The myth of legitimacy

The only myth worth discussing regarding Bolsonaro is the one that claims he won the election democratically and therefore has the legitimacy to govern. The others are baseless and don't deserve consideration. Only idiots believe that Bolsonaro is, in himself, a "myth".

It is likely that, in the not-too-distant future, our descendants will be astonished by what happened in Brazil in 2018, as is already happening today with almost unanimous international public opinion. Virtually everything that the modern democratic canon establishes to consider an election legitimate was disregarded. Starting with one of its fundamental requirements, that only free and fair elections in which all political leaders have the right to compete for support and votes are democratic.

The exclusion of Lula, based on strongly contested legal decisions and perpetrated by a political actor committed to another candidacy, was an institutional absurdity, without which Bolsonaro would not have won. Bringing Moro into the ministry and confirming him as a pre-candidate in the next election only highlights the character (or lack thereof) of both the one who extended the invitation and the one who accepted it.

The military veto against the review of this absurdity by higher courts, coupled with the prohibition against Lula even speaking during the electoral process, was a further step in characterizing the illegitimacy of the result. Bolsonaro's emotional gratitude to the head of the Army, acknowledging him as responsible for his victory, formalized this second intervention.

Neither the civilian coup orchestrated by Moro, nor the white military coup confessed to by the former minister, were, however, sufficient to produce the result. Without another illegitimate act committed against the electorate, Bolsonaro would not have won.

In Graph 1 below, we can see how voting intentions for presidential candidates evolved in the seven weeks leading up to the first round. It shows the evolution of the average of polls from 14 institutes, all of which registered surveys for public release.

The data shows that there were only two moments of intense change in the voting decision-making process: in the first six weeks (that is, until the beginning of the last week), Bolsonaro went from 20% to 28%, which made it uncertain whether he would finish ahead in the first round; meanwhile, Haddad, in the two weeks between September 9th and 23rd, went from 6% to 20%. Thus, at the beginning of the final week, Bolsonaro was stagnant and Haddad was still growing, with the distance between the two, on average across 14 polls, at 4 percentage points, that is, within the margin of error of most of them. 

Bolsonaro's growth in the last week needs to be explained, as Haddad's, after being nominated by Lula, is easily understood. Saying it was the "stabbing" (however mysterious it may be) doesn't work, given the captain's near stability in the following days. Claiming it was "anti-PT sentiment" that propelled him is also not enough: almost the entire electorate already knew for some time that Haddad was the PT and Lula's candidate, and that didn't drastically alter voting intentions in the final seven days.   

Tracking polls conducted by Vox Populi show how and where Bolsonaro's growth occurred, leading to his advantage in the first round and victory in the second.

The numbers show that this didn't happen in the Northeast (where, in the final fifteen days, the gap between the two remained stable), it didn't occur among male voters (where Bolsonaro's lead grew moderately), it didn't exist among low-income people, and it didn't exist among Catholic voters (among whom Haddad always led). However, among women, especially in the Southeast and those with middle and lower-middle incomes, Bolsonaro grew significantly, due to the influence of religion in this group.

What happened among the evangelical public can be seen in Graph 2 below:

Chart 2 shows how Bolsonaro widened the gap with Haddad: he almost tripled the advantage he always had among evangelical voters. The ten-point lead he had on September 26 became thirty in the survey completed on October 5. Since evangelicals make up about 30% of the electorate, a thirty-point advantage in this segment represents 10% of the total.

What changed the election and allowed Bolsonaro to enter the second round almost elected was not anti-PT sentiment, Lava Jato, Moro's sleight of hand, the intervention of the generals, the politicization of the Judiciary, the Dilma government, Lula's imprisonment, or the horror of the PT shown on TV Globo. It was an abrupt and intense shift in the evangelical electorate, especially in the Southeast (and South), especially among the lower middle class, especially women.

A rare example of good journalism offered by the mainstream Brazilian press revealed how this was done: through the promotion of false information and lies against Haddad, disseminated via WhatsApp. Most likely, using databases of phone numbers provided by neo-Pentecostal bishop-businessmen aligned with Bolsonaro. We know in part how this worked, who did the dirty work, how much it cost, and who paid.

The myth surrounding the election lies in pretending that it was "normal" and that Bolsonaro won legitimately. However, having more votes than the opponent does not mean winning legitimately, as we see constantly in manipulated elections around the world.  

As more information and new confessions come to light, this myth loses substance and the proportion of those who subscribe to it diminishes. Today, excluding Bolsonaro and his cronies, perhaps only Ciro Gomes still believes in the legitimacy of the results, for reasons unknown.