The dangerous game of the PDT

At this point in the game, 9 out of 10 analysts will say that the election is decided. Not that the winner is known, that's not the point. It's decided because it's a contest between only two candidates – and at this moment the only question is whether or not there will be a second round. The polls have remained practically unchanged for two years, and the percentage of certainty in voting (people who say they will not change their vote) reaches almost 80% among both Lula's and Bolsonaro's voters. Even attempts by both candidates to break this inertia have had no practical effect.

On the Workers' Party side, the campaign relied on exploiting the support of major artists (such as Anitta, Daniela Mercury, etc.) and later on the support of "digital influencers" like André Janones and Felipe Neto. It yielded no results. On the Bolsonaro side, the violation of electoral law with the increase in "Brazil Aid," and the manipulation of the Brazilian economy to present less negative (and unsustainable in the medium term) indicators also did not cause any alteration in the electoral landscape. 

Therefore, barring unforeseen circumstances, what is at stake right now is whether Lula wins in the first round or whether Bolsonaro advances to the second round. Any alternative outside of these two is militant fantasy and lacks any serious analytical basis.

Given this scenario, no serious political strategist can presume to think about politics outside of these lines. I don't believe anyone in the PDT campaign management (or even in the political leadership) believes in winning the election or even making it to the second round. Not even Ciro believes that. If he does believe it, we should consider the danger of magical thinking in the mind of a candidate who aspires to be president of the republic.

Working with facts, the PDT only has a chance of winning in two scenarios: (1) on the one hand, if Bolsonaro (or Lula) are abruptly removed by the Electoral Court, invalidating their candidacies. We are on the eve of September 7th, and a second coup attempt by Bolsonaro (the first was on September 7th, 2021) could lead to a tougher (and more supported) response from Brazilian institutions. The withdrawal of one of the contenders could open space for Ciro, but it is necessary to know that this is a remote possibility. Not that Bolsonaro hasn't deserved – numerous times already – to be removed from the election. The fact is, however, that the cost of removing one of the candidates seems unsustainable for the institutions.

The other possibility for the PDT (2) in the daydream of Ciro's victory is an impossible math. Ciro would need to triple his total votes (reaching something close to 27%) and even then a significant part of that total (more than 7%) would come from Bolsonaro. Knowing the ideological formation of fascism, looking at the Brazilian electoral scenario in the last two years and Ciro Gomes' history of political concertation, it is possible to affirm that this possibility is virtually impossible. Not even if Ciro Gomes were to transform himself into a Nelson Mandela of pacification and consensus would the loss of 7% of Bolsonaro's votes not occur.

So, what does the PDT want, after all?

In political jargon, the PDT is trying to "boost its influence." This is legitimate and occurs at all levels of politics. Candidates seek to demonstrate their strength at the polls (even without a chance of winning) in order to establish more power internally within their parties or to "sell" their support for the highest possible price. This is very common, and the best example is in English politics. There, two enormous parties dominate the majority of seats in the legislature. Labour and Conservatives compete for control of parliament and the possibility of appointing the prime minister, and in this process, often small parties that managed to win 10 or 12 seats end up having enormous weight. The side that these smaller parties support will form a majority, and thus their support is worth a great deal.

That's not the case here for the PDT. Even if Ciro were to support Bolsonaro (in a possible second round), the polls show that consolidating Lula's votes would be enough for victory. Ciro's votes, therefore, aren't worth that much. Ciro can't impact the election except for a moment and through a single action:

Ciro could be the final nail in the coffin for Bolsonaro's fascism. All he needs to do is announce his support for Lula – even in the first round – and victory in the first round would be practically guaranteed. Therefore, a window of opportunity opens for the PDT in the next 15 days, where its political actions could be very valuable.

The PDT, however, has two serious problems here. The first problem is that the value of its support becomes infinitely smaller in the second round. By missing this window of opportunity, the PDT flirts with insignificance, because if the left-wing forces alone can defeat Bolsonaro in the second round (as polls indicate they can), the PDT's support will be worth very little. And a party that has been fighting since the 2000s to establish itself as a national force could be mortally wounded. If the PDT chooses to stay out of the coalition that is organizing to rebuild the country in the next 4 or 8 years, possibly not even the party's history will be enough to keep it standing.

The other problem the PDT faces is Simone Tebet and the MDB. Tebet's growth (from 1% to 5%) makes the MDB also a viable alternative for a PT victory in the first round. In theory, Lula needs something between 2% and 3% to consolidate his victory outside the margin of error. With 5%, Tebet is positioned for this task. A substantial part of the MDB is already pressuring Tebet to go in this direction, and therefore, all the arguments made above for the PDT can also be used for Tebet. Her support, at this moment, is of great value because it could be the final nail in the coffin for Bolsonaro.

And for the next 15 days, both Ciro and Tebet, and their respective parties, have a decision to make. Whoever first allies with Lula will "sell" their political strength for a much higher price than they normally would, and – at the same time – whoever doesn't make that decision will move towards insignificance. Logically, the MDB has much more strength than the PDT in Congress, and the term "insignificance" for the party would only apply to the executive branch. For the PDT, however, there is no strong legislature.

Given this scenario, Lula and the PT should transform this game into a kind of "prisoner's dilemma." Since both Tebet and Ciro are facing a unique window of opportunity, Lula should separately pressure each party and assert that the first to offer an alliance should be rewarded, while the second bears the full cost of failure. If only one of them is enough to seal the defeat of fascism, who will go down in history as the ultimate support that united Brazil against authoritarianism and against Bolsonaro's genocidal fascism? Tebet or Ciro?

And who will go down in history as directly responsible for prolonging the electoral process and increasing the violence (deaths and attacks) and even the chance of a coup? Tebet or Ciro?

The PDT is facing a dangerous game. Either it decides to be essential at this historical moment or it flirts with delegitimization and historical oblivion. I know what decision the late Leonel de Moura Brizola would have made, and what decision Lupi and Ciro will make.