Moniz Bandeira: In 1964, the generals were following the American playbook.

By Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, in Other words - Following the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1960, the United States' attention increasingly turned to Latin America. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), at the suggestion of the United States, approved Resolution XLVII in December of that year, proposing that the Armed Forces, considered the most stable and modernizing institution on the continent, undertake "civic action" projects and increase their participation in the "economic and social development of nations." Shortly afterward, in January 1961, upon assuming the presidency of the United States, John F. Kennedy (1961–1963) announced his intention to implement a strategy that was both therapeutic and prophylactic, with the goal of defeating subversion wherever it manifested itself. And the Pentagon began to prioritize, in its continental security strategy, not the hypothesis of war against an external, extra-continental enemy (the Soviet Union and China), but the hypothesis of war against the internal enemy, that is, subversion. These guidelines, complementing the counterinsurgency doctrine, were transmitted, through the JID and the military schools in the Panama Canal Zone, to the Armed Forces of Latin America, a region to which President Kennedy repeatedly referred as "the most critical area" and "the most dangerous area in the world."

The surge of coups carried out by the Armed Forces on the continent from then on stemmed not only from domestic factors, but, above all, from the change in the United States' security strategy for the hemisphere. The objective of the Armed Forces' intervention in politics was to align the countries that refused to break relations with Cuba with Washington's directives.

Although coups d'état were almost routine in Latin America, those that occurred from 1960 onwards did not stem from national policies. Rather, they constituted battles of the hidden Third World War, an international political phenomenon resulting from the Cold War. And it was necessary to create the objective conditions—economic, social, and political—that would compel the Armed Forces to carry them out. The CIA dedicated itself to this task through spoiling operations, one of which consisted of penetrating political, student, labor, and other organizations to artificially induce the radicalization of the crisis and favor the overthrow of the government through a military coup.

In Brazil, ever since the commanders of the Armed Forces failed to prevent Vice-President João Goulart of the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) from assuming the presidency in August 1961, following the resignation of President Jânio Quadros, the CIA began assisting various sectors of the opposition that were conspiring to overthrow him. In 1962, the CIA spent between US$12 million and US$20 million financing the electoral campaigns of right-wing deputies through organizations created by its agents, such as the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (IBAD) and Parliamentary Democratic Action. The number of deputies elected through these and other CIA fronts did not compensate for the losses. But the spoiling operations continued.

In mid-1963, the Pentagon sought to develop several contingency plans in order to intervene militarily in Brazil should President João Goulart, reacting to economic pressure from the United States, shift further to the left, becoming ultranationalist, in the style of President Getúlio Vargas's government.

Around the same time, on June 13, 1963, the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, under the leadership of Ambassador Roberto Campos, sent to Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) the document "North American Foreign Policy – ​​Analysis of Some Aspects," Annex 1 and only one to Official Letter No. 516/900 (Secret), in which it commented that pressure from the Pentagon was leading the United States to recognize and cultivate "friendly relations with the worst right-wing dictatorships," because "from the point of view of the military sectors in Washington, such governments are much more useful to the interests of continental security than constitutional regimes."

Meanwhile, CIA agents carried out a wide variety of political operations (POO), covert actions, and spoiling actions. On September 12, 1963, corporals, sergeants, and non-commissioned officers, mainly from the Air Force and Navy, led by Sergeant Antônio Prestes de Paulo, revolted in Brasília and occupied the buildings of the Federal Police, the Central Radio Patrol Station, Rádio Nacional, and the Urban and Interurban Telephone Department. The movement served as a provocation and contributed to placing the officers of the Armed Forces in favor of the coup d'état. The CIA campaign continued, instigating strikes in both cities and farms, and other increasingly radical actions to characterize a revolutionary war, denounced by Congressman Francisco Bilac Pinto of the UDN in several speeches in the Federal Chamber, in which he accused President Goulart of supporting it. And, in order to make it appear as if a communist insurrection was underway, between March 25 and 27, 1964, José Anselmo dos Santos, known as "Corporal Anselmo," but in reality a university student infiltrated among the sailors by the Navy Information Center (Cenimar) in collaboration with the CIA, led hundreds of sailors who decided to celebrate the anniversary of the Association of Sailors and Marines, defying the prohibition of the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Sílvio Mota, and rushed to the headquarters of the Metalworkers' Union in Rio de Janeiro in order to involve the workers in the movement. The marines, sent to invade the union, evict and arrest the sailors, ended up joining the mutiny. The Army had to intervene to quell it.

The episode aimed to stage a repeat of the mutiny on the battleship Potemkin, which triggered the 1905 revolution in Russia. This mutiny aggravated the effects of the sergeants' revolt and pushed the remaining loyalist officers to the side of the conspirators. The Armed Forces could not accept the breakdown of hierarchy and discipline. Goulart had already lost almost all military support. Between March 31 and April 1, he heard from many senior officers that they were not against their president, but "against communism," a phantom that served as a pretext for the coup.

Four days before the coup, the United States ambassador, Lincoln Gordon, telephoned Washington and demanded the shipment of oil and lubricants to facilitate the logistical operations of the conspirators, as well as the deployment of a naval force. On March 30, the CIA station in Brazil transmitted to Washington, according to sources in Belo Horizonte, that "a revolution carried out by anti-Goulart forces will take place this week, probably in a few days," and would march towards Rio de Janeiro. On the same day, while President João Goulart was addressing sergeants at the Automobile Club, Secretary of State Dean Rusk read to Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, by telephone, the text of telegram No. 1.296, suggesting that, since ships loaded with weapons and ammunition could not reach southern Brazil for at least ten days, the United States could send them by air. He feared that in those few hours there might be an accommodation, which would be deeply embarrassing for the American government.

The sailors' mutiny on March 26th was the provocation that General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco had been waiting for to induce the majority of the military to accept a break with legality. The coup was planned for after the March of the Family with God for Liberty in Rio de Janeiro, scheduled for April 2nd and financed by the CIA. However, General Olímpio Mourão Filho, commander of the IV Military Region, based in Juiz de Fora (MG), hastened events.

The Brazilian military certainly wouldn't have carried out the coup if they hadn't had the backing of the United States. However, for the United States to provide military aid, it was necessary to give the coup an appearance of legitimacy. And by telephone, from his ranch in Texas, on March 31st, President Lyndon B. Johnson gave the green light to Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Thomas Mann.

The coup d'état was complete, aided by Senator Auro de Moura Andrade, who illegally declared the presidency vacant. Deputy Pascoal Ranieri Mazzilli, first in line to succeed him as president of the Chamber of Deputies, assumed the government. No legal formalities were observed.

Nevertheless, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon recommended to the State Department that the new government be recognized, and President Lyndon B. Johnson immediately telegraphed Mazzilli to congratulate him. Diplomatic recognition was one of the necessary elements for establishing the government's authority. The purpose of the haste was to justify the fulfillment of any request for military assistance from the new government.

The coup d'état that overthrew President João Goulart in 1964 and proclaimed itself the "Redemptive Revolution" exemplified the set of operations that the CIA developed and refined. In his diary, CIA agent Philip Agee, then stationed in Montevideo, noted that Goulart's downfall was "undoubtedly largely due to careful planning and consistent propaganda campaigns that went back at least to the 1962 election." Goulart knew this. Upon arriving in Brasília on April 1st, he told Congressman Tancredo Neves that the CIA had inspired the uprising, reiterating his intention not to surrender. He then went to Rio Grande do Sul, where he realized that there were no conditions for resistance either.

The satisfaction was so great in Washington that, on April 3rd, at 12:26 PM, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Thomas Mann, phoned President Lyndon B. Johnson: "I hope you are as pleased with Brazil as I am." Johnson replied: "I am." Mann continued: "I think it's the most important thing that has happened in the hemisphere in three years." Johnson concluded: "I hope they'll give us some credit instead of hell."