Rafael Bastos avatar

Raphael Bastos

Professor at the Faculty of Education at UERJ (Rio de Janeiro State University) and in the Postgraduate Program and the Public Policy Laboratory.

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Organized fan groups, the State, violence, and the need for a non-Manichean debate.

"We are facing yet another opportunity to act in the face of a far from simple phenomenon. It is also necessary to avoid insisting on standard, tried-and-tested, and failed responses."

Organized fan groups, the State, violence, and the need for a non-Manichean debate (Photo: Reproduction)

The scenes of violence that preceded the classic Rio de Janeiro derby between Flamengo and Vasco, on Sunday, March 05th of this year, once again brought the organized fan groups (TOs) of football teams to the front pages of our newspapers. 

Common sense tends to label such organizations as marginal. This process, on the one hand, has been fueled by the actions of the respective fan groups themselves, but very strongly by the press and public authorities, such as the judiciary, the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Military Police. In this text, I discuss some of the complexities of organized fan groups, the inadequacy of this type of hegemonic perspective, and the persistent failure of state actions.  

As a football enthusiast and someone curious about the subject, I also participate in fan movements. An unusual coincidence led me to experience firsthand some of the behind-the-scenes drama surrounding the Fluminense football team, which I now share in a reflective manner.  

On March 01st, in Nova Iguaçu, a match took place between the team of the same name from that city in the Baixada Santista region and the colossal Esporte Clube Vitória. The match, valid for the first phase of the Copa do Brasil, unfortunately ended with an ambush by Vasco fans against members of the Vitória supporters' group and members of a Flamengo supporters' group allied with Vitória.  

Due to our participation in the game, our supporters' group made prior contact with the local police. On the day of the match, we noticed a low presence of this public security agency. This was somewhat reasonable, a priori, since there is no history of friction between the Nova Iguaçu and Vitória fan groups. However, after the tragic episode, we concluded that there was a failure in policing, as we understood the dynamics of the attack and realized the number of people mobilized, at the end of the match, from outside the stadium, moving towards us.

Later, news reports about the incident were mostly unequivocal in stating that fan groups were involved in a brawl. However, experiencing the event firsthand, it became clear that the headlines were insufficient to describe the dynamics of the confrontation.

Returning to the classic Rio de Janeiro derby on March 05th, many fan groups were warned, via social media, about the possibility of clashes between Vasco and Flamengo supporters. On the day of the match itself, the activity in the city, in multiple locations, showed that the organization of the fans for that game was several shades more heated than usual. The predicted tragedy was confirmed with a death, intense fights near the Maracanã stadium, on public transport, and in some more distant neighborhoods, such as Madureira. 

Quickly, the main organized fan groups of Vasco (Força Jovem) and Flamengo (Raça Rubro-Negra and Jovem Fla) published statements on social media explaining the procedures they adopted with the Specialized Stadium Policing Battalion (BEPE). There was a consensus that in the areas where BEPE was present, no clashes occurred, but that participants found some changes in BEPE's operational strategy strange, such as the repositioning of access points for each fan group. They also alleged a lack of policing in some strategic points near the Maracanã stadium. Based on my prior experience and reading the situation, I tend to agree with the assessments of the aforementioned fan groups.

Extensive images show a large number of fans moving around with pieces of wood, etc., escorted by the PMERJ (Military Police of Rio de Janeiro), in some parts of the city and the Baixada Fluminense region. Analyzing all of this leads us to understand that the security failures are clear. The causes need to be brought to light.   

A brief legal and political history is necessary to better understand the existing tensions between public authorities and their relationship with organized fan groups. In 2003, an important milestone became national law: the Fan Statute, which addresses the rights and duties of sports fans. In 2008, the main organized fan groups from the four major cities created the Federation of Organized Fan Groups of Rio de Janeiro. Some interpretations attribute this fact, as well as the close dialogue between the leaders of the organized fan groups and the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ), to a certain decrease in confrontations for a period.    

In 2016, the Guide of Recommendations for the Action of Public Security Forces in Sports Venues was published, with the aim of creating rules and procedures in Brazilian stadiums. This document was developed based on numerous hearings and through studies by experts.   

In 2013, organized fan groups were banned in Rio de Janeiro, but a law passed last year by the Legislative Assembly granted them amnesty. This act, however, was supposed to be linked to a Conduct Adjustment Agreement (TAC). Both the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ) and the Public Prosecutor's Office (MP) systematically criticized the amnesty. Governor Cláudio Castro partially vetoed Law 9.883/22. In the end, the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro (ALERJ) re-examined the matter, overturning Castro's veto and indicating the need for the TAC to be drawn up between the fan groups, the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the PMERJ.  

On March 13th of this year, the judiciary stepped in, banning the main organized fan groups in the state for five years and ordering the arrest of their leaders. The fights during the derby led to this measure, disregarding the recent law and all prior dialogue between other levels of government.

Perhaps some elements explain the current tension between organized crime groups and local public authorities. It appears that each body acts in its own way, but they coincide in their perspective on the use of repressive forces. If we relate this to other instances of public authorities' protagonism associated with repression, such as the war on drugs, the arbitrariness, the violation of laws, and the failure of this formula become evident. However, the same path is repeated. 

The mainstream press corroborates this theme of marginalization, but is contradictory regarding football-related content. Several television broadcasts, for example, show the chants of organized fan groups, including images of the celebrations at their peak, such as when a goal is scored. Thus, they benefit from the spectacle that these members provide in the stadiums. On the other hand, there is a repressive logic in various other situations, as an immediate response to society.

The process of drafting the aforementioned amnesty law may raise good alternatives for attempting to address the problem of fan violence, as it involved dialogue, hearings, etc. In addition, it addresses sexist, racial, and homophobic issues, which are so necessary to rethink in society as a whole. 

To link the image of organized fan groups to marginality is a fruitless reductionism. This action does not consider the power of these people, in terms of their willingness to organize collective actions, from cheering to even protesting (in a unified way) for democracy, as was the case with the first major Brazilian demonstrations, at the height of the pandemic in 2020, during the Bolsonaro government.

It is necessary to consider the expertise of these people in dealing with the various forms of repression from public authorities, including sectors of Brazilian society that believe the standard of fan attendance in stadiums should mirror the European model. This has been intensifying since the modernization of stadiums for the 2014 FIFA World Cup. In the Copa Libertadores, for example, we see the repetition of the single-final model in a neutral stadium/country, with exorbitant ticket prices. Organized fan groups are a clear example of the antithesis to this standard.  

Studies on this phenomenon demonstrate how there is a set of "diplomatic" relationships between fan groups. It is also pointed out that the organization goes far beyond violence, but has very high dimensions of willingness, collectivity, loyalty, love for the club and for the fan group itself, and a sense of belonging. Organized fan groups present a framework of cultural production, ranging from musicality to a type of interaction in stadiums and a way of experiencing football. They are thus important institutions of this sport and part of Brazilian culture, so much so that they endure despite all the tensions. 

It is not surprising that associative groups largely led by men, in a country with so many traces of violence, like Brazil, reproduce brutality in stadiums or outside of them. A fundamental issue that needs to be addressed is understanding the complexity of all this. We are facing yet another opportunity to act in the face of a far from simple phenomenon. It is also necessary not to insist on standard, tried-and-tested, and failed responses.

* This is an opinion article, the responsibility of the author, and does not reflect the opinion of Brasil 247.