Plutocrats manufacture anti-Lula storm

Although the increase in food prices in Brazil cannot be directly attributed to the federal government, since several factors independent of state action contributed to this rise, the opposition, driven by its sponsors, blames Lula for the phenomenon.

Production costs have increased significantly due to rising prices for fertilizers, energy, and fuels, items whose value is heavily influenced by the international market and not just by national policies.

Extreme weather events also strongly impacted the food supply. In 2024, Brazil faced its worst drought in seven decades, drastically reducing agricultural production, especially coffee. Intense rains and heat waves also compromised crops, demonstrating that natural factors, not government decisions, were decisive in the scarcity of products and, consequently, in the increase in prices.

The appreciation of the dollar against the real played a crucial role in raising the costs of agricultural inputs, such as imported fertilizers and pesticides. This exchange rate increase is linked to global factors, such as the monetary policies of major economies and international crises, which are beyond the direct control of the Brazilian government. With a devalued real, domestic products become more competitive in the foreign market, encouraging exports and reducing domestic supply, which also puts pressure on domestic prices.

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic since 2020 has generated a series of cumulative increases, with logistical disruptions, trade restrictions, and changes in global demand. Although containment measures have been taken, economic recovery is gradual, and the effects of the crisis still affect food prices.

Financial speculation also plays a crucial role in the rise in food prices. Commodities such as coffee are heavily influenced by financial market dynamics, and may experience price increases not necessarily related to agricultural production or the domestic economy. Price pressure also stems from increased global demand for food and limitations on the expansion of new agricultural areas in Brazil.

Paradoxically, the very increase in workers' income and purchasing power also contributed to the rise in food prices, because when there is growth in the population's income, consumption tends to increase, which generates inflationary pressure, especially in essential sectors such as food.

Under Lula's government, policies that increased the minimum wage and expanded income transfer programs, such as Bolsa Família, raised the purchasing power of millions of Brazilians. Furthermore, positive factors such as reduced unemployment and growth in the formal labor market also allowed more people to access higher quality food in greater quantities. This increased demand, which was not accompanied by a proportional increase in supply for the domestic market, contributes to higher prices.

With the post-pandemic economic recovery, domestic food consumption has started to grow again, while production has faced challenges such as high costs and weather restrictions. This mismatch between supply and demand has intensified inflation. This effect is one of the components of demand-pull inflation, which occurs when increased purchasing power drives prices up.

 Government action can mitigate impacts through public policies, but it has no control over climate events, the appreciation of the dollar, speculation in the global commodities market, or the economic consequences of the pandemic.

 The rise in food prices does, in fact, have a direct impact on the popularity of any government, as it affects the population in a generalized way, especially the most vulnerable segments. However, in the case of Lula's government, this food inflation has been exploited politically in a radical way by opponents, and amplified by hostile campaigns on social media, which omit structural and global factors that contribute to the phenomenon. It is also important to say that food inflation is not a problem exclusive to Brazil, but a global trend since the Covid-19 pandemic.

Meanwhile, in Congress, the Centrão (center-right bloc) is taking advantage to extort money. The behavior of the Centrão parties in relation to the federal government follows a recurring pattern in Brazilian politics: the use of the threat of rupture as a bargaining tool to obtain more space in the government, strategic positions, public funds, and influence over the budget. With President Lula's declining popularity, these parties see an opportunity to increase their negotiating power, exploiting the government's political vulnerability. When the lion is most vulnerable, the hyenas approach.

The Centrão, historically, has no ideological alignment beyond pragmatism focused on political and electoral advantages. Faced with the government's decline caused by the rising cost of living, its leaders intensify pressure to obtain more ministries, greater control over parliamentary amendments, and influence over state-owned companies and strategic agencies, always acting as an opportunistic bloc, using the government's decline to expand its power.

This strategy of political blackmail is not new and has been a challenge in all PT (Workers' Party) governments. In the current context, the Lula government needs to balance concessions to the Centrão (center-right bloc) without compromising its governability or weakening its most loyal base. The challenge is to maintain sufficient support in Congress to approve important projects without yielding to all the demands of these parties, which can, at any moment, change sides, for the promise of a larger share of power in a new government.

The “perfect storm” against the Lula government is a coordinated action by plutocrats to undermine democracy itself, through their media-political “HAARP Project.” Since taking office in 2023, the Lula government has faced a series of political, economic, and media challenges that, when analyzed together, indicate a coordinated attempt by plutocratic elites to destabilize it and prepare the ground for its downfall. The increase in food inflation, the persistent negative media coverage of its popularity, the blackmail by the Centrão (center-right bloc) in Congress, and the war of narratives on social media comprise a strategy orchestrated by sectors that do not accept a government focused on social inclusion and wealth redistribution.

Instead of pointing to global and structural factors, major media outlets insist on blaming the government, concealing the fact that many of the sectors benefiting from rising prices belong precisely to the elites who are trying to destabilize it. Large exporters, who profit from selling products abroad, have influence over domestic prices, but their responsibilities are ignored in media coverage.

The mainstream Brazilian media, historically aligned with the interests of the financial elite, has intensified its campaign against Lula. Any economic or political difficulty receives disproportionate coverage, while achievements such as the increase in the minimum wage, the reduction of poverty, and job growth are minimized or ignored. On social media, organized groups spread misinformation and distort data to fuel a climate of permanent dissatisfaction. Bots and fake profiles boost hashtags attacking the government, amplifying the perception of crisis and weakening its ability to communicate directly with the population. This movement is fueled by businesspeople and political agents who financed Bolsonaro's campaigns and are now trying to pave the way for a return of the far-right to power.

Although there are no explicit signs of a classic coup, like those of 1964, the current strategy is different: to wear Lula down as much as possible, create an environment of widespread dissatisfaction and, in 2026, guarantee an election controlled by plutocratic interests.

The Lula government is facing a storm manufactured by those who refuse to accept a less unequal and more inclusive country. The fight is not only against inflation or political instability, but against an elite that refuses to relinquish privileges. Given this scenario, it is crucial to strengthen our presence on digital networks and popular mobilization, and to denounce media manipulation.

Democratic resistance will be essential to prevent this maneuvering from culminating in a new institutional coup, disguised as "natural wear and tear" or "spontaneous popular dissatisfaction." Brazil has seen this scenario before, and it is up to society to prevent history from repeating itself.