Moro's imminent removal from office and Toffoli's historic decision redeem the damage caused by Lava Jato.
Moro's impending conviction heightens the sense of anxiety among those who promoted him.
Nothing could be more symbolic of the unique moment the country is experiencing than the imminent trial that could revoke the mandate of such a paradigmatic figure as Senator Sergio Moro.
Transformed by partisan media into a superhero in the fight against corruption, the then-judge was caught making deals with the prosecution to convict defendants in Operation Lava Jato. Moro's main target was President Lula, who consequently spent 580 days in jail in Curitiba. Moro is involved in other investigations, including the extortion of those under investigation and forcing them to obtain compromising information about powerful people whom he, Moro, could then blackmail. The scheme sought to obtain information to have in his hands, among others, judges of the Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region, ministers of the Superior Court of Justice, and even the Supreme Federal Court itself, instances that review the sentences of the judge from Curitiba.
A moralist without morals, Moro now faces accusations of having, as if by chance, diverted 2 million reais from his pre-campaign for president of the Republic, which he abandoned due to lack of support, to his campaign for senator for Paraná, breaking the parity of resources between candidates. Senatorial campaigns have lower spending limits than presidential campaigns, obviously. It is striking that the scheme originated from a figure so often portrayed as the sheriff of corruption.
Moro's impending conviction heightens the sense of anxiety among those who promoted him, especially that segment of the media that the conservative philosopher Edmund Burke defined, in the 18th century, as the Fourth Estate, "more important than all the others."
The media reserved headlines for a malicious report from the foreign NGO Transparency International, itself involved in the Lava Jato corruption scandal.
Together, they plotted a scheme to misappropriate and divert funds abroad that originated from leniency agreements originally intended for the Brazilian treasury.
Perhaps distressed by the defeats and eager to reverse Moro's likely dismissal, Transparency International has obscurely decided to lower Brazil's ranking in a certain "Corruption Perceptions Index," of its own making, based on what it claims to be the opinion of "businesspeople and analysts."
As if written by Moro himself, the nonsensical "report" cites the appointment, by the President of the Republic, of ministers who uphold labor rights, such as Cristiano Zanin and Flavio Dino, to the Supreme Federal Court, as justification for the demotion, in addition to also disapproving of the new Attorney General of the Republic, Paulo Gonet.
Operation Lava Jato constituted the biggest judicial and media scandal in Brazilian history, serving a project to seize state power. It was implemented through collusion by public officials using seemingly legal means, but acting against the law and with intense involvement from media outlets opposed to Brazilian development.
If Moro's conviction leads to the ruin of this criminal edifice and the exposure of its inner workings, Minister Dias Toffoli's decision to suspend the 3,8 billion reais fines on Odebrecht (now Novonor) resulting from a leniency agreement that the company is challenging opens a new avenue.
Because, in addition to questioning the methods of coercion, including torture, used by the consortium of authorities, the decision focuses on the sentences and agreements extracted from the accused under irresistible pressure. Methods to threaten family members and impose exorbitant demands. This machine led to the bankruptcy of countless large, medium, and small companies, leaving hundreds of thousands of workers unemployed and causing estimated losses in the trillions of reais to the national economy, as a direct consequence of the Lava Jato imbroglio and its reciprocal influence with the conspiracy and coup against President Dilma Rousseff.
The country needs to know in detail the version of events from companies and individuals regarding the conditions under which confessions and leniency agreements were obtained.
More than that, Brazil needs to investigate responsibilities, punish criminals, and find ways to redeem the State's mistakes, in order to repair companies and sectors that were not properly preserved, in the perhaps vain hope of trying to restore them to their former exuberance.
It won't be easy, because resistance to the Lava Jato operation exists, is strong, and remains entrenched both inside and outside the state apparatus. The judiciary, at least, owes this to the country.