Olavists, generals, and coup plotters

Since Sun Tzu, virtually all strategists have maintained that knowing the enemy is a fundamental condition for victory in battles. This military thesis, in general, also applies to political battles. Anyone who has studied Machiavelli and Klausewitz, but also Mao and Lenin, knows that there is an interchange between the categories of military strategy and the categories of political strategy. Hence, both the statement that "war is the continuation of politics by other means" is true, as is the inverse statement, that "politics is the continuation of war by other means." 

All prudent leaders are capable of foreseeing and predicting future events. To do so, one of the fundamental conditions is knowing how to read circumstances and situations, which also includes knowing one's enemies. It is this ability that, to a large extent, left-wing and center-left political leaders, as well as media analysts, have lost. Therefore, it is necessary to make an effort to better understand Bolsonarism.

Bolsonarism is composed of various groups and subgroups. This is not an attempt to inventory these groups, although that would be a necessary task. It merely indicates the lines of force influencing the government. Strictly speaking, there are three: the followers of Olavo de Carvalho, the generals, and the coup plotters. 

1. The Olavists. These are the followers of Olavo de Carvalho, who were students in his courses and adhere to his doctrines. The Olavists define themselves as liberal-conservatives, which, in short, means the following: conservatism in values, radical freedom in the economy (neoliberalism), and political freedom with reference to American individualistic ultraliberalism and a strong reference to the Fifth Amendment. Hence the freedom to criticize, offend, arm oneself, etc. 

There is a deeper issue in Olavism, which links it to the so-called new right. This issue has been formulated since the 1980s in the United States. It concerns the idea that the West is in decline and that China will become the greatest power of the 21st century. The new right has defined a strategy to confront the decline of the West and the advance of China: against globalization, valuing nationalism, conservative values ​​of family, property, individualism, and God. Bolsonaro follows this playbook, and this playbook, with this discourse, builds bridges with neo-Pentecostals, transformed into a sword of this conservative counter-revolution.

Olavo's followers are organized into two structures: one is the so-called "hate cabinet," a group of advisors operating within the Presidential Palace, and the other is those who operate on social media, acting as a kind of light cavalry for attack, disseminating fake news and the ideas of Bolsonarism. Olavo's followers oppose a military coup, defend democracy and freedom, and, almost daily, Olavo attacks government generals. They know that if there were a coup, they would lose influence.

Olavo de Carvalho's followers argue that Article 142 of the Constitution does not apply, as it only refers to public security situations. They advocate for a civilian government, consider themselves anti-establishment, and preach a conservative revolution. They believe Bolsonaro must confront the Supreme Federal Court (STF) because a judicial dictatorship exists in Brazil, resulting from the approval of Constitutional Amendment 45. They maintain that there is an institutional crisis pitting the Executive and Judiciary branches against each other, and that there is no mediating power in this conflict. Thus, Bolsonaro, as the holder of power, needs to decide and find a way out. After Bolsonaro's decision, a plebiscite or a constitutional reform could be called. 

Olavo's followers employ the cunning strategy of creating imaginary enemies, so well-known to authoritarian movements, to recruit, indoctrinate, and discipline their troops. For them, the great enemies are the São Paulo Forum and communism, two entities that, strictly speaking, do not exist. Within these entities they place all the left, the mainstream media, and even some generals. They attack the São Paulo Forum and communism more than the PT (Workers' Party) and PSOL (Socialism and Liberty Party). 

2. The Generals. In short, it must be said that after redemocratization, the Armed Forces placed greater emphasis on professional training and distancing themselves from politics. But they fell into the “Bolsonaro trap” for two reasons: 1) self-interest, as they benefited from the pension reform and the salary adjustments for high-ranking officers, and by occupying positions, they increased their earnings; 2) the opportunity to rewrite history, as they believed they would tutor Bolsonaro and that it was possible to have a competent government with him within the framework of democratic parameters. With thousands of deaths in the pandemic, the collapse of the economy, the destruction of public institutions, and Bolsonaro's demoralization in the world, the military is being dragged towards a loss of credibility.

The vast majority of generals and commanders of the Armed Forces do not want a coup. They know that the world cannot handle this, that they would be embarking on an adventure, that they would divide the Armed Forces, and that they would not be granted amnesty. They also understand that the Supreme Federal Court (STF) is overstepping its functions with excessive interference in politics and executive decisions. Among the generals in the government, there are two factions. One aligned with General Heleno, more radical, more nostalgic, and which includes more reserve contingents. The other, made up of Generals Ramos, Azevedo e Silva, Braga Neto, and Mourão, is linked to the majority of the General Staff. They want, of course, Bolsonaro to moderate himself, finish his term successfully, and have a chance in the elections. To this end, they seek an alliance with the centrist bloc and see the followers of Olavo de Carvalho as an obstacle. 

3. The Coup Plotters. The electoral and militant base of Bolsonarism, in general, is coup-plotting. It advocates military intervention, the closure of Congress and the Supreme Court, and discretionary power for Bolsonaro. They invoke the application of Article 142. This base has been radicalizing. It is made up of dispersed voters, but also organized groups, ex-military personnel, sectors of the military police, militiamen, small merchants and businessmen, and rural sectors. It does not have a direct presence within the government, but this does not mean that it ceases to be a line of force and influence over the government. They are not controlled by Bolsonaro, nor by the followers of Olavo de Carvalho, nor by the generals. And in this lies the risk of loss of control, chaos, street conflicts, and upheaval.

At this point, it is necessary to analyze the conduct of the Bolsonaro family. The president and Eduardo Bolsonaro oscillate between three lines of force. They allow themselves to be ideologically and politically influenced by Olavism, the president is wary of pressure from the generals, and both are veering towards coup-mongering, as this is expressed more in the heat of the moment, in motorcades, and in the occupation of the streets. Both seem to have unstable personalities, very susceptible to pressure. They lack a fundamental attribute of a great leader: self-control. They are the main factor in the crises and instability of the government. Bolsonaro is a weak president, and at this moment when his isolation is growing, he is increasingly inclined to resort to the military. Eduardo Bolsonaro gives himself far greater importance than he actually has. He envisions a grandiose future for himself.

Carlos Bolsonaro has adopted the persona of a shadowy figure, a prominent figure in the powerful elite, and even a role model for his father, the president. His reserved nature prevents much from being said about him. However, he seems to align more closely with the Olavo de Carvalho ideology. Whether or not he supports a coup is difficult to say. What is certain is that he also supports a confrontation with the Supreme Court and Congress. He appears to profess the anti-establishment views of Olavo de Carvalho's ideology and the so-called "hate cabinet." 

What can be concluded from this is that a military coup is not an immediate or probable possibility, but a remote one. And in this, the strategy of the left is wrong. The government is also not fascist, although there are some fascists in the government and many in Bolsonarism. The Supreme Federal Court (STF) is right to tighten the noose around Bolsonarism to contain it. But one should not expect the STF or the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) to take action to remove Bolsonaro from the presidency. 

Impeachment at this moment is not feasible, although desirable: despite growing rejection, Bolsonaro retains little more than 30% support, and the center and left are not very comfortable pushing forward with impeachment. However, the worsening economic crisis, which seems inevitable, could push people into the streets demanding impeachment. Congress has been showing itself to be cowardly: it outsources the task of containing and tightening the screws on Bolsonaro and his supporters to the Supreme Court. At the very least, Congress should fulfill its role by revoking the mandates of some Bolsonaro-aligned parliamentarians who have violated parliamentary decorum.