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Helena Chagas

Helena Chagas is a journalist, former Minister of Social Communication, and a member of Journalists for Democracy.

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Lula's 50 days and strategic haste.

'To govern peacefully, Lula not only needs to maintain, but must rapidly expand his social base,' writes columnist Helena Chagas.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Photo: Ricardo Stuckert/PR)

To hell with Niccolò Machiavelli, the one who for 500 years has been advising princes to do evil all at once—but leave the good for later. Lula is in a hurry. He also differs from the average contemporary ruler, including his predecessors, by not starting to govern under the cliché of first "getting the house in order"—a euphemism for tightening the budget—before distributing benefits to the population. In this order of priority, when everything works, the "evil" is forgotten and the "good" arrives close to the next election—or reelection.

Lula 3.0 is doing everything differently. Reaching 50 days in office, he is reversing Machiavellian logic and widespread practices. Just last week, he relaunched the largest housing program the country has ever had, Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House, My Life); announced an increase in the minimum wage (R$ 1.320); authorized an adjustment to the income tax exemption bracket for those earning up to R$ 2.640; and announced that he will present the new Bolsa Família (Family Allowance) program, with conditionalities, focused on those in need and with a clean registry free of irregularities.

In the preceding weeks, while dealing with the fallout from January 8th and the subsequent military crisis, he launched the Yanomami rescue operation, issued dozens of measures limiting the rampant use of weapons, declassified previous government secrets, and dismantled obscurantist policies. He initiated vaccination campaigns, environmental initiatives, efforts to combat prejudice, and increased public participation in government forums. This is no small feat—and, due to lack of space, we will not discuss the international agenda.

Why the rush, some ask, even pointing to the total expenses. But Lula's activism doesn't seem to be merely a political ploy to deepen the contrast with his predecessor—who only considered social programs, for example, on the eve of seeking re-election. Nor, as others accuse, is it the result of demagogic impulses from someone who has just regained power and has no economic plan. It's a deliberate strategy driven by the urgency of political survival.

The worst coup attempt since the return to democracy confirmed the diagnosis that we have a divided country, which elected the president by a narrow margin, and which remains hostage to the disinformation manipulation of Bolsonaro's online supporters. To govern peacefully, Lula not only needs to maintain, but must, above all, rapidly expand his social base. The positions and amendments given to politicians who are building a congressional majority are not, in the medium term, sufficient to guarantee his survival, as it must come from society.

This is where Lula's strategy goes beyond pleasing those who voted for him and consolidating his popular base. A veteran politician, he sensed that more is needed—and that this support today doesn't only, or necessarily, come from the centrist "broad front" with which he was elected. It comes from low- and middle-income sectors that voted for Bolsonaro—but who repudiate the coup attempt of January 8th.

With measures such as raising the minimum wage, restructuring the Bolsa Família program, and undertaking the MCMV (Minha Casa, Minha Vida) projects, the president wants to get the economy moving and also benefit the middle-middle and lower-middle classes. This includes, for example, evangelicals. While this may not be the exact target audience of Bolsa Família, it is the segment that is indebted and will be served by Desenrola, the debt renegotiation program—and here the discourse about high interest rates fits perfectly. It is also a segment that can gain employment in construction projects or fit into the second and third income brackets of the new MCMV, which will offer subsidized interest rates for families earning up to R$ 8,000 to buy their own home.

In the puzzle of Lula's plans, which he doesn't fully reveal to almost anyone, the pieces of social activism and leftist discourse against the Central Bank and interest rates don't always fit together. But, according to allies, understanding what is a priority at this moment—expanding his social base—helps illuminate seemingly disconnected movements that, further down the line, may give more meaning to the situation. A popular president, for example, has more power in Congress. Paradoxically, after attending to the needs of the most vulnerable, he will also feel free to make concessions to the other side of the table, in tax reform and the debate on the new fiscal anchor. 

* This is an opinion article, the responsibility of the author, and does not reflect the opinion of Brasil 247.