A meme

One of the organizations calling for the June 10th protest is circulating a meme with the words "Out with Temer. New elections."

The event on June 10th is a unified event. But, obviously, each organizing group has the full right to defend its particular point of view.

This particular case is surprising, since the organization in question was one of the most opposed to including the defense of [something] in the slogans of the fight against the coup. immediate changes in economic policy, arguing that this type of slogan could weaken the Dilma government.

Also surprising is the direct and somewhat thoughtless way in which "new elections" are advocated, going far beyond the cautious and tentative proposal that had been approved by the party that leads that organization.

Be that as it may, it is clear that (at least) two tactics still exist in the fight against coup attempts.

Previously, there were those who argued that to better defend democracy, it was necessary to immediately change economic policy. And there were those who, with different arguments, distinguished between the two tasks.

Now, on the one hand, there are those who advocate concentrating energies on defeating the impeachment. This means, among other things: a) not giving up the legality and legitimacy of the popular mandate won in 2014; b) which in turn includes committing to implementing the victorious program of 2014 upon returning to the presidency.

On the other hand, there are those who argue that to defeat the impeachment, we should advocate for calling new elections.

To put it plainly, this second position argues that, in order to win over/reverse the votes of some senators who voted for impeachment on May 12th, President Dilma should commit to resigning part of her term.

Those who defend this position adopt, sometimes in isolation, sometimes in combination, three lines of argument, according to which the defense of new elections: a) would supposedly allow for the division of the coup plotters and victory in the Senate; b) would supposedly engage with sectors of the population that are against Temer but do not want the president's return; c) would supposedly solve the problem of the president's governability upon her return. 

The first line of argument states the following: the coup plotters face a major problem.

To be clear: popular resistance, plus the disagreements among them, which includes leaks and arrest warrants, all this together demonstrates that it will not be easy to approve the impeachment. And even if they manage to consummate the coup in the Senate, Temer would still have great difficulty continuing to govern until 2018.

Thus, that sector of the coup plotters that is less concerned with saving their own skin and more concerned with implementing a harsh neoliberal program—an implementation that presupposes a government with more legitimacy than Temer's—that sector of the coup plotters is beginning to think about alternatives.

There are several alternatives available, from parliamentarism to a classic coup. But one of the alternatives that has been appearing most frequently in the speculations of this sector of the coup plotters is the calling of early presidential elections, whether for an interim term or a six-year term.

This alternative has its disadvantages, among them its unpredictability. But it also has some advantages for the coup plotters, including appearing democratic, as well as "pleasing" sectors that oppose both Dilma and Temer.

This is, in fact, the second line of argument from left-wing sectors that advocate for new elections: large sectors of the population do not tolerate Temer, but do not want the president to return. Therefore, they say, new elections would appeal to these sectors.

Finally, it is argued that if we win in the Senate, Dilma would return to the presidency but would lack governability, as the existing majority in Congress would sabotage our government.

Each of these lines of argument contains some truth. The error, in our opinion, lies in the argument as a whole. Let's examine them point by point:

1. The fight against the coup has as one of its main lines of resistance the defense of legality and democratic legitimacy. President Dilma is the main guarantor of this defense. If she accepts to relinquish part of the mandate she won in 2014, this would weaken one of the main arguments we use against the coup. After all, if the president can relinquish legality/legitimacy, why couldn't Congress also?

2. Moreover, let's suppose the president announced she was willing to make this gesture. Who would guarantee that yesterday's coup-plotting senators would actually honor the terrible deal they are offering? Who would guarantee that we wouldn't lose anyway, by vote, even after having previously announced our willingness to compromise?

3. Assuming they comply, there would still be a small "detail": how to constitutionally materialize the proposal for new elections? As far as we know, there would be two alternatives: either the resignation of the ticket elected in 2014 or a constitutional amendment that would require 2/3 of the votes in both legislative houses. Resignation, needless to say, is the golden dream of the coup plotters: our heads would be cut off by ourselves. As for a constitutional amendment, this would only be approved by 2/3 of both houses if the anticipation of elections is actually an alternative in the interest of most of the right wing (and not just some senators who are in doubt now).

4. But let's imagine that such an amendment is approved and that elections are brought forward, for a temporary term or for a six-year term. Does anyone imagine that general elections called under these conditions would necessarily be a democratic solution?

Without a doubt, we need to regain the support of a segment of the population that opposes Temer but is not with us. But the path of bringing forward the elections, contrary to what it seems, does not help in this. In practice, it would only serve to remove us from the path. In other words: it would not change people's opinion of us, it would only remove us from their sight.

Undoubtedly, if we defeat the coup in the Senate, we will have problems with institutional governance. But we already know this, and the only complete solution to this—in institutional terms—is the election of a new Congress that is more progressive than the current one. This implies a change in the balance of power and the rules. None of this would be possible to achieve in the short time between the Senate vote and the new elections. Therefore, taken in isolation, the alternative of new presidential elections would not help to solve the problem of congressional governance either.

In practice, the result of new elections would be: either we will have someone in the presidency aligned with the current congressional majority; or we will have someone in conflict with this majority. There would, of course, be the possibility of calling general elections. But can anyone imagine the current Congress calling for early general elections? And for what reasons, under the conditions described, would new elections result in a better Congress?

In short, the problems pointed out by those who advocate for new elections are real and should be debated. They all point to the following: the political crisis we are experiencing is more serious than it seems and continues to deepen. And, as is natural in these moments, magical solutions of all kinds emerge.

One of these magical solutions is the idea of ​​calling a plebiscite on whether or not to hold new elections. This proposal, as explained before, involves a trade: some senators promise to vote against impeachment, provided the president commits to calling a plebiscite in which the people decide whether or not to bring forward the elections.

We've said it before and we'll say it again: this type of proposal implies that we would give up the legality/legitimacy of our mandate in exchange for a promise. And even if they fulfill the promise and the impeachment is defeated, what alternative would we have in the plebiscite? Would we defend that there should be no new elections? It's obvious that, if the plebiscite is proposed, the only position left to us would be to support its anticipation. In practice, therefore, defending the plebiscite is a disguised way of defending that we give up part of the mandate won in 2014, which would render our eventual victory in the Senate absolutely ineffective.

With one aggravating factor: the coup would receive a makeover and be presented as a "democratic rearrangement." And it could impose a double defeat on us. In the plebiscite, we would inevitably be asked why we made the country suffer so much, if in the end we were willing to give up part of the mandate. And anyone can imagine what the result of this would be in the presidential elections.

One more question remains: in the presidential race, which candidate should one support according to the logic of "dialogue with opposing sectors"?

The most terrifying aspect of these magical proposals is that they go against the growing sentiment in the streets. And what has been growing is the "Out with Temer" movement. It's also necessary to pay attention to the conflict within the coup's ranks, a conflict that is leading several of our tormentors to believe they could be arrested and lose their mandates. All of this increases their willingness to find a way out. But it also further fuels the indignation and popular mobilization against the coup plotters and against the measures of the coup government.

In this context, the proposal for new elections only makes sense to those who have their eyes set on institutional order, more precisely on the arrangements and rearrangements of the coup-supporting factions. The problem is that this fixed focus on institutional order was one of the many mistakes that led us to our current difficulties. Repeating this mistake will not help us at all. This is because it leaves the initiative in the hands of this or that sector of the coup plotters, while simultaneously affecting the unity of the popular movement.

The proposal for new elections has, as one of its practical effects, to confuse and divide the united front against the coup. In relative terms, it would have a similar effect to João Goulart's acceptance of parliamentarism. For some, it even seemed like a victory, allowing Jango to take office without further conflict. But the truth is the opposite: unlike the suicide of 1954, which postponed the coup for ten years, the capitulation of 1961 only made it clear to the coup plotters that the democratic and popular camp was not willing to go to the ultimate consequences. The lack of resistance in 1964 was a collateral effect of that capitulation.

For all these reasons and more, a proposal to bring forward the presidential elections is only justifiable after a vote on the merits in the Senate and, obviously, if we lose. In that case, bringing forward the elections would aim to shorten the illegitimate term of a coup leader. And not, as is now being proposed, to shorten the legal and legitimate term of someone who received 54 million votes.

Therefore, Temer out! And let's retake the presidency!!!