PCC and CVM: Brazil risks becoming a haven for criminal capital and a hell for honest investors.

Before being executed at Guarulhos airport, businessman Antônio Vinícius Gritzbach revealed the infiltration of organized crime into the regular asset market. His testimony pointed to corrupt civil police officers, but as the investigations progressed, it was discovered that the scheme is much more robust.

Civil police officer Cyllas Salerno Elia Júnior owned a fintech company that laundered money for Rafael “Japa” and Anselmo “Cara Preta,” members of the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital, a Brazilian criminal organization). What is now known is that 2GO Bank, founded by the police officer, was only a fraction of the scheme. 

A June 2025 study by the Brazilian Public Security Forum shows that the PCC and Comando Vermelho use online betting platforms, other fintech companies, and cryptocurrencies to launder money, with investments in various investment funds.

In recent years, the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) has specialized in monitoring formal businesses. Routine corporate transactions, capital restructurings, disputes between shareholders, or even mergers with a clear economic logic have become targets of immediate public scrutiny. Rigor is not a problem—as long as it is impartial. But it isn't.

While the CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) focuses its efforts on governance minutiae and expansive interpretations of fiduciary duties, criminal structures advance fluidly within the system. 

Organized crime already invests in funds, structures companies, competes for concessions, and accesses capital without attracting the same attention. It doesn't challenge the rules—it simply adapts to them with surprising efficiency.

In early 2025, Operation Hydra, launched by the São Paulo Public Prosecutor's Office and the Federal Police, dismantled a billion-dollar money laundering scheme using the fintech company of a civil police officer, as well as InvBank, another fintech company.

These companies made transfers via "dummy accounts," then converted the funds into real estate and other shell assets, giving the operations an appearance of legality.

The fintech company 4TBank, which operated without authorization from the Central Bank, moved between R$ 6 and R$ 8 billion, some in cash, benefiting criminal groups.

2GO Bank also transferred more than US$82 million in crypto assets to offshore accounts abroad, through means where regulations are minimal and oversight is almost nonexistent.

Experts and agents in the financial sector point out that a significant part of the responsibility for the escalation of these schemes falls on the CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission). The agency, which should oversee the capital market and protect investors, has been adopting a contradictory stance.

In recent years, the CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) has tightened the rules for small investors, limiting access to products such as FIDCs (Investment Funds in Credit Rights), structured funds, and crowdfunding platforms, under the justification of "protecting the consumer." 

There has been a tightening of the criteria for "qualified investor" and a series of new regulatory requirements for legitimate investment platforms — which has generated criticism for hindering the democratization of access to the capital market.

Meanwhile, unregistered fintechs, unaudited crypto platforms, and online betting sites operate with almost complete freedom. By not considering these entities within its jurisdiction or by postponing specific regulations, the CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) fails to recognize the growing infiltration of organized crime in this market.

This disconnect creates a paradox: the average investor faces increasing obstacles to accessing legitimate and diversified investments, while criminal networks move billions without any effective oversight.

In addition to allowing parallel financial structures to flourish, this regulatory asymmetry poses a systemic and reputational risk to Brazil.

The perception that the Brazilian financial system is vulnerable to infiltration by criminal factions and inefficient in digital regulation may deter foreign multinationals that demand robust compliance standards.

This environment may also deter international institutional funds that adhere to ESG (environmental, social, and governance) and anti-money laundering standards.

Without effective oversight, the asset market could lose reputable Brazilian managers and funds, who find themselves penalized by unfair competition from unsupervised criminal platforms.

The result is an environment hostile to productive and transparent capital, and increasingly fertile ground for illicit and opaque capital. This dynamic undermines market confidence, compromises the integrity of financial institutions, and directly threatens the country's sustainable economic development.

Political financing and what needs to change.

In addition to acting as a money laundering vehicle, 4TBank is being investigated for financing election campaigns in cities such as Mogi das Cruzes and Ubatuba, with funds originating directly from criminal structures linked to the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital). This action reveals the destabilizing potential of the financial infiltration of crime into democratic institutions.

In Rio de Janeiro, the Civil Police prepared a report listing 25 candidates who received funding from Comando Vermelho and also from militias.

To curb the advance of factions in the financial market, experts point to the need to expand the jurisdiction of the CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) and the Central Bank, including small fintechs, crypto exchanges, and betting platforms; the adoption of mandatory compliance and audit systems for all platforms with digital transactions; data integration between regulatory bodies and public security in order to track and prevent suspicious operations; and the creation of a unified regulatory framework that treats fintechs, crypto assets, and betting as part of the regulated financial ecosystem.

The infiltration of the PCC and Comando Vermelho criminal organizations into fintechs, cryptocurrencies, and betting highlights the transition from organized crime to corporate crime. The CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission), by increasingly restricting legitimate investments and ignoring the advance of crime into digital finance, not only fails in its mission to protect the market but also creates a hostile environment for serious and transparent capital.

Without a firm and coordinated response, Brazil risks becoming a haven for criminal capital—and a hell for the honest investor. The price of this omission could be high: not only in billions laundered, but in the loss of credibility, strategic investments, and institutional sovereignty.