And now, Messrs. Fenske and Frostedte, I would like to hear your opinions on possible deliveries to Ukraine.

Fenske: I'd like to focus on the training issue. We've already studied this, and if we're dealing with personnel who already have the appropriate training and will be trained in parallel, it will take about three initial weeks to study the equipment, and only then proceed directly to Air Force training, which will last about four weeks.

Therefore, it's much less than 12 weeks. Of course, all of this assumes that the personnel are qualified for it. The training can be done without the need for interpreters and a few other things. We've already spoken with Ms. Friedberger. If we're talking about combat use, we'll practically be advised to support at least the first group.

It's difficult to plan. It takes us about a year to train our staff, and now we're trying to reduce that time to ten weeks, while also hoping they can race off-road in a car designed for Formula 1.

One possible option is to provide scheduled technical support, which, in theory, could be done from Büchel, provided secure communication with Ukraine is established. If this is available, then proper planning will be possible. This is the basic scenario, at a minimum: providing full manufacturer support, assistance through the user support service, which will resolve software problems. In principle, everything is the same as what happens here in Germany.

Gerhartz: One minute. I understand what you're saying. Politicians may be concerned about Buchel's direct and closed communication with Ukraine, which could be seen as direct involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. But in that case, we can say that the exchange of information will occur through MBDA and that we will send one or two of our specialists to Schrobenhausen.

It's clearly a trick, but from a political standpoint, it probably looks different. If the exchange of information is done through the manufacturer, it's not related to us.

Fenske: The question arises of where the information goes. If we are talking about target information, which ideally includes satellite imagery with a maximum accuracy of up to three meters, we will have to process it first in Buchel. I think that, regardless, we can somehow organize the exchange of information between Buchel and Schrobenhausen, or we can consider the possibility of transferring information to Poland, doing so wherever we can reach by car.

This issue needs to be analyzed more closely; there will certainly be options. If we have support, in the worst-case scenario we could even travel by car, which would reduce the response time. Of course, we couldn't react in an hour, as that would require consent. In the best-case scenario, only six hours after receiving the information could the planes execute the order.

An accuracy of more than three meters is sufficient. to achieve specific targetsHowever, if it's necessary to refine the target, it's essential to work with satellite imagery that allows for simulation. In that case, the response time can be up to 12 hours. It all depends on the target. I haven't studied this issue in detail, but I believe it's also possible. All we have to say is that we need to think about how to organize the transfer of information.

Gerhartz: Do you think we can expect Ukraine to be able to do everything on its own? After all, it's known that there are many people there in civilian clothes who speak with an American accent. So it's quite possible that they will soon be able to do it on their own? After all, they have all the satellite images.

Fenske: Yes, they receive them from us. I would also like to briefly address the issues of air defense. We must think very carefully about having equipment in Kyiv to receive information from IABG and NDK [the Japanese quartz crystal company]. We have to provide it to them, and that is why I will have to fly there on February 21st. We have to plan everything in the best possible way, and not like what happened with Storm Shadow, when we planned control points. We have to think about how to fly around or below the radar's viewing sector. If everything is prepared, the training will be more effective, and then we can return to the question of the number of missiles. If we give 50 units, they will be used up very quickly.

Gerhartz: Exactly, this won't change the course of military operations. That's why we don't want to deliver all of them, and not all at once. Maybe 50 in the first tranche, then maybe another tranche of 50 missiles. That's perfectly understandable, but it's all big politics. I think I know what's really behind it.

I learned from my French and British colleagues that, in fact, the same thing happens with these Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles as with the Winchester rifles. They might ask: "Why should we supply the next batch of missiles if we've already supplied them? Let Germany do it now." Perhaps Mr. Frostedte has something to say on this subject?

Frostedte: Let me add a bit of pragmatism. I'd like to share my thoughts on the Storm Shadow's characteristics. We're talking about air defense, flight time, flight altitude, and so on. I've come to the conclusion that there are two interesting targets: the bridge to the east and the ammunition depots above. The bridge to the east is difficult to reach, it's a rather small target, but the Taurus can hit it, and the ammunition depots can also be hit.

Taking all of this into account and comparing it to the number of Storm Shadow and Himar submarines that have already been used, I have a question: "Is our target the bridge or the ammunition depots?" Is this possible with the current shortcomings of the RED and Patriot submarines? And I've come to the conclusion that the limiting factor is that they generally only have 24 rounds…

Gerhartz: That's understandable.

Frostedte: It makes sense to attach Ukraine to the shipping work; that would take a week. I think it makes sense to think about task planning and centralized planning. Our group's task planning takes two weeks, but if there's interest in it, it can be done faster.

Regarding the bridge, I think the Taurus isn't sufficient, and we need to get an idea of ​​how it can function. For that, we need satellite data. I don't know if we can train the Ukrainians in a short space of time; we're talking about a month to accomplish such a task.

What would a Taurus attack on the bridge look like? From an operational standpoint, I can't estimate how quickly the Ukrainians will learn to plan such actions and how quickly integration will occur. But since we're talking about the bridge and military bases, I understand they want to obtain it as quickly as possible.

Fenske: I'd like to say one more thing about the destruction of the bridge. We've been dealing intensely with this issue and, unfortunately, we've come to the conclusion that the bridge is like a runway due to its size, so perhaps more than ten or even 20 missiles will be needed.

Gerhartz: There is an opinion that the Taurus will be successful if it uses the French Dassault Rafale fighter jet.

Fenske: They'll only manage to make a hole and damage the bridge.

And before we make any important statements, we ourselves must…

Frostedte: I'm not promoting the idea of ​​the bridge, but pragmatically speaking I want to understand what they want, and what we have to teach them. So it turns out we'll need to highlight the key points in the images when planning these operations.

They will have targets, but what must be kept in mind is that when working with small targets, more meticulous planning is needed, rather than analyzing images on a computer. In the case of confirmed targets, everything is easier and planning takes less time.

Gerhartz: We all know they want to destroy the bridge, which ultimately means how it's protected, not just because it's important militarily and strategically, but also politically, although they also have a land corridor at the moment.

There are some concerns if we establish a direct link with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Then the question arises: can we use this strategy and deploy our personnel to MBDA? Thus, the direct link with Ukraine will only be through MBDA, which is much better than if there were a link with our Air Force.

Grefe: Gerhartz, that doesn't matter. We need to make sure that, from the beginning, there's no way that makes us part of the conflict. I'm exaggerating a bit, of course, but if we tell the minister now that we're going to schedule meetings and take a car from Poland without anyone knowing, that's already participation. We're not going to do that.

If we're talking about a manufacturer, the first thing to do is ask MBDA if they can do this. It doesn't matter if our people do it in Buchel or Schrobenhausen. This is still participation, and I don't think it should be done. We identified this early on as the main element of the red line, so we will participate in the training.

Let's say we'll prepare a roadmap. It's necessary to divide the learning process into parts. The long track will be designed for four months; we'll train them exhaustively, including developing the variant with the bridge. The short track will last 15 days, so they can use the missiles as quickly as possible.

If they are already trained, we will ask if the British are prepared to handle them at this stage. I believe that action would be the right thing to do. Imagine if the press finds out that our people are in Schrobenhausen or that we are traveling by car somewhere in Poland! I consider that option unacceptable.

Gerhartz: If this political decision is made, we must say that the Ukrainians should come to us. First of all, we need to know if this political decision doesn't involve direct participation in the planning of the tasks. In that case, the training will take a little longer. They will be able to perform more complex tasks, which is quite possible since they already have some experience and use high-tech equipment.

If there is a way to avoid direct involvement, we cannot participate in task planning, do it in Büchel, and then send it to them. That is a "red line" for Germany. We can train them for two months. They won't learn everything, but they will be able to do something. We just need to make sure they can process all the information, work with all the parameters.

Grefe: Seppel said it's possible to create a long and a short roadmap. It's about getting results in a short period of time. If, in the first stage, the task is to hit ammunition depots, and not complex objectives like bridges, then in that case, it will be possible to embark on a shorter program and get a quick result.

Regarding IABG's intelligence, I don't consider that a critical problem because they aren't tied to a specific location. They need to conduct their own reconnaissance. Of course, efficiency depends on that. That's what we're talking about, that it's worth taking that into account when transferring missiles. This hasn't been decided yet, but it's accepted.

Gerhartz: And that will be the main point. There are ammunition depots where short-duration training cannot be carried out due to very active anti-aircraft defenses. This will have to be dealt with seriously. I think our personnel will find an option. We just need permission to try it out first so that we can provide better policy guidance.

We need to be better prepared so we don't fail because the KSA may not know where the air defense systems are actually located. The Ukrainians have this information, we have radar data. But if we're talking about precise planning, it's necessary to know where the radars and fixed installations are, and how to get around them. This will allow for more precise planning.

We have a super-medium, and if we have the exact coordinates, we can apply it precisely. But there's no basis for saying we can't do it. There's a certain scale where the "red line" is politically; there's a "long" path and a "short" path. There are differences here in terms of utilizing the full potential, which, over time, Ukrainians will be more able to use because they'll have practice, they'll be doing it all the time.

Personally, I don't think I should participate in the meeting. For me, it's important that we present a sober assessment and not add fuel to the fire, as others are doing by providing Storm Shadow and SCALP.

Grefe: I mean, the longer it takes them to make a decision, the longer it will take us to implement all of this. We need to break things down into phases. First, start with the simple things and then move on to the complex ones. Or we could turn to the British. They could support us in the initial stage, take over the planning?

We can accelerate what is within our area of ​​responsibility. The development of missile launchers is not our task. Ukraine has to resolve this issue with the manufacturers on its own.

Gerhartz: We wouldn't want to have problems now because of the budget committee. That could make it impossible to start construction work at Buchel Air Base in 2024. Every day counts in the schedule now.