Boulos: the coup and the ten steps backward

By Guilherme Boulos, in Capital letter  - In Brazil's recent history, it would be difficult to find a period as marked by regression as 2016. In a short space of time, democracy and social rights were savagely attacked. It was the year in which the relationship between social forces lost all balance, in a shift in favor of the 1%, without any system of checks and balances.

The consummation of the parliamentary coup in April-May, and its confirmation in August, opened Pandora's box, which had been waiting for a suitable opportunity. Old projects were dusted off. The audacity of the ruling class, contained for some time, returned with renewed force.

Enthusiastically, the president of the National Confederation of Industry publicly expressed his nostalgia for the 19th century, with its 12-hour workdays, and proposed it as a benchmark for labor reform.

To understand 2016 and plan for 2017, it is necessary to grasp the reasons that led to the parliamentary coup in Brazil. With the worsening economic crisis, capital began demanding harsh measures to guarantee its profitability: attacking labor rights by reducing the cost of labor, and cutting public investment to ensure the payment of debt interest.

The new global scenario, coupled with changes in the internal balance of power, led the bourgeoisie to exert strong pressure in this direction.

They quickly understood that the country was at a crossroads. It was no longer possible to maintain the "win-win" strategy of the previous period, based on accommodating opposing interests through budgetary management.

With the slowdown in Chinese growth and the drastic reduction in commodity prices, the financial room for maneuver to secure its interests while simultaneously guaranteeing heavy social investments had been greatly reduced. The blanket had shrunk, and someone would be left uncovered. The ruling class acted quickly to ensure that it wasn't them.

After her re-election, Dilma Rousseff made significant gestures indicating that she could cater to these interests. The disastrous 2015 adjustment, the proposed pension reform, and the repeated attempts to reconcile with sectors already settled in the opposition fall into this category. But it wasn't enough. They wanted more.

Furthermore, they harbored a deep distrust of the president due to the attempt at economic policy change made in 2012, with the reduction of interest rates and bank spreads. The desired project required a new government or, in FHC's words, a "new power bloc".

This led them, after some hesitation, to overwhelmingly support the impeachment. It's clear they couldn't have emerged victorious without other political and social factors. Operation Lava Jato, with its selective conduct and calculated leaks, was decisive in creating the necessary political instability.

When Sergio Moro illegally leaks the conversation between Lula and Dilma, he positions himself as an actor in the coup. When Minister Teori Zavascki decides to remove Eduardo Cunha only after the latter has orchestrated Dilma's impeachment, even though the request had been on his desk for four months, he implicates the Supreme Court in the plot.

The street protests, openly encouraged by the media, also played a prominent role in the process. As did Cunha's appointment as Speaker of the House, which undermined Dilma's parliamentary governability. And, of course, the government's own erratic policies, which eroded its support base in society, contributed to disarming the conditions for resistance.

Michel Temer, the vice president, took office in May promising to pacify the country. Far from it, his government represents the beginning of a long period of instability in Brazilian society.

The Temer government represents the greatest risk of setbacks for the Brazilian people since the end of the dictatorship. Because he was not elected and does not intend to seek re-election, he can commit the greatest atrocities without having to answer to society, without any political or electoral cost.

No government in the New Republic was so comfortable committing atrocities. In the case of Itamar Franco, the political context and the level of social resistance did not allow for such audacity.

The regressive proposal championed by Temer, initiated this year but which will face its ultimate test in 2017, is condensed into three major measures: the Spending Cap Amendment and the pension and labor reforms.

This ultraliberal program is further compounded by a resurgence of political conservatism, with setbacks in various areas and attacks on current Black, feminist, and LGBT agendas, as well as an increase in the criminalization of popular struggles.

The proposed amendment, underestimated by many on the left, represents a true "deconstitutionalization." It mortally wounds what is most advanced in the 1988 Constitution: its social safety net.

It should also be noted that this is an unprecedented measure internationally: neither Carlos Menem, nor Alberto Fujimori, much less the wizards of the IMF, ever proposed including a 20-year austerity policy as a constitutional clause.

This also implies a complete demoralization of Brazilian democracy, as it predetermines the economic policy for the next four presidents who will be elected by popular vote.

In fact, if implemented, the proposed fiscal regime will lead to a collapse of social policy and public services. The dismantling of social programs created during the PT (Workers' Party) governments is underway, with the prospect of gradual bleeding until they die of starvation.

In the case of public services, they will simply lose their operational capacity in the medium term, which is certainly part of the script associated with a strong pro-privatization discourse, willing to eliminate the notion of universal rights, including in education and health.

In the case of healthcare, a collapse is predictable in the short term. We are living through a clash between reduced supply and increased demand, a so-called perfect storm.

With the recession and unemployment, around 1,7 million Brazilians left private health insurance plans between the second half of 2015 and the middle of this year. They returned, therefore, to the SUS (Unified Health System). This happened precisely at a time when the austerity policy, brutally deepened by the PEC (Proposed Constitutional Amendment), is reducing resources for investment.

The increase in poverty and precarious employment, visible to the naked eye, will be exacerbated by the eventual approval of the pension and labor reforms. In the latter case, there are two main measures: generalizing outsourcing and prioritizing negotiated agreements over legislation.

If implemented, the CLT (Consolidation of Labor Laws) will be reduced to mere ornamentation, as there will be ample room for contracts that circumvent the rights guaranteed by it. It's worth noting that not even the dictatorship, in its 21 years, dared to tamper with the CLT. Temer, in just a few months, is venturing to do so.

There is no yardstick to measure the regression. Resistance, of course, exists. The important struggle of students, with occupations of schools and universities throughout Brazil, should not be underestimated, nor should the significant increase in occupations by the homeless in the fight for housing in large cities.

Just like the struggle of public servants against the austerity packages, especially in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, in the mobilizations against the coup, hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the streets on several occasions. It must be recognized, however, that we are far from what is needed to block this process.

Those who are betting on social pacification will need to reconsider. If there is any certainty regarding 2017, it is the fact that it will be a year of profound instability. The recipe for dealing with the recession through reduced investment, besides being economically foolish, is socially explosive.

Today's Rio de Janeiro is a harbinger of tomorrow's Brazil. This is evident both in the intensification of attacks and in the strengthening of resistance. The penny is dropping. It will be difficult to count on the passivity of broad sectors of the population when the effects of this bitter recipe are felt more strongly.

It will also be difficult to maintain for long the narrative that everything is the PT's fault and that Temer and his financial team are merely "getting Brazil out of the red."

Next year is also expected to be the year of the Odebrecht plea bargain, which is likely to deepen the political crisis and strengthen the power of the Curitiba Republic. Its effects are unpredictable.

The possibility of Temer being forced to leave office, opening the way for an indirect election by a Parliament demoralized by corruption and trickery, should not be ruled out. Incidentally, a certain resident of the Higienópolis neighborhood has been showing his true colors.

Political instability, social instability. The timing of this unfolding is unclear, but it is very likely that waves of popular reaction, spontaneous or organized, will mark Brazilian reality. Where this will lead, and whether the left and social movements will be able to channel this momentum into a counter-hegemonic project, is uncertain. It still depends on many variables.

It will definitely not be a year of stagnation. The ruling class has reason to be alarmed by the political uncertainty and even more so by the potential for escalating social conflicts. Ironically, the violence of the attacks from their own government is the main fuel for Brazil to catch fire.