The only option left for the PSDB was to oppose Brazil.

The recent Ibope poll, which showed a substantial loss – albeit less than expected – of electoral capital for Lula, contains elements that reveal which voter groups abandoned Dilma Rousseff, the former president, and the PT (Workers' Party). Together, these groups represent about a third of the total electorate that re-elected the president.

This poll was released on Saturday, despite being conducted in the second half of June, and showed that Lula would be defeated by 48% to 33% of the total votes in an electoral confrontation with Aécio Neves, and that it would be a technical tie if the candidate were Geraldo Alckmin (40% for the PSDB candidate and 39% for the PT candidate).

The stratification of the research reveals who the electorate is that abandoned not only Dilma and the PT, but also the so-called "Lulism".

Political scientist Marcus Melo, from UFPE, provided a very good analysis of the research and divided the voters who abandoned the PT into two groups, which he called "core voters" and "swing voters".

The "core voters" are the ideological, left-leaning voters who, in previous presidential elections, voted for the PT (Workers' Party) due to greater identification with the party and to prevent the new major center-right party, the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party), from coming to power.

These voters are middle class and linked to unions, social movements, and even left-wing parties. They are politically informed and highly educated. However, they are far less numerous than those in the second group.

This electorate was heavily affected by the criticism that Dilma's government suffered "from the left" and, disillusioned, is part of the segment that would spoil their ballot or cast a blank vote if there were a new presidential election.

"Swing voters" make up the vast majority of voters who, according to the media, have relegated the Dilma government, Lula, and the PT to "dead water." They are associated with the practice of "swinging" (figuratively meaning changing partners) because they lack ideological loyalty; they are guided, basically, by their wallets.

"Swing voters" have very little political information and no defined ideology. This group responds primarily to changes, for better or worse, in their well-being and includes those most fearful about the future, especially regarding issues such as unemployment and inflation.

In the recent past, this group had not largely abandoned Dilma, Lula, and the PT because, despite fears about the future, they had not felt a considerable decline in their well-being. With the fiscal adjustment measures, they are now feeling a decline and, therefore, became enraged, believing that the criticisms the Dilma government was receiving were justified.

Due to the extensive media campaign associating Lula with Dilma, "swing voters" began to see them as one and the same.

In the event of a democratic breakdown at this moment (impeachment) or in the 2018 elections, the "core voters" would end up voting for the PT (especially if the candidate is Lula) reluctantly, to avoid the "greater evil" associated with the return of the center-right PSDB (or similar) to power, but they would be insufficient to block the PSDB candidate.

Therefore, even though the "core voters" are furious with the government, with Lula, and with the PT – ironically, thanks to negative propaganda, including from sectors within the PT itself, against the fiscal adjustment – ​​they would reduce Aécio's advantage in a direct confrontation with Lula at this moment. And, very likely, if the PT candidate were someone else.

In the case of "swing voters," however, the situation would be more complicated if there were a "white" coup and a new presidential election were called at this time, since the economy would still be in trouble and, therefore, the volatile electorate would vote for anyone who promised to avoid the economic problems they fear and/or are already beginning to feel.

For the record, it's worth reflecting that, should the PSDB (or a similar party) assume power and fail to prevent the crisis, even attributing the problem to the "cursed legacy of the PT" would not avoid the discredit and anger, now directed at them, of the "swing voters".

However, if the coup is avoided and the presidential election only takes place in 2018, reversing the situation for Lula and the PT is absolutely feasible, depending only on Brazil resuming a consistent pace of job and income growth from 2017 onwards.

The aforementioned political scientist considers it "unlikely" that the economy will get back on track in a year and a half. And, although he didn't say so, this is due to the fact that, in addition to the problems inherent in the imbalance between revenue and expenditure, there is the political component, which is currently the Achilles' heel of the economy.

The leaders of Operation Lava Jato promise to keep the uproar going until the 2018 presidential election. Congress, currently in the hands of the right wing, will proceed to approve all sorts of absurdities – such as extending minimum wage adjustments for retirees – in order to discourage investment.

On the other hand, the Dilma government is working tirelessly to show investors that it will do its "homework"—that is, implement fiscal adjustments—and that it will adopt a policy more receptive to private enterprise.

The government's stance of focusing on rebalancing public finances and making life easier for investors has a high probability of working, which is why Aécio Neves and Eduardo Cunha's group doesn't want to wait until 2018 and seeks to oust Dilma now, before the economy recovers.

Be that as it may, one thing is certain: today, the PSDB as a whole and sectors of the PMDB are in opposition to Brazil. They basically depend on the country not emerging from the crisis so that they can win the 2018 presidential election or even make the impeachment succeed in order to hold a new election while the economy is doing poorly.