Why didn't the PSDB win the 2018 election?

For a long time, the PSDB was considered the party of the fence. It was a time when the left had the PT, PCdoB, PSB, and PDT. And on the right, parties like the PDS (later PP), PFL (now DEM), PTB, and other equally respectable parties. The PSDB was in the center. And it played the bride, supporting one side or the other.

In the succession of Erundina in '92, for example, the party in São Paulo overwhelmingly supported Paulo Maluf against Suplicy. But even so, it pretended to be center-left.

But then came Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his neoliberal agenda, and the PSDB gradually made it absolutely clear what it was: a center-right party, more right-wing than center. From an economic standpoint, it was further to the right than other parties that, in their shoddy agendas, defended and still defend aberrations such as the death penalty and lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 14 years.

Gradually, however, the move to come down from the fence in order to defend this macroeconomic vision brought the party closer to the overseers of everyday life.

Today, within the PSDB party, there are many former police officers accused of massacres, killings, or with extensive criminal records of murders and human rights violations, who hold public office under the banner of the party that was born to combat the political opportunism of Orestes Quércia. And whose sacred mantra was ethics.

But, to be fair, it's not just former police officers. There are actual criminals. Accused of crimes of all kinds, operating in some places on the fringes of the PSDB party. And in others, in the center. At the very heart of power.

But what does this have to do with the 2018 election and the PSDB's chances of winning it?

There's a saying that smoking a pipe distorts the mouth. And the PSDB of today is no longer a party. It's an acronym harboring diverse and contradictory interests. And in the struggle for these interests, there are leaders who hate each other and are willing to take any action to eliminate the other.

And the war has already begun. The election of Aécio Neves to lead the party until June 2018 in an internal coup where he counted (believe it or not!) on Serra's help is something that has not yet been fully grasped by political analysis.

Aécio and Serra did not make an agreement for the future. Only for the immediate present, to secure what seemed inevitable, an Alckmin candidacy in 2018.

And they left the future to be decided later.

If they win the power struggle with the governor of São Paulo, they can make a deal. Whoever is in a better position to win the election becomes president, and the other becomes governor of either Minas Gerais or São Paulo. Or they can go back to fighting until they kill each other.

Alckmin has already understood the message and, on the one hand, is beginning to blackmail Temer not with a PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) action, but via the PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party). The little notes planted in newspapers suggesting that the party that once belonged to Arraes might leave the government are actually a message from Alckmin, who may jump ship to the socialist camp (pause for a huge laugh...).

On the other hand, he tries to convince his supporters that only he can win in 18, in an attempt to win the internal dispute. And he bets that the Temer tragedy will be favorable to him, making him the only viable candidate.

Unlike Serra and Aécio, Alckmin has argued that he should maintain a safe distance from the Temer government. And he has done so rigorously, seeking not to be affected by the low popularity of the acting president.

Alckmin's strategy seems the most appropriate for the moment. And for that very reason, perhaps in some time he will realize that he cannot remain in the PSDB to implement it.

Alckmin will have to change parties to make his candidacy viable because the PSDB will already be completely contaminated.

And without Alckmin on board, the party will drift aimlessly, contributing to the complete dismantling of the hegemony that has prevailed since 94, where the disputes for the federal government have always had the PT and PSDB as the main players.

Aécio and Serra are no match for Lula, nor for a more robust third option that is yet to emerge. They are candidates marked by hatred. And they will reap the hatred they have sown, with interest, in the next election.

So, does Alckmin become the favorite in 18? Not at all. On the contrary, he could even become a less prominent candidate.

What seems strongest at the moment, despite all contrary predictions, is that the end of the PSDB, even though it was the big winner in the last municipal elections, may be closer than that of the PT.

The Workers' Party (PT) still has Lula, who unifies the party. If he runs for president, everyone will be with him. If he is unjustly convicted and this possibility is obstructed, it tends to amplify the myth.

Brazil in 2017 will be worse than in 16 from the point of view of the economy and social difficulties. It is from this scenario that 18 should be analyzed.

And in this context, the PSDB, which played all its cards to defeat the PT, has defeated itself. And worse, it may see its opponent recover. If not in 18, then in 22.

Because if number 18 isn't Lula's, it's likely to be that of an adventurer.