Cunha: SP is the key to victory in the election.

247 – PT (Workers' Party) congressman João Paulo Cunha warns that São Paulo is the key to victory in the presidential elections. According to him, it is his performance in the state that has sustained Marina Silva's (PSB) position to rival President Dilma Rousseff on equal footing. Read more:

São Paulo is the key to victory in the presidential election.

In the most fiercely contested Brazilian presidential election since the return of direct presidential elections in 1989, the state of São Paulo is currently emerging as a tipping point, with the race polarized between Dilma and Marina. According to the latest Datafolha poll, conducted on September 08th and 09th, while Dilma leads nationally with 36%, closely followed by Marina with 33%, in the state of São Paulo Marina holds a significant advantage, with 40% compared to Dilma's 26%. (In the Ibope poll conducted up to September 15th, nationally, Dilma has 36%, Marina 30%, and Aécio 19%).

Strictly speaking, it is this strong performance in São Paulo, the country's largest electoral college with almost 32 million voters, representing 22,4% of the country's votes, that has guaranteed Marina the ability to polarize the race against Dilma. To get an idea of ​​the importance of the São Paulo vote for the PSB candidate, today almost a third of her national voting intention comes from São Paulo. Therefore, it is the state that is the birthplace of the PT and PSDB parties that has been sustaining Marina's ability to rival Dilma on equal footing.

The political and electoral weight of São Paulo in the national race is enormous. Its electorate represents, for example, the sum of the entire Northeast region (38 million), minus the state of Ceará. Or the sum of the voters of the entire South region (21 million) plus the North region (10.8 million) or the Central-West region (10.2 million). São Paulo alone is equivalent to more than half of the Southeast, which has more than 62 million voters, representing 43,4% of the total Brazilian electorate.

While facing difficulties in São Paulo is nothing new for the PT (Workers' Party), never before in a presidential race has the party been in such an unfavorable situation in the state. According to Datafolha's voting intention numbers, Marina Silva would have almost 13 million votes in São Paulo today, more than two and a half times the 4.8 million votes she received in the state in the first round of 2010. This is also well above Serra's vote count, who came in first in São Paulo that year with 9.5 million votes. Even more than Alckmin's performance in the first round of the 2006 presidential election, when he led in São Paulo with 11.9 million votes.

Also according to the same Data-Folha poll, Dilma would have more than 8 million votes in São Paulo today. These numbers are similar to her vote count in the state in the first round of 2010, when she obtained 8.7 million votes, and Lula's vote count in 2006, when he won slightly more than 8 million votes from São Paulo voters. While the PT's vote in the first round in São Paulo might be close to the numbers it achieved in the last two presidential elections, the problem now lies in the wide margin, exceeding 4 million votes, that Marina could gain over Dilma in the state. In the first round of 2010, Serra had a lead over Dilma in São Paulo of less than 800 votes, and in 2006, Alckmin surpassed Lula by just over 3.8 million votes.

The explanation for these overwhelmingly favorable numbers for Marina in São Paulo lies in the fact that the PSDB candidate suffered a decline in support in the state, registering only 16% of voting intentions, which would amount to approximately 5 million votes, representing the biggest embarrassment for the PSDB in its main stronghold. Thus, it is clear that the PSB candidate entered the PSDB's strongest base with force, even more so than in the entire country, when she took approximately a third of Aécio Neves' votes.

The favorable numbers for Marina in São Paulo can also be explained by the fact that the state concentrates the largest and most organic part of the Brazilian economic elite. It is in São Paulo that the cream of the leadership of bankers, merchants, and industrialists is found, who traditionally align themselves with the liberal-conservative camp in opposition to the PT and its ideology in defense of workers.

Another possible explanation for Marina's strong performance in São Paulo lies in the fact that the state was the epicenter of the June 2013 protests. This movement spread to the country's largest cities, undermining the approval ratings of government officials, particularly the federal government. Led by a largely affluent youth, last year's protests were characterized by their opposition to political parties and Brazilian politics. This same anti-institutional stance guides Marina's conduct, thus making her the most favored by this movement.

Based on these considerations, it is possible to affirm that for the PT (Workers' Party) to remain in charge of the federal government, it must improve its performance in the state of São Paulo, starting in the first round, reducing the large advantage Marina holds at this stage of the race. It is clear that it can and should also compensate in other states and regions, particularly in the Northeast.

In favor of the PT (Workers' Party), it can be said that the latest polls already point to a slight increase for Dilma and a decrease for Marina in São Paulo. However, this movement needs to be maintained and intensified to ensure that Dilma does not lose in the state to the PSB candidate by a large margin of votes.

A profound connoisseur of politics and electoral processes, Lula has already realized that the PT (Workers' Party) needs to improve its performance in São Paulo and, therefore, has summoned the main PT leaders in the state to dedicate themselves more to the national race and to strengthening Dilma's campaign among the people of São Paulo. After this initiative to shake up the PT in its home state, the next step should be to call the PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) to its responsibility as the main partner in the alliance, starting with the vice-presidency held by Michel Temer. In this context, it is not politically acceptable for the PMDB to have a gubernatorial candidate in the state of São Paulo who refuses to ask for votes for Dilma.

Another move that Dilma's campaign should make in the state is to rebuild and improve its relationship with a segment of the productive sector of the São Paulo economy, especially with the part of the business community that does not align with the liberal discourse. This sector can and should play a prominent role in reducing the rejection of the PT and Dilma in the state.

At the same time, the PT campaign should open a constructive dialogue with all progressive and left-wing sectors operating in the state, inviting these groups to participate in the campaign, the program, and Dilma's government. This includes leaders from more left-leaning parties such as PSOL, PSTU, and PCO, union leaders from all major labor federations, and leaders of social organizations and popular movements. Even if, at this moment, there is no reciprocation of these overtures, this gesture from the PT would already create the basis for, in a possible second round, the electorate and the base of these sectors and parties to help Dilma defeat neoliberalism, now embodied by Marina.

The Workers' Party (PT) must also organize and prepare its supporters and activists in the state of São Paulo so that they can fully dedicate themselves to this final stretch of the first round of the presidential election. The main argument here should be the many achievements that the federal government has made in Brazil and in particular in the state of São Paulo, with actions, investments, and social programs that benefit millions of people in São Paulo. It should also engage in dialogue with mayors from various parties who have received assistance from the federal government, highlighting the main programs and works carried out in their cities and showing that Dilma's re-election strengthens the partnership that is changing municipalities for the better.

In this context, it is clear that one of the main paths for the PT (Workers' Party) to emerge victorious from the presidential race is to substantially improve its performance in São Paulo, reducing the wide lead in voting intentions that Marina Silva currently holds. Since the state has a more informed electorate, the process of political deconstruction of the PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party) candidate should also be effective here. If in Rio de Janeiro Dilma Rousseff has already turned the tables and regained the lead following the enlightened debate about the pre-salt oil reserves, the PT now needs to find the arguments and facts to reorient São Paulo voters' intentions.

Finally, it is worth considering, as a point of reflection, the consequences of this type of electoral division in a Republic organized as a Federation. We could consider an embryonic division in the country that would affect its unity. That is: a president elected with the fundamental electoral base of the richest and most populous state, and losing in the rest of the country. Or the opposite: a president elected with the votes of the vast majority of the country's states and defeated, by a wide margin, in the state that is the largest electoral college in the federation. Taking this reasoning to the extreme, we could admit, as a possible consequence, that the one elected based on the richest and most populous state could discredit the rest of the Federation, or that the one elected with the votes of the rest of the country would not adequately serve the state with the most voters.