Mearsheimer: A country like Brazil cannot help but maintain good relations with the United States.

247 - The return of competition between great powers and the end of the period of unipolarity in the United States are reorganizing global geopolitics and restricting the room for maneuver of emerging countries like Brazil. This is one of the main conclusions of political scientist John J. Mearsheimer, one of the most influential names in structural realism in international relations, when analyzing the new world scenario in an interview with the Horizons channel on YouTube.

When discussing the role of middle and emerging powers, Mearsheimer was direct in addressing the Brazilian case. According to him, Brazil's position in the Western Hemisphere imposes clear limits on the country's foreign policy, regardless of China's economic expansion. "Brazil is in the Western Hemisphere. The United States has a policy called the Monroe Doctrine. And the Monroe Doctrine says that there is no way for Brazil to form an alliance with China. And I think Brazilians understand very well that they can have economic relations with China. But they have no choice but to be friendly with the United States, not to ally with China," he stated.

The statement summarizes a central argument of realism: for states, survival and security outweigh economic prosperity. Even if countries try to "hedge"—that is, balance relations with multiple poles—this strategy tends to become unfeasible when rivalry between powers intensifies. According to the professor, the pressure of the international system pushes states, in extreme situations, to choose a side.

The end of the "pause in history" and the return of multipolarity.

Mearsheimer stated that the world lived through an exceptional period between 1990 and 2017, in which the United States was the only major power. "From approximately 1992, shortly after the disappearance of the Soviet Union—and, of course, the Cold War had ended at that point—until around 2017, when China and Russia emerged as major powers, we lived in a unipolar world," he said, explaining that the absence of rivals made the typical security competition between powers impossible.

According to him, this reality began to change decisively when China and Russia started acting as centers of global power. "My argument is that this happened around 2017, when China and Russia entered the scene as major powers," he stated. From that moment on, the world supposedly returned to a multipolar logic—and with it, the strategic dispute on a global scale reappeared.

Mearsheimer maintains that he foresaw this return of rivalry, especially in East Asia and Europe. He recalled that he had argued for years that the Chinese rise would result in increasing tension with Washington. "I completely disagreed with that and thought that the rise of China and China becoming a great power would lead to all sorts of problems in East Asia and there would be intense security competition between the United States and China in that region," he said.

Regarding Europe, he reaffirmed that he had warned about the consequences of NATO expansion and the attempt to integrate Ukraine into the Western bloc. “I argued for a long time that trying to expand, especially into Ukraine, was a recipe for disaster. This would lead to problems with Russia,” he stated. He added that the conflict on Ukrainian territory, in his view, reinforces that his warnings were correct. “And, once again, with sadness I say that I was right on this point as well,” he concluded.

The shift in the US and the decline of "liberal hegemony"

The interview also touched upon the shift in US policy under “Donald Trump 2.0,” described by the interviewer as a transition from a project to “remake the world in the American image” to a more transactional policy focused on national interest.

Mearsheimer rejected the idea that this represents a shift towards isolationism or a "withdrawal from global leadership." "That's nonsense. That's not what's happening," he stated.

According to him, during the unipolar period, since there was no direct competition with other powers, Washington tried to impose a strategy of "liberal hegemony," based on the expansion of Western institutions and values. "What the United States decided to do, instead of engaging in competition between great powers, was to remake the world in its own image. To pursue a liberal foreign policy—what I call liberal hegemony," he explained.

The result, for him, was disastrous. “The end result of this is that we entered into endless wars. It was disastrous,” he said. Mearsheimer states that this series of failures helped reduce domestic support in the US for military interventions, while the return of multipolarity forced the country to redirect its priorities. “Once you’re in a multipolar world after 2017, the United States had to focus on great power competition,” he stated.

Russia and China: "a situation that makes no sense for the US"

Mearsheimer also insisted on the idea that the West — especially the policy adopted during the war in Ukraine — contributed to bringing Moscow and Beijing closer together, which he considers contrary to American strategic interests. "As a result of the war in Ukraine, we pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese," he said.

According to him, this balance of power creates a scenario in which the US simultaneously faces its main rival power (China) and a nuclear power with decisive geopolitical weight (Russia), without being able to separate them. Mearsheimer stated that he believes Trump is trying to "correct" this situation. "I believe that what Trump wants to do is, first, end the war in Ukraine and, second, have good relations with Moscow. He wants to improve relations between the US and Russia in order to distance the Russians from the Chinese," he said.

He compared the idea to a strategy used by Nixon and Kissinger in the 1970s. "This is similar to what Kissinger and Nixon did in 1972. In that case, we distanced China from the Soviet Union," he stated.

But while he considers the logic “rational,” Mearsheimer believes there are almost insurmountable obstacles in the short term. “I would say it is extremely unlikely that this will work in the foreseeable future,” he said, citing the Russophobia entrenched in Western elites and Russia’s lack of trust in the West.

A more fragmented Europe with "poisonous" relations with Moscow.

In the debate about Europe, Mearsheimer argued that the weakening of "American protection" tends to increase internal divisions on the continent. "My argument is that the opposite will happen: European relations will become more conflictual," he stated, saying that the US presence acted as "glue" between European countries.

According to him, even if the war in Ukraine is halted, the subsequent scenario tends to be one of lasting instability. "Once the shooting stops and you have a frozen conflict, relations between Europe on one side and Russia on the other will be poisonous," he stated. He also pointed out that Moscow could exploit differences between European governments regarding the degree of hostility or rapprochement.

International institutions weaken, "limited orders" advance.

Another central theme of the interview was the crisis of global institutions built in the post-war period. Mearsheimer agreed that organizations such as the UN and the WTO are suffering from paralysis and fragmentation, but stated that this process should not be interpreted as "total failure," but rather as a natural consequence of the balance of power.

“We have moved away from unipolarity and are now in a multipolar world. So these international institutions... will make it increasingly difficult, over time, to achieve much cooperation between the three major powers,” he stated.

Instead of a truly global order, he sees the emergence of “limited orders,” led by the competing powers. “What China is doing and what the United States is doing is creating their own limited orders… designed to stifle security competition,” he stated. And he cited as examples initiatives led by Beijing: “Think of the Belt and Road Initiative. Think of BRICS. Think of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Think of the AIIB,” he said.

Economic interdependence does not guarantee peace — and can turn into vulnerability.

Mearsheimer also criticized the liberal belief that economic integration reduces the risk of war. "Many people believe that economic interdependence brings peace... that makes no sense at all," he stated, noting that Europe had strong economic integration before the First World War.

For him, the real problem today is strategic dependence. Mearsheimer cited an example linked to technological competition and the supply chain of critical minerals. "The United States depends on China for certain raw materials, and this gives China great leverage over the United States... mainly rare earths and rare earth magnets," he said.

He reported that, in attempting to impose tariffs and "play hardball" against Beijing, Trump was restrained by this factor. "The Chinese told President Trump, without any hesitation, that they would cut off these rare earths to the United States if the U.S. played hardball. And the end result is that President Trump backed down," he stated.

Where the world could explode: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and seven dangerous spots in Europe.

When asked about the risk of "accidental" wars in a multipolar system, Mearsheimer pointed out that East Asia is the main focal point of conflict between the US and China.

“There are three major points of tension in East Asia… the first is Taiwan… but there are two others that concern me greatly: the South China Sea and the East China Sea,” he stated. Regarding Taiwan, he was categorical: “The Chinese are deeply committed to recovering Taiwan… they believe Taiwan is sacred territory,” he said.

Regarding Europe, he warned that Ukraine will remain a dangerous hotspot even after an eventual ceasefire. "Even if you stop the fighting in Ukraine, you'll end up with a frozen conflict... and there's always the danger of that frozen conflict turning back into a hot war," he stated.

In addition to Ukraine, he listed six other areas where the Russia-West dispute could escalate: "The Arctic, the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad, Belarus, Moldova, and the Black Sea," he said, stating that each of these regions has the potential to produce direct clashes.

Brazil between economic pragmatism and geopolitical limits.

The discussion about Brazil, placed at the center of the interview when addressing middle powers, summarizes the dilemma of emerging economies in the multipolar era. According to Mearsheimer, Brazil can expand trade, investment, and economic ties with China, but it cannot, under any circumstances, transform this into a strategic alliance in the classical sense, especially given the historical doctrine of the US in the Western Hemisphere.

"Brazil is in the Western Hemisphere... there's no way Brazil can form an alliance with China... but it can have economic relations with China," he stated, reinforcing that geopolitics, more than economics, defines the limits of national choices.

In the logic of realism, autonomy exists—but it is always conditioned by the power structure. And, in the new scenario described by Mearsheimer, with increasingly intense competition between poles, the space for "diplomatic balances" tends to narrow, requiring pragmatism and caution to prevent global disputes from becoming traps for countries like Brazil.