Temer is racing against time. Brazil is fighting against dismantling.

"To hell with scruples at this point," said Jarbas Passarinho, then Minister of Labor during the dictatorship, in 1968, defending the enactment of Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5), which would allow the suspension of all constitutional guarantees. Without votes, without popular approval, and cornered by corruption allegations, Temer follows this lesson. Amidst the chaos in prisons and public security, abandoning scruples and even appearances, he nominated his Minister of Justice, affiliated with the PSDB party, Alexandre de Moraes, as a minister to the Supreme Court and future reviewer of the Lava Jato cases; he appointed Moreira Franco, cited 34 times in plea bargain testimonies, as Minister of State with privileged jurisdiction; and, furthermore, he elected the investigated Senator Eunício Oliveira (PMDB) and Representative Rodrigo Maia (DEM) to the presidencies of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

The Chief of Staff, Eliseu Padilha, who is also under investigation, took it upon himself to explain the rest. In a recently revealed audio recording, he defended exchanging government positions for votes in Congress, citing the choice of Health Minister Ricardo Barros (PP) as an example. The Attorney General's Office is next on the list. If he manages to get Moraes appointed to the Supreme Court, Temer has already warned that he will not reappoint Rodrigo Janot, the main person responsible for the corruption investigations coordinated by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office.

Assuming he will remain in the presidential chair until the end of his term, the illegitimate president is racing against time to protect himself and his allies from the imminent risks of unfolding corruption investigations. In a desperate fight for survival – civil survival first, political survival if possible – the recent announcement regarding the removal of ministers who are indicted (while maintaining their salaries), and the dismissal of those who become defendants, is, contrary to appearances, revealing of the process of shielding them. Temer himself is cited more than 40 times in plea bargains, in addition to ministers Eliseu Padilha, Moreira Franco, Senator and former Minister Romero Jucá, former Minister Geddel Vieira Lima, as well as loyal allies from the PSDB party, Senator Aécio Neves and Minister José Serra. Approximately 18 ministers in his government are under investigation for corruption. Let's consider this: between the formal indictment and the possibility of a minister becoming a defendant in the Supreme Court, the process, once initiated, can take an average of 14 months. In other words, the promised layoffs would thus be postponed until after the 2018 elections – either by Lava Jato or by the people.

But it's not all about fear and money. Behind this narrative lies a strong conservative and neoliberal ideological base interested in preserving newly regained power without the scrutiny of the ballot box. With frequent exceptional measures – legal, political, and moral – what was valid before is no longer valid now. Unlike Eduardo Cunha, Renan completed his term as president of the Senate; unlike the Lula case, Moreira Franco took office as minister; unlike the leaked audios of President Dilma, the plea bargains are kept secret; and even the trips and dinners between Supreme Court Justice Gilmar Mendes, president of the TSE (Superior Electoral Court), and Temer, investigated by the body, were able to move the "ducks" of Paulista Avenue and the pots and pans on balconies.

On the other hand, to the liking of the business sectors and the mainstream media, promoters of the impeachment and guarantors of his position, Temer is implementing the fiscal adjustment and selective austerity program represented by Aécio Neves (PSDB) in the 2014 campaign, and doubly defeated in the elections. In just nine months, among other measures, he amended the Constitution establishing a twenty-year limit on spending and investments in education, social programs, health, and science and technology; he determined the end of national exclusivity in the exploration of the pre-salt layer and the opening to participation of international capital; he wants to change the national content policy in public purchases made by the federal government and Petrobras, reducing it to less than half; he presented a proposal for pension and labor reforms to reduce rights and benefits; he demands that states and municipalities implement adjustment policies, sell assets and privatize in exchange for financial aid from the Union.

Temer's time in power will be short, but the damage to the country could be long. Stopping this predatory process of plundering national wealth and social rights depends on the capacity for reaction of Brazilian society and progressive sectors committed to democracy, combating corruption, and a model of distributive development with social justice. It is necessary, above all, to restore full democracy by bringing forward elections, returning to the people the right to elect a legitimate president.