Jacqueline Muniz: "Firearms have color, sex, and gender"

Leonardo Fernandes, Brazil of Fact - Jacqueline Muniz is today one of the most level-headed voices in the debate on public security in Brazil. She is a professor in the Department of Public Security at UFF, founder of the Network of Police and Civil Society of Latin America, and a member of the Brazilian Forum on Public Security.

A graduate in Social Sciences from the Federal Fluminense University (UFF), Jacqueline holds a master's degree in Social Anthropology from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), a doctorate in Political Science from the Brazilian Society of Instruction (SBI/IUPERJ), and a post-doctorate in Strategic Studies. She has held positions in public administration since 1999. She was director of the Public Security Secretariat of the State Government of Rio de Janeiro. Subsequently, she was Sectoral Coordinator of Public Security, Justice and Human Rights and director of the Department of Research, Information Analysis and Personnel Development in Public Security of the Ministry of Justice.

In an exclusive interview with Brasil de Fato, the anthropologist discusses Jair Bolsonaro's government's proposals for public security and demands concrete actions, not just ideas. Check it out:

Brasil de Fato: How do you assess Sérgio Moro's move to the Ministry of Justice and the so-called "crusade against corruption" that he claims to lead?

Jacqueline Muniz: Well, the first thing is that the current minister, a former judge, needs to show what he's capable of. Up to this point, the proposals presented haven't yet gained an executive dimension, meaning they aren't capable of being implemented within the executive branch. They are all ideas, not yet structured, that must be submitted to the legislature. Since the legislature hasn't yet returned to work, we await what actually constitutes the action plan, the criminal justice and public security policy of the current government, which should be executed and managed by the current minister. So the question remains: there's a lot under the minister's purview, but little concrete action. This generates misgovernance, an inability to take concrete action, to apply resources, and to transfer resources to the states. There's something called public management that depends on having concrete actions. Otherwise, it will just be a political platform.

Under the Ministry of Justice lies the National Public Security Fund, the National Force, the Prison Police, and the National Penitentiary Fund (FUNPEN). All of this awaits implementation. What will be done with the budget approved the previous year? What is the intention? What are the priorities? This is because the fight against corruption, as proposed, depends overwhelmingly and exclusively on the legislature. So you don't need to be a minister for that. It would have been better to have been a deputy or senator to go there and vote and guarantee measures. Therefore, for me, it's a question mark. What a judge was or wasn't is of little use for an executive position. You need some experience, knowledge of previous policies, ongoing programs, what will be added, what will be done differently. We are waiting. For now, it's all attitude, posture, and performance, but little concrete action.

The first measure taken by Jair Bolsonaro's government regarding public safety was the easing of gun ownership laws in Brazil. What are the consequences of this decision?

The president needed to pretend to do something, since the critical areas of the government, including the economic issue, seem to be outside his competence, curiously. So it seems to me that he is hastily fulfilling a poorly conceived campaign promise. The proposal, as presented, provides neither collective security nor individual protection. In fact, the average citizen with a gun in hand becomes vulnerable to any self-defense and only becomes brave if he has the prerogative to attack. In other words, he is neither protecting himself, on the one hand, nor contributing to public safety, on the other. In fact, the easing of gun ownership is a public insecurity problem. We already know that easy access to weapons favors suicide, fatal accidents involving children and young people, and encourages femicide. It also maximizes attacks on homes, because now there is something to steal inside; Weapons are a valuable commodity for crime, and they also lower the price of illegal and clandestine weapons, both in terms of purchase and rental for criminal activities. Furthermore, for the police, armed citizens increase the escalation of force. Every time an individual is armed and confronted by the police, the police are authorized to use far more force than they would to contain that particular problem.

What lies behind this is called property, power of command, power of possession. And in Brazil, who owns the woman? The man. Who owns the worker? The boss. Places have owners, things have owners. What will happen is that we are stimulating social conflict that occurs in an extremely unequal scenario, of unequal citizenship. Maximizing the idea that one can have four weapons per person actually imposes a cost on the citizen who can buy them for R$ 40. Who can afford that? That's what it's about. We are reaffirming powers of command, privileges, powers of possession. Weapons have color, sex, gender. And that's what the politically incorrect bullies are unable to say publicly. It's not about improving security or making citizens feel safer in their domestic environment. It's about reproducing unequal mechanisms.

Another issue that involves color, race, and social class is the issue of prison policy in Brazil. Minister Sérgio Moro announced his support for the proposal to reduce the age of criminal responsibility. What could be the impact of such a policy?

In Brazil, the youth who die most from violence are poor and Black people. And they are the ones who will be most affected by lowering the age of criminal responsibility. I would like to remind you that in Brazil, the first time the reduction of the age of criminal responsibility was discussed in a differentiated way, according to the regions of the country, was during the First Republic. As soon as Brazil became a Republic, there were discussions in Congress about changing the Code of Criminal Procedure and lowering the age of criminal responsibility. This was because it was understood that we Brazilians, not being necessarily evolved, being products of miscegenation, would be incapable of taking care of our own lives. If we are strong, from a physical point of view, we would be weak, from a mental point of view, always requiring the tutelage of the State. If this had happened, if the liberal and progressive deputies had joined this wave of lowering the age of criminal responsibility, neither the current minister nor Professor Jacqueline would be pursuing their careers. Because, as we are both mixed-race, he and I would be in preventive detention, that is, for being unable to conform to the white, superior, Caucasian, civilized race.

So, as you can see, these discourses come and go. The impact of this will be bad because the problem in Brazil isn't quantity, it's poor prison practices. The Brazilian prison system is extremely expensive and, at the same time, inhumane, incapable of guaranteeing the fulfillment of sentences as stipulated in the penal execution law, and therefore, the result is a disaster. They cut social programs, reduce social and labor rights, and offer more prison time as a mechanism for regulating the workforce and unemployment, because more prison time removes people from the job search. It will seem that unemployment in Brazil has fallen, either because citizens were killed – some by each other, because of weapons, or by law enforcement agents – or because they are confined within the prison. We need better, more qualified prison management that allows for greater transparency and the consequential and responsive control of sentences, because one day these people will be released.

The executive branch needs to have policies. What is the policy for youth in situations of social vulnerability? What is the policy for youth who have committed crimes, who are in conflict with the law? The question is how we are going to reduce the homicide rate in Brazil and the high degree of police victimization to which we are exposed. That's what it's about. Another issue is the degree of police lethality. Are we going to confront this or not? Or are we going to keep playing games with a false war against crime?

In São Paulo, Governor João Dória (PSDB) proposes privatizing the entire state prison system as a solution to the problem. What do you think of this proposal?

Once again, there's that fantasy that the market is superior to public management. That's an illusion. There are things where private management works better, and others where public management also works better. This story of fully privatizing the prison system or part of the prison administration has been going on for many years, since the 80s. What they're aiming for with this [privatization of prisons] is profit.

The individual wins the election and then hands everything over to the private sector. Or he's just too lazy to work; because in the end, the state doesn't become minimal, it becomes minuscule. If it becomes minuscule, why do we even need a governor, a president, or a legislative assembly? Put everything in the hands of companies and let's watch them compete as if the world were a war zone.

I want to know what the relationship with the system will be like, the prison issue, the career paths of the employees, how the job security of these employees will be maintained, because they are all exposed to risks inside and outside the prison.

It's important to remember that the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) was born in São Paulo's prisons. The PCC presents itself as an autonomous government, spreads throughout the country, and continues to operate as a source of undeclared campaign funds. So what do they want? The São Paulo prisons are already privatized, and the PCC is there. So what? Does the PCC now have a CNPJ (Brazilian tax ID)? Will they effectively govern? Will they create a shell company to manage what they already control? Or will the State regain control of the prisons? Because that's what it's about. The prisons are already illegally privatized and controlled. It seems to me that they are not a good example because, in the end, in the private sector, what really matters is competition; the pursuit of profit is superior to the results that should be produced for the community.

We have a militarized public security system, but there's a promise from the new government, and even from state governments like that of Rio de Janeiro, to place the entire security system under military command. What's your opinion on this?

In fact, I could say that the world of militarization in Brazil corresponds to that saying: "let those who are military sort it out among themselves." Because there is no common command and control structure. There is no coordination between institutions. In reality, everyone is pointing fingers at everyone else and asking who is in charge. The idea that people will salute each other internally is an illusion.

Here in Rio de Janeiro, for example, whenever there has been intervention by members of the armed forces, and I would like to remind you that from 1820 until the Brizola government in the 80s, the Military Police was commanded by members of the armed forces. And this has not necessarily implied, throughout almost 200 years of history, an improvement in the quality of service provided.

What changes the quality of service delivery is politics. What is your plan? What is your policy? Where does what the police will do begin and end? What are your priorities? Therefore, the idea of ​​militarization, as implemented here in Rio and elsewhere, is nothing more than the continued replacement of everyday policing, whether investigative, visible, emergency response, or intelligence-based. In short, whatever the dimension, it is the replacement of these everyday dynamics, the "bread and butter," with the so-called "goat syndrome": the up and down of the hill, punctual, high-visibility actions that are incapable of producing control of the territory and the population for obvious reasons. So much so that the intervention in Rio de Janeiro left through the back door, with lamentable, paltry results, considering the investment, the cost in lives, and all the goals were not met.

And this has been the case because the trend is much more towards the electoral and political spectacle than towards the tedious, routine, and monotonous daily life of public security. What works in public security is what happens now and soon; it's the routine, the obvious, the glaringly obvious, therefore, conventional, integrated policing, articulated with society in a way that produces results beyond the immediate outburst and shock. The outburst of authority in the face of the shocks of criminal actions. Now, it's impossible to live in a policy of outbursts and shocks.

We need to build something more lasting and everyday. And that has to do with daily life. All of this is not very visible, it has little prestige and little visibility. So, the discourse of militarization is much more the discourse of "we want law and order, look how we want discipline." I'm sorry, order doesn't exist on its own. Order is the product of a construction with society. Does that take work? Yes, it does.

In public safety, it's difficult to go around inaugurating plaques or painting street curbs with lime. Public safety is a lot of work, with little visibility in terms of short-term results. Because every day there will be a corpse on the doorstep of some government official. Even if the homicide rate and the number of robberies fall, we will still have a measure of conflict and violence. That's why it's necessary to move beyond the publicity-driven politics typical of São Paulo's government. We need to act on a daily basis.

This daily routine is indeed tedious, tiring, and tiresome. It doesn't allow for heroics, but it does allow for resilience, competence, professionalism, transparency, and accountability.