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For Marconi, the best defense in a CPI (Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry) is a good offense.

The governor of Goiás, from the PSDB party, advised by a lawyer and a company that manages the image of politicians, is trying to put into practice the maxim that the best defense is a good offense. Thus, he acts like a candidate and attacks Lula primarily. But to gain credibility, he will have to do more than that: he could, for example, authorize the joint parliamentary commission of inquiry to open his bank and tax records. Spontaneously. Will he do that?

For Marconi, the best defense in a CPI is a good offense (Photo: Edição/247)

Vassil Oliveira_Goiás 247 – In the name of transparency and courage above all else, in recent days Governor Marconi Perillo (PSDB) has sought to act proactively. The highlight: before the joint CPI (Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry) on Cachoeira summoned him, he went to it. In a pyrotechnic act, this Wednesday, the 29th, he arrived unexpectedly at a commission session and offered to testify.

If he truly wanted to convey credibility and truthfulness in his words, he would need to do more than that: for example, voluntarily opening his tax and banking records. Furthermore, he would need to convince his advisors, such as Lúcio Fiúza, to do the same. That would be a start.

In practice, the governor of Goiás, pressured to give answers about his connections with the illegal gambling operator Carlinhos Cachoeira and the latter's connections with his government, is trying to do what in journalism is called inverting the agenda. Is he questioned? Then he starts questioning. Is he pressured? Then he starts threatening.

That's how I raised the banner of the Construction Companies CPI, which he promises to propose when he goes to the CPI. That's also how he got a CPI approved in the Legislative Assembly of Goiás, also on Cachoeira, but to pressure his adversaries – for example, mayors of cities that are his political opponents will be called, but his own attendance isn't even being considered.

Attacking to defend oneself is not a new weapon in war, much less in political warfare. Regarding Marconi, what is new is that he has never been under so much pressure and has never been so close to rock bottom, according to accounts from friends and aides, who at one point even feared he would "give up," as they put it, such was the anguish that gripped him. They say he even suffered health problems, seeing no way out of his situation.

The decision to lift his head and "return to being the Marconi he always was," says a reliable source at the Palácio das Esmeraldas (the governor's palace), came from his advisors, not from him. It came primarily from one advisor who, during the campaign, handled the hiring of a national company to manage communications. The same company was contacted a little over a month ago and took over the management of social media and the administration of the politician's image at the national level.

Marconi's company and lawyer, Kakai, defined the model of action being adopted. In short: Marconi always seeks to be one step ahead. Is it inevitable that he will go to the CPI (Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry)? Then he gets ahead and proposes to go voluntarily. Is he questioned about the house? He attacks Lula, saying that he is the target of the former president's hatred because he was one of the guarantors of the Mensalão (monthly allowance) accusation. Anything goes, and everything is a weapon.

In the state, the reaction began with the approval of an 'emergency' supplement of R$ 20,5 million for advertising. With money to spend, government supporters went to the media outlets and offered a helping hand, demanding basically two things in return:

a – space for positive government actions;

b – the disappearance of the “Cachoeira” issue from the news or its treatment always from a perspective favorable to the government, which included extensive coverage of the Assembly's CPI, controlled by the supporters of Marconi;

c – limited space, if not total exclusion, for opponents, including the three potential pre-candidates for governor in 2014: Iris Rezende and Vanderlan Cardoso (PMDB), Júnior Friboi (PSB) and Rubens Otoni (PT).

Some points from the recurring and exhaustively repeated discourse by Marconi Perillo's team in the Goianian press:

1 – Dilma is a partner, the enemy “from Goiás” – because she doesn’t like Marconi – is Lula;

2 – Lula hates Marconi and everything that is happening is motivated by this, aiming to get back at him in an act of revenge for the Mensalão scandal;

3 - The PT (Workers' Party) is afraid of Marconi because he is the only one who can defeat Lula in 2014;

4 – There is nothing linking Marconi to Cachoeira; everything that has been published so far is part of a conspiracy to target the politician.

5 – The PMDB and PT parties are connected to Cachoeira because the municipalities of Goiânia and Anápolis, governed by PT members, and Catalão, governed by a PMDB member, are the ones that allegedly signed contracts with Delta, while the state's contract was signed by the previous government (the fact that the current government renewed the contract and increased the value isn't even mentioned);

6 – In short, Marconi is a victim. Period.

Along with this political action, the governor intensified government actions. The newspaper Tribuna do Planalto even noted the many programs in which the government has invested (to see, click here – ), among which is one with the suggestive name of PAI, or Integrated Action Program, “launched with the objective of prioritizing certain works, inspired by the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) of the federal government.”

In parallel, the governor is trying to minimize the political fragility within his own government, which prevents him from making the changes he would like to the team. For example, he wants to remove the president of the Communications Agency (Agecom), José Luiz Bittencourt, and the Secretary of Infrastructure, Alexandres Baldy. The former has the backing of the president of the Legislative Assembly, Jardel Sebba, and the government leader in the House, Helder Valin; the latter is the son-in-law of businessman Marcelo Limírio, who is linked to Cachoeira and Marconi.

The fact is that Marconi Perillo hasn't yet managed to get the government moving, but he's pushing his allies who are resisting to his side. A good portion, however, is waiting quietly. Quietly – which doesn't mean they're hoping the bad times will pass soon.

This detail is relevant because, in the past, word-of-mouth always functioned as a powerful means of communication – multiplying with omnipresence in municipalities – for the politician. Now, it's a vehicle with noise. It has spread doubt and fear. And if the governor's situation becomes complicated, it will lead to despair during election time.

In other words: Marconi is acting like someone who knows it's win or win. Perhaps the biggest campaign of his life. His political survival is at stake. That's all he has. Because credibility and respect have already been defeated. In Goiás and in Brazil.