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Samuel Guimarães: "The US is betting on Marina"

Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, former Secretary-General of Itamaraty (Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) during Lula's government, says that "the strategists of the United States are surely in agreement with the guidelines of the foreign policy defended by candidate Marina Silva. If she is elected, it will be the victory of a diplomatic model similar to what we had in the 90s," he assesses; he emphasizes that Marina could be the path, desired by the US, to dismantle Mercosur.

Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, former Secretary-General of Itamaraty during Lula's government, says that "the strategists of the United States are surely in agreement with the guidelines of the foreign policy defended by candidate Marina Silva. If she is elected, it will be the victory of a diplomatic model similar to what we had in the 90s," he assesses; he emphasizes that Marina could be the path, desired by the US, to carry out the dismantling of Mercosur (Photo: Valter Lima)

Darío Pignotti, from Major Card "United States strategists are surely in agreement with the foreign policy guidelines advocated by candidate Marina Silva. If she is elected, it will be a victory for a diplomatic model similar to the one we had in the 90s," Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, former Secretary-General of Itamaraty during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's government, told Carta Maior.

Along with former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and advisor Marco Aurélio Garcia, Pinheiro Guimarães was part of the troika responsible for planning diplomacy with an emphasis on South-South relations, implemented between 2003 and 2010. These premises “continued from 2011 onwards during the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, who adopted very correct measures regarding Mercosur and against US intelligence in the NSA scandal, and resisted pressure to purchase US warplanes,” stated Pinheiro Guimarães.

In the government program presented a week ago by Marina, proposals were formulated that in some cases are antagonistic to those of the Dilma and Lula governments, in addition to formulating intricate criticisms of what she defines as an "ideologized" and "partisan" diplomacy during the three PT administrations.

Ambassador, are we facing the risk of a return to the diplomatic principles that dominated the second half of the 90s?

I believe that candidate Marina Silva embodies the undoing of the progress achieved in these 12 years. She and the sectors she represents seek a different model of international integration. This thinking translates into the purpose of weakening Mercosur under the pretext of opening it to the world.

Will this be the end of any aspiration for an independent diplomacy?

So far, the only time I've heard Marina talk about independence was when she mentioned the independence of the Central Bank (laughs).

Washington is betting on Marina or Aécio?

I'm not in Washington to say what people think. Now, there are US interests that were harmed during the Lula and Dilma governments, and it's clear that the candidate they liked best was Aécio.

The US Embassy adopted a very discreet profile during the elections, but this should not be confused with the fact that they are oblivious to what is happening. When Aécio is out of the race, the United States leans towards Marina, out of pragmatism and because she represents the opposite of the PT (Workers' Party). Furthermore, she is someone without her own team and, according to reports, has good contacts in the United States, and has demonstrated an openness to dismantling the state, reducing its international capacity and autonomy. It is in the United States' interest that Mercosur be dismantled and that projects from the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) era be resumed; let's not fool ourselves: in these elections, what is at stake is the resumption of the privatization process, partial or total, of Petrobras, Banco do Brasil, and BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank).

How would Marina implement this dismantling of Mercosur?

I believe it could begin with the elimination of the clause that obliges Mercosur countries to jointly negotiate free trade agreements with other blocs. This point, which they have not yet been able to overturn, is a clause that dates back to the Treaty of Asunción (signed in 1991, during the formation of Mercosur).

And after this limitation is lifted, what would happen?

Once this clause is eliminated, the path will be open for Brazil to sign agreements with the European Union without the participation of the other four Mercosur members. But if the clause remains in place, a pact between the entire Mercosur and the European Union would be equally dangerous. And this negotiation, which has already begun but is progressing slowly, will likely be accelerated during Marina's government.

What consequences would an agreement with the EU bring?

Many, one of them being the considerable reduction in European industrial import tariffs affecting our factories. I have long argued that this rapprochement, which pleases Marina's economists, is the initial step towards the end of Mercosur.

To summarize, the signing of an agreement between the two blocs will mean an extraordinary advantage for European companies, which will be able to export here without us charging tariffs, while there will be no major benefits for South American exporters.

And I would add that if this agreement happens, it will affect another fundamental institution of Mercosur, which is the Common External Tariff, set for third countries. If this happens, the customs union, a central quality of Mercosur, will be shattered. And once we reach the hypothetical signing of the free trade agreement with the Europeans, the United States will reappear.

In what way?

The Brazilian media and interest groups that feel represented by Marina Silva only talk about an agreement with the European Union out of opportunism, for the positive image of Europeans, who are supposedly wonderful, educated, and would open the doors of the first world for us. This rhetoric is used to conceal the fact that the agreement will be detrimental to us. Anyone who wants to know what awaits us with this agreement should ask the Greeks and the Spanish how old Europe is treated.

Now all this brings us back to the beginning of this conversation, which is the United States. Why? Because once the EU-Mercosur pact is signed, the very next day Washington will want equal trading conditions that the Europeans have achieved, demanding a free trade agreement from us. The United States has never forgotten the spirit of the FTAA (Free Trade Area of ​​the Americas).

MAR DEL PLATA, NOVEMBER 2005

At the beginning of the last decade, FHC sanctioned Pinheiro Guimarães for publicly opposing the signing of the FTAA, which would be buried during the Summit of the Americas, held in November 2005 in the Argentine resort of Mar del Plata, thanks to a front formed by Presidents Lula, Néstor Kirchner, Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales, supported by other South American leaders in front of an astonished George Walker Bush and his ally, the Mexican Vicente Fox, former Coca-Cola manager with a large mustache.

The FTAA (Free Trade Area of ​​the Americas) thesis could be recreated under another name. Is it possible that Marina Silva, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and the neoliberal intelligentsia will recycle the project?

Everything leads me to believe that the American project of hemispheric commercial integration, of eliminating barriers, of enacting a system of laws that favor its multinational corporations, etc., remains in effect. Attention must be paid to the Pacific Alliance (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile).

I understand that the United States is preparing to revive this proposal if Marina wins. Because her positions on foreign policy reflect the aspirations of business sectors, bankers, and major media outlets that have shown a certain nostalgia for colonial dependence.

With Marina, will we return to the past before the Mar del Plata encounter?

The candidate seems very open to these ideas. But what's interesting is that she's not alone.

In his circle, this spirit that predates the Mar del Plata meeting is expressed. I am referring to Professor André Lara Rasende, Professor Eduardo Giannetti da Fonseca, and Ms. Maria Alice Setúbal (Banco Itaú). Furthermore, it seems natural to me that after the first round (October 5th), other people with similar thinking, who are now supporting candidate Aécio, will join him. I am referring to Professor Armínio Fraga and Professor Pedro Malán.

DILMA RE-ELECTED

Do you believe that, despite Dilma's rise, Marina will be the next president?

No, on the contrary, I believe that, despite all this commotion, President Dilma will be re-elected. I believe that, over these two months, the former senator's ideas will come to the forefront.

In that case, what would be the objectives of your foreign policy in a second term?

First of all, it should be mentioned that her foreign policy did not differ from Lula's, although Dilma did not have the same style of conducting foreign policy. She worked to strengthen the BRICS, promoted the BRICS bank, and was firm in favor of Venezuela's entry into Mercosur, despite the United States having openly expressed its interest in replacing the Venezuelan government, a stance that resonated with the mainstream Brazilian press, FHC (Fernando Henrique Cardoso), and the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) leaders.

In her second term, the president should aim to reduce the country's external vulnerability and dependence on speculative capital to pay the debt, and all of this creates a vicious cycle that increases interest rates. It is false, it is a myth, that rates rise to combat inflation.

In other words, diplomatic alliances should continue, but are changes in international economic strategy necessary?

Yes, and the comment is complete by saying that in a second term, President Dilma will have to work to diversify our foreign trade, to reduce our commercial vulnerability due to the growth of exports of primary products whose prices we do not decide. When I say diversify, I mean a basis for strengthening industrial exports because Brazil risks moving towards a regressive specialization in agricultural and mineral production, accompanied by a contraction of the industrial sector, coupled with an atrophy of its technological capacity.