Marinho: Marina can't 'cry like a victim' over a tough debate.

by Eduardo Maretti and João Peres, from Current Brazil Network
São Paulo – “São Paulo and Brazil want safe change,” says the pamphlet placed on Luiz Marinho’s desk, featuring a photo of Dilma Rousseff and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Eight words in tune with the mayor of São Bernardo, who has the mission of coordinating the PT’s reelection campaign in a state traditionally resistant to the party, and who offers undecided voters the idea of ​​the “safe haven” represented by the president, in contrast to the “return to the past” symbolized by Aécio Neves and the “insecurity” demonstrated by Marina Silva (PSB).

Traditionally, voters in São Paulo inflict defeats on the Workers' Party (PT) in presidential elections – this was the case with Lula, even in his reelection – compensated by strong performances in other states in the Southeast, North, and Northeast. This time, however, São Paulo has given Marina a wide lead over Dilma, according to opinion polls, and Marinho is one of those tasked with working to reverse the trend and secure her reelection.

To achieve this, he believes that focusing the campaign agenda and directing television messages to the population of São Paulo will be fundamental. In an interview given to RBA at Dilma's campaign headquarters in the southern zone of São Paulo, he also stated that the PT candidate in São Paulo, Alexandre Padilha, will grow in the final stretch and help the party in the national election.

During the conversation, Marinho explained his reasons for believing that Dilma could win even in the first round, especially considering that Marina's best period has already passed. “The water is starting to become clear. That's where Marina's contradictions come in. The PT isn't attacking Marina. We're addressing the contradictions present in her government program. It's incompatible to talk about social investment and neoliberal policies.”

The coordinator of Dilma's campaign in São Paulo disapproves of Marina's stance in the face of criticism from the PT and PSDB parties, and says that politics is not a place for "victims." "The electoral battle is inherently tough. You have to know that in a situation like this, leadership needs to be strong."

Dilma's campaign coordinator believes that Marina should accept being questioned about what she considers contradictions in her government program. The PT's bet is that, as it stands, the set of proposals will lead to a neoliberal government, which would be demonstrated by the exhortation to reduce the role of public banks and the proposal for the independence of the Central Bank.

When questioned about the statement by Marina's running mate, Congressman Beto Albuquerque (PSB-RS), that one cannot govern without the PMDB, Marinho reacts with a laugh. "But don't say that. What is this? Yet another contradiction."

Below are excerpts from the interview given to RBA.

At the PT meeting in Anhembi on the 5th, the leaders, mainly Marta Suplicy and Lula, spoke about the importance of the state of São Paulo in Dilma Rousseff's election. How do you assess São Paulo's role in the election?

It's almost redundant to talk about the importance of São Paulo. Given the number of voters we have, it becomes a very important state in any national decision that is made. The electoral process is no different. São Paulo has a very significant role in this process. And it's the state where the PSDB is most deeply rooted and strongest, giving us the most trouble. This elevates the state's importance from the point of view of the performance of our candidates. This was the case with Lula in the various elections he contested and the two he won, as well as with Dilma in 2010 and now.
Padilha is now beginning to make it easier to win votes on the streets, in the city, because throughout the campaign voters kept asking who Padilha was. There was a great deal of unfamiliarity. What makes someone known is a lot of television media exposure or electoral competition. It's an illusion to think that just because someone holds an important position or implemented important policies, they are known.

Should the strategy involve a greater physical presence of Dilma and Lula here in São Paulo, or should it involve targeting television advertising specifically to the São Paulo audience?

You can see how many times Dilma has been to São Paulo. There's a clear agenda for the president in São Paulo aimed at connecting with that electorate. Because even if she doesn't go to Dracena, Santa Fé do Sul, Barra Bonita, or Nazaré Paulista, the fact that she's in the state of São Paulo creates better conditions for activists in those cities to approach voters, ask for their vote, and present their proposals. It's a search for a coordinated agenda to create conditions for activists to make that approach.

Does a supposedly negative approval rating for Mayor Fernando Haddad, coupled with the Padilha issue, make the scenario more difficult than in other elections?

You have a combination of factors; it's not just the difficulty of Padilha's campaign, or the role Haddad can play. We had a significant decline, especially in São Paulo, with all the debate surrounding the imprisonment and the mensalão scandal, which damaged the PT's image. So it's not just Padilha or Haddad; the PT as a whole suffered a major setback. We are working on a recovery process. If you look at the evaluation of Haddad's government from the beginning of the campaign until the end, you'll see a natural improvement in these indicators. Natural because the activists are out on the streets, campaigning, and fighting for votes.

In the 76 largest cities in São Paulo, we implemented specific materials for each city, informing about the federal government's investments in that city, delivering materials to homes to draw the families' attention. Then comes the TV campaign highlighting what we want to continue doing on that street, in that city.

How do you assess the PT's reaction to Marina's emergence in the race, to her speeches, and to her set of proposals?

First, there's a great commotion, like a torrent of water entering a crystal-clear lake. It becomes mud, and things gradually condense, settling the dirt in the water so it becomes crystal clear again. The water is starting to become crystal clear. Then Marina's contradictions come into play. The PT (Workers' Party) isn't attacking Marina. We're addressing the contradictions present in her government program. It's incompatible to talk about social investment and neoliberal policies. The neoliberal policies she advocates will make resources for social policies unviable. This triangle doesn't close.

This is what we're talking about: there will be unemployment. It's not that Marina, in her right mind, wants unemployment. It's because her government plan will lead to unemployment. Suddenly, poor thing, she doesn't even realize it, but that's what her government program team has prepared for her. It's written in the stars. Similarly, her government program is talking about the independence of the Central Bank. But it's not just the independence of the Central Bank. It's about changing the operating model of public banks, it's about reorienting the BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) to wean the industry off its investment programs. What does weaning the industry off its investment programs mean? What does that mean? Along with the independence of the Central Bank, it means making the set of investments facilitated by the policies of public banks unfeasible.

Take Caixa Econômica Federal as an example. If you look at the pattern of the 2002 debate, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government was in a continuous privatization process, if Lula had lost that election, the continuity of the policies that had been underway and that Serra would have continued, many things we are talking about today would no longer exist. This could be the case with Caixa, Banco do Brasil, and Petrobras. These things are included in Marina's program. There's no point in crying about being a victim because she's not a victim (read more). closest).