The October election and the division of popular forces.

The unity of leftist forces is not, in itself, a guarantee of victory or the conquest of power, but it is... conditio sine qua non For our survival and advancement. Or, at the very least, for resistance, which is the current stage of the democratic struggle.

It is true that, even united, we can be defeated, as evidenced by the results of the 1989 presidential elections, which, however, represented a great political advance whose electoral consequences would be felt in 2002. That was the last great electoral campaign of the Brazilian left, because the natural and necessary pursuit of votes then did not obscure the values ​​that distinguish us politically and ideologically. In addition to the unification around Lula's campaign, the organized left (I am referring again to the 1989 elections) managed to expand its reach to considerable sectors of the center and win over the elusive middle class.

If unity is not a sufficient cause, the dispersion of our forces, or our gross difficulty in broadening towards the center, has been decisive in the setbacks, to which the demobilizing pursuit of hegemony among our parties has contributed greatly.

Despite the 2002 election teaching us that there is no electoral alternative outside of expanding our field.

Divided by the crisis of August 1954 – Prestes' Communist Party was allied with Lacerda's UDN in opposition to Vargas – we watched, as surprised spectators, the president's suicide and the rise of the right-wing coalition led by Eduardo Gomes, Juarez Távora, and Carlos Lacerda. We had lost the support of the middle class, and the Vargas-supporting masses would only take to the streets to mourn their dramatically lost leader. Once the catharsis was over, they all returned to their homes and unions to follow the formation of the new government on the radio, which, in its anti-national bias, anticipated the ideology of the 2016 coup, announced in the 2013 protests, which we failed to interpret.

On the other hand, the unity of leftist and progressive forces, broadened by significant segments of the Armed Forces, and even liberal sectors, then symbolized by the iconic figure of Sobral Pinto, managed to secure the inauguration of Juscelino and Jango in 1955, and, in 1961, to confront the coup that attempted to prevent João Goulart from taking office. But we would soon divide, and divided, we fostered the coup of parliamentarism, a step backward in history, and an act of betrayal against the great masses who took to the streets in defense of legality. This division, moreover, would deepen throughout João Goulart's government, weakening it, and thus favoring the 1964 conspiracy, so far the most profound and lasting defeat we have had in the course of the Republic.

The destabilization of João Goulart's government, including within the military, began with the rejection by the left at the time – PCB, Brizola, Arraes, UNE, unions, severely accused of infantile leftism – of the proposed state of siege and consequent intervention in the government of the then state of Guanabara, from where Lacerda, with civilian and military allies, was plotting the coup and the establishment of the dictatorship, which he himself had announced in an interview with... Los Angeles Times.

The president's defeat, triggered by his own parliamentary and union base, served as the signal for the destabilization of his government, with the predicted, known, and expected outcome. The rest is history.

In that crisis (October 1963), the left was blind to the political process unfolding. It waited for the serpent's egg to hatch and for the venom to claim democracy as its preferred victim, while Brizola, Arraes, and Juscelino, the Nationalist Parliamentary Front, and the unions turned (each to their own devices) to the expectation of an electoral process that ultimately failed: instead of the Presidential Palace, the harvest was exile and 20 years of dictatorship.

The difficulty of historical interpretation persists, and those who do not understand the social process are doomed to repeat the mistakes and lose.

It is more than evident that the current situation (by "current situation" I mean the crisis that, clearly revealed in the 2014 elections, reaches us today like a sphinx to be deciphered) is different, not least because no historical moment reproduces past events. But, again, the more we need unity, the more we disperse, and, once again, underestimating the depth and quality of the crisis.

What we might call the left is divided, through an intrinsic distortion, by an autistic reading of the electoral process, and, unable to go beyond appearances, is further divided in its attempt to interpret the process as it unfolds. Those who do not understand the present cannot influence the future.

Before us, and once again, the right wing, unified in the 2016 coup (as it was unified in 1954, 1961, and 1964), marches steadily towards this year's election, which is not simply about replacing Joaquim with Manuel, because if its candidate is victorious, it will signify the consolidation (for how many more years?) of the regime of legal exception that ensures the reign of neoliberalism, that is to say, the meeting of the anti-national with the anti-popular.

That is the question.

Despite the clarity of this picture, our parties – turning away from objective reality – ignoring any medium-term strategy – see the election as a tactical opportunity to promote their own growth, as if one of our parties could grow and survive in isolation, that is, amidst any eventual debate on the left. The other side of this division will be the consecration of a right-wing candidate, which would mean not only the continuation of the regime of exception, but also its deepening, with consequences that no longer need to be recalled. This time under the command of a president supported by the pronouncement of popular sovereignty.

The challenge is broad, as it presents itself on both the political and electoral levels. Circumstances demand that leftist forces engage in political-ideological debate, explicitly state and defend our theses, and establish our differences in the face of reactionary and authoritarian practices. This requires both a unified denunciation and the unified formulation of a leftist project that can be presented as a proposal for a National Project.

The people know, and have experienced firsthand the suffering involved, the meaning of a right-wing government, this recurring tragedy in our history. They know our criticism. They need to know our alternative, our proposed project for Brazil.

Is it possible that we can't even formulate this in a unified way?

History has shown us that a broad front policy is the alternative that strengthens us and puts us in the ring in a position to compete and advance. Not to mention other memorable struggles, such as the defense of the state monopoly on oil, let us remember that it was a broad front policy that led to the defeat of the military dictatorship.

The Popular Brazil Front – a victorious initiative – could have been the space for building a larger front, given its extraordinary social base, which includes the MST (Landless Workers' Movement), Consulta Popular (Popular Consultation), CUT (Unified Workers' Central), and CTB (Brazilian Workers' Central). But even this front, of broad nature and purpose, was rejected by left-wing and center-left parties, such as PSOL (Socialism and Liberty Party) and PDT (Democratic Labour Party), limiting its scope.

An extraordinary opportunity to unify parties and social movements is being lost, which in part may explain the current difficulties in popular mobilization.

The proposal for a National Project (nothing to do with a Government Program) might be the unifying element of a Broad Front policy.

It is once again on the agenda, as a historical necessity.