Why Iran won't break

By Pepe Escobar, for the Asia Times

Translation by Patricia Zimbres, for 247

So, what is happening in Iran? How has the Islamic Republic responded to Covid-19? How has it been dealing with Washington's relentless "maximum pressure"?   

These questions were the subject of a long phone call I had with Professor Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran.

According to Marandi, "Post-revolutionary Iran has focused primarily on social issues. A very elaborate network of health services has been established, similar to Cuba's, but with more funding. A vast network of hospitals. When the coronavirus struck, the United States went so far as to prevent Iran from obtaining testing kits. Even so, the system – not the private sector – fared very well. There was no total shutdown. Everything was under control. The numbers – despite being contested by the West – remained stable. Iran now produces everything it needs, from tests to face masks. None of the hospitals are at full capacity." 

Adding to Marandi's observations, Tehran-based journalist Alireza Hashemi says: "Iran's basic healthcare system, which includes public clinics, health homes, and health centers, is operational in thousands of cities and villages," which has facilitated "the provision of basic services by the government."

Hashemi details: "The Ministry of Health created a telehealth service for Covid-19 and distributed protective equipment provided by aid providers. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei called upon the armed forces, employing 300 soldiers and volunteers to disinfect streets and public places, distribute sanitation products, and administer tests." 

It was the Iranian military that created production lines for face masks and other equipment. According to Hashemi, "some NGOs partnered with the Tehran Chamber of Commerce to set up a campaign called Nafas ("breath"), with the aim of providing medical products and clinical services. Iran's Farabourse, an over-the-counter stock market based in Tehran, organized a donation campaign to purchase medical equipment and supplies to help healthcare personnel. Hundreds of volunteer groups – called "jihadi" – began producing personal protective equipment, which was scarce in seminaries, mosques, and hussainias, and also providing natural fruit juices for healthcare workers."  

This sense of social solidarity is extremely powerful in Shiite culture. Hashemi observes that "the government relaxed health restrictions about a month ago, and in recent weeks we have been experiencing a small glimpse of normalcy." But the struggle is not over. Just as in the West, there is fear of a second wave of COVID-19. 

Marandi emphasizes that the economy, as could be expected, suffered: "But, due to the sanctions, most of the damage had already occurred. The economy now functions without oil revenues. In Tehran, it's barely noticeable. There's no possible comparison with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, or the United Arab Emirates. Large waves of workers from Pakistan and India are leaving the Persian Gulf. Dubai is dead. In Tehran, the changes are barely noticeable. Iran was the country that best dealt with the virus. Furthermore, we had good harvests last year and this year. We are more economically independent."

Hashemi adds an important factor: "The COVID-19 crisis was so severe that people chose to participate in the effort, revealing unprecedented levels of solidarity. Individuals, civil society groups, and other actors mounted a whole range of initiatives to help the government and healthcare personnel working on the front lines of the fight against the pandemic." 

What the relentless Western disinformation campaign always ignores is that Iran, since the revolution, has become accustomed to extremely critical situations, beginning with the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s. Marandi and Hashemi are adamant: for older Iranians, the current economic crisis pales in comparison to what they had to face throughout the 1980s. 

Made in Iran skyrockets

Marandi's analysis ties the economic data together. In early June, Mohammad Bagher Nobakht – responsible for planning Iranian state budgets – declared to the Majlis (the Parliament) that the new normal was "to set aside oil in the economy and manage government programs without oil." 

Nobakht stuck to the numbers. In 2019-20, Iran earned only $8,9 billion from the sale of oil and refined products, a sharp reduction compared to the peak of $119 billion less than a decade ago.

The entire Iranian economy is in transitionOf particular interest is the surge in growth in the manufacturing industry, which is now targeting not only the large domestic market but also exports. The sharp devaluation of the rial is being used to benefit the sector. 

In 2019-20, Iran's non-oil exports totaled $41,3 billion, surpassing oil exports for the first time in the country's post-revolutionary history. And about half of these non-oil exports were manufactured goods. The "maximum pressure" via sanctions imposed by the Trump administration may have caused a 7% reduction in total non-oil exports. However, the total remains close to the highest levels in the country's history. 

According to data from the Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) published According to the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, a large number of private sector industries had already returned to full capacity in the first month following the easing of restrictions. lockdown partial. 

The fact is that consumer goods and industrial products – from biscuits to stainless steel – are exported by small and medium-sized enterprises to the Middle East, as well as to Central Asia, China, and Russia. The myth of Iranian "isolation" is – well – a myth. 

Some industrial sectors are promising. For example, titanium – of essential importance in numerous military, aerospace, and maritime applications, as well as in industrial processes. The mine of  Qara-AghajUrmia, the provincial capital of West Azerbaijan, which is part of the Iranian mineral belt and includes the country's largest gold reserves, presents tremendous potential. 

Iran is among the 15 richest countries in mineral resources. In January, after acquiring deep-level mining technology, Tehran launched a pilot project for the extraction of rare earth minerals.  

However, the pressure from Washington remains as relentless as the Terminator. In January, the White House issued a new executive order addressing the "construction, mining, manufacturing, and textile sectors of the Iranian economy." The Trump team, therefore, is targeting precisely the rapidly expanding private sector – which, in practice, means a huge number of Iranian blue-collar workers and their families. This has nothing to do with forcing the Rouhani government to say "I can't breathe." 

The Venezuelan front

Aside from some minor disagreements between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Health regarding the Chinese response to COVID-19, the Iran-China "comprehensive strategic partnership" remains in effect.

The next major test will come in September, the date that Team Trump intends to... extend The UN embargo on Iran. Add to that the threat of using the mechanism. snapback as stated in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 - in case other members of the UN Security Council refuse to support Washington and allow the embargo to expire definitively in October.

China's mission to the UN stressed The obvious. The Trump administration unilaterally abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and then reinstated unilateral sanctions. Therefore, the United States does not have the right to extend the arms embargo or resort to the mechanism of... snapback against Iran. 

China, Russia, and Iran are the three fundamental nodes of Eurasian integration. In political and diplomatic terms, their main decisions tend to be made by common agreement. It is therefore not surprising that this was reiterated in Moscow last week at the meeting of Foreign Ministers Sergey Lavrov and Javad Zarif – who get along very well with each other.   

Lavrov said"We will do everything possible to ensure that no one is able to destroy these agreements. Washington has no right to punish Iran." Zarif, for his part, described the entire situation as "very dangerous." 

Other conversations with Iranian analysts reveal their way of interpreting the region's political chessboard, calibrating the importance of the resistance axis (Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, Hezbollah) in comparison with the other two fronts: the United States and its "clowns" (the House of Saud, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt), the master – Israel – and also Turkey and Qatar, which, like Iran, but unlike the "clowns", are in favor of political Islam (but of the Sunni type, that is, the Muslim Brotherhood). 

One of these analysts, writing under the name Blake Archer Williams, notes the important fact that, "the main reason Russia avoids providing aid to Iran (trade between the two countries is practically zero) is that it fears Iran. If Trump doesn't have a Reagan moment and doesn't assert himself against Iran, and the United States is expelled from the Middle East due to Iran's ongoing arms parity process, as well as its ability to project power in its own region, then all the oil in the Middle East – from the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, to Iraq, of course, including the oil fields in the Qatif region of Saudi Arabia (where all the oil is located and it's 100% Shiite) – will fall under the umbrella of the resistance axis." 

Even so, Russia and China continue to support Iran on all fronts, for example, by expressing their repudiation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, accusing it last week of having yielded to the "intimidation" of the United States when its board approved a resolution presented by France, Great Britain and Germany criticizing Iran for the first time since 2012. 

Another important foreign policy front is Venezuela. Tehran's soft power attracted the attention of the entire Global South by spectacularly ridiculing Washington's sanctions and blockades in the region that the Monroe Doctrine considers its "backyard," when five Iranian tankers loaded with gasoline crossed the Atlantic and were met by a Venezuelan escort of jets, helicopters, and naval patrols.

What happened there was, in fact, just a tests The Ministry of Petroleum is already planning another round of two deliveries, sending two or three cargo ships full of gasoline to Caracas each month. This will also be useful for Iran, which will thus be able to dispose of enormous quantities of its domestically produced fuel.

This historic first shipment was described by both sides as part of scientific and industrial cooperation, and also as an act of "solidarity." 

And then, last week, I finally got the confirmation I was looking for: the order came directly from the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. In his own words: "The blockade must be broken." The rest is the story of the Global South being made.