The eternal discourse of the road blackout.

This article continues the series I intend to present on the theme "Fallacies about Brazilian freight and passenger logistics" (click here to read the first article). Today, I will write about the eternal discourse of road congestion.

It is a fact that the Lula government inherited the federal highway network in terrible condition, due to more than a decade of little or no investment, justifying the term "highway blackout" at the time. At the end of 2002, a third of DNIT's contracts were paralyzed. The debt to contractors reached R$ 1,2 billion. But, from 2003 onwards, investments in highways have not stopped growing, as I will show later, especially with PAC 1 and 2, as well as due to concessions.

As a consequence of these high levels of investment – ​​both federal and state – the conditions of the national road network have been improving since 2006. However, the narrative of the "road blackout" remains strong and is constantly being disseminated.

In order to prove this fallacy of the road infrastructure blackout, I will use the 2014 CNT Highway Survey, specifically its relevant items, which are pavement and signage. It evaluated 98.475 kilometers of paved roads throughout the country, of which approximately 60 are federal and 38,5 are state roads.

- Speed ​​as a function of road surface – this is undoubtedly the main indicator, since regularity, smoothness, and therefore a feeling of safety and comfort are expected from the pavement when driving vehicles, especially trucks. According to this research, 96,1% of the pavement studied does not require drivers to reduce their speed and does not affect the regularity and smoothness of vehicle driving.

- Roadway Condition - 77,1% of Brazilian highways have roadway pavement in good condition, 19,1% have cracks in the road network/patches, and only 3,8% have potholes, depressions, undulations in the road surface, and completely destroyed pavement. It should be noted that the item "Cracks in the road network/patches," according to the CNT definition, excludes the existence of potholes. If we add the 77,1% (perfect and worn) to the 19,1% (with patches), we get 96,2%, which is the percentage of road sections that offer smooth, regular, and safe driving, as mentioned in the previous item.

- Shoulders - 82,3% of the shoulders were considered excellent because they were paved and in perfect condition.

- Signage – 52,4% of the center lane markings on highways have visible paint, in a condition to separate traffic and regulate overtaking. However, another 40,8% had worn-out markings and 6,8% had no paint at all. This is the most unfavorable item among the relevant ones.

- Speed ​​limit signs - speed limit signs are present in 73,6% of the evaluated highway length, and 82,3% of these signs are visible to vehicle drivers, with no vegetation obstructing the driver's view.

Finally, it's important to keep in mind that the highways used by at least 80% of cargo, bus passengers, private vehicles, and motorcycles are in good condition and comfortable to drive on. After all, these are the country's main highways, almost all operated by concessionaires. Therefore, it doesn't make sense to talk about a highway blackout, although there is always a need for occasional interventions, especially on the highways that form the "soybean route."

A brief summary of the history of increased investment in highways during the Lula and Dilma governments.

As I wrote at the beginning of this text, the Lula government inherited the federal highway network in terrible condition, due to more than a decade of little or no investment, and the debt situation with contractors.

Furthermore, the FHC government, through Provisional Measure 82/2002, was transferring 14,500 kilometers of highways to some states, with 6,000 kilometers going to Minas Gerais alone. To maintain these highways, an average cost of R$ 130,000/km was established, generating a total transfer of R$ 1,9 billion. This money, with rare exceptions, was not used for its intended purpose by the states, but rather for paying the 13th-month salary increase for civil servants, among other uses.

In 2003, the Ministry of Transport (MT) began to settle accounts and carry out emergency works, calling in the Army for this purpose, since contractors refused to resume work until they received what was owed to them. The MT was authorized to spend only R$ 1,7 billion that year. In 2004, the transfer of CIDE funds to states and municipalities began, amounting to R$ 1,1 billion, thanks to a law initiated by the Lula government.

Recognizing that the problems would not be solved with words, but with money, the Lula government created the PPI – Pilot Investment Project, withdrawing resources of around R$ 3,0 billion/year from the primary surplus, with R$ 2,3 billion going to Mato Grosso. These amounts enabled a jump in allocation from R$ 2,4 billion in 2004 to R$ 5,8 billion in 2005.

From 2005 onwards, the volume of resources transferred to states and municipalities, originating from CIDE (Contribution for Intervention in the Economic Domain), increased to R$ 1,8 billion/year. This became a significant cash boost for these federated entities. In December 2005, the TCU (Federal Court of Accounts) ordered DNIT (National Department of Transport Infrastructure) to resume investments in highways transferred in 2002 to Minas Gerais, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul, which were literally "destroyed" and abandoned, endangering the lives of their users.

In 2006, the budget allocation from 2005 was practically the same, and the works continued, especially the duplication of the BR-101 Northeast, BR-101 South, BR-060, and BR-153 highways in Goiás, among others. At the beginning of 2007, the Lula government launched the Growth Acceleration Program – PAC. R$ 58,3 billion was allocated to logistics and transportation alone for the period 2007-2010.

During Dilma's first term, more than R$ 10 billion was invested in highways per year, in addition to several stretches granted to private companies for operation. It is for this reason that the opposition, when talking about a highway blackout, has to use images of highways in Mato Grosso and Pará that are not yet completed, but are beginning to be used by soybean truckers.

Published on the Carta Maior website.