The democratic and popular movement and the truckers' strike. What to do?

The truckers' strike reveals a certain difficulty in strategic planning and rational thought within the popular, democratic, sovereign, and developmentalist movement that is mobilizing against the coup, which has plunged Brazil into a period of profound darkness.

On social media, a large presence of activists from the democratic camp can be seen advocating against supporting the movement, which threatens to paralyze the country.

Is this position correct?

The alliance of various sectors of the right wing acted differently when it took advantage of popular movements with legitimate demands, such as those demanding free public transportation in São Paulo in 2013, and those protesting the social impacts of the World Cup construction projects that same year. These were two movements with valid and specific demands that, under normal circumstances, could have garnered the attention of the governments involved and could have been resolved to the benefit of the social groups involved.

During this period, there was also a movement by truck drivers, instigated by large transport companies, in a model strangely similar to what happened in Chile on the eve of the deposition and assassination of President Salvador Allende.  

Using techniques and infrastructure of foreign origin (as President Dilma herself admitted in an interview with Brasil247, when she mentioned the phone call from Turkish President Recep Erdoğan), in addition to a lot of money to fund fascist groups like the MBL and the omnipresent weight of Rede Globo, controlling the rest of the Brazilian conservative media; the right-wing alliance took advantage of these movements – both those that presented just demands, and those fabricated by the coup plotters (as is the case with the truckers). These movements served as a trigger to create the climate of unease that infected the middle class and produced the demonstrations that preceded the coup.

Clearly, there was strong manipulation of public opinion through communication techniques aimed at disinformation, as well as half-truths, outright lies, and slander, which created the climate conducive to the explosion that occurred.

This analysis cannot ignore the mistakes made at the beginning of Dilma's second term. One of the most serious was the reliance on austerity measures, as proposed by the international financial system, to overcome the crisis, signaled by the appointment of Joaquim Levy to the Ministry of Finance. Levy is a career banker; he came from Bradesco to the government and, upon being dismissed, took a position at the World Bank. A person like that has no commitment to the country, but rather to his banker bosses. The result of the experiment with the representative of the banks was to exacerbate the economic crisis, primarily affecting the lives of the middle and lower classes.

In the background was the communication policy, which was always poor under all PT governments, in addition to the disconnect with social movements that also began to occur, especially during the period when the party was in power. In this scenario, the democratic camp failed by not seeking to engage more emphatically and negotiate with these movements.

There could even be room for dialogue with truck drivers, a sector of the economy comprised of 46% self-employed individuals and another 25 to 30% small and medium-sized business owners with up to 10 vehicles, according to ANTT (National Agency for Land Transport). This group was heavily benefited by the policies of the Lula and Dilma governments, especially regarding credit, fuel price control, expansion of the domestic market, and overall economic growth.

Obviously, it wouldn't have been possible to negotiate with the large transport companies deeply involved in the coup. But the interests of almost 70% of the sector, made up of independent workers, small and medium-sized business owners, are quite different from those of the mega-transport companies. It would have been possible to talk to them. 

The same misconception seems to be repeated, now by many activists in the popular and democratic camp, who refuse to support the movement, resentful of the truck drivers' role in preparing for the coup. This view fails to recognize that they were used. Many of them joined those movements against the Dilma government either because they were forced or manipulated by their bosses. Others, small business owners and the self-employed, were misled by a strong campaign to manipulate public opinion, which, as history shows, affected almost the entire middle class and a good portion of the poorest.

EXPLORING THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE COUP

However, there are two issues to consider. The first is that, even without this primary intention, the truckers' movement undermines and weakens the coup by attacking one of its pillars, which is the attack on the state, social, developmental, and strategic function of Petrobras. And what creates obstacles for the coup is in the interest of those fighting against the accelerated dismantling of Brazil.

The coup, as we know, is a consortium of diverse interests that have joined forces for a momentary move. There are strong contradictions among the participants in this consortium.

It's not appropriate here to go into detail about the format of these distinct groups – that's for another time.

The current president of Petrobras, Pedro Parente, a member of the PSDB party, represents one of the most powerful of these groups: the powerful international lobby composed of multinational oil companies and banks, which participated in the financing and organization of the coup. This sector has interests in the pre-salt reserves and in transferring the immense wealth generated by the company to their own pockets (or bank accounts) through the highest possible dividends on profits. The entire mechanism of Brazilian oil is currently under the management of this lobby, through Pedro Parente. The new oil policy aims at three objectives: to make Brazilian reserves accessible to foreigners, mainly Anglo-Americans; to transform Brazil into an exporter of raw materials and an importer of industrialized derivative products with higher added value (which affects technological development, job creation, and the trade balance); and to pay the maximum dividends to shareholders (mainly large international banks, powerful rentiers, and usurers).

While Parente is committed to this policy, other sectors involved in the coup have different interests.

It is possible to perceive the intentions of some of them, such as those of the kleptocratic group within the current MDB party, which has entrenched itself in Brasília under the leadership of Michel Temer. This veritable gang intends to remain in power to continue plundering state funds and negotiate agreements that prevent them from being caught by the justice system for their crimes.

There is also the ideologically submissive group, gathered in a rather uncomfortable way around the main historical figures of the PSDB party: Fernando Henrique Cardoso, José Serra, and Aloysio Nunes. For them, who consider Alckmin a backwoods politician and Aécio Neves's political movement an antiquated feudal conglomerate to be used and discarded as needed, the project is to lead Brazil to integrate into the neoliberal empire of the "West".

Another group is the judicial republic, a sector that deserves further analysis, although the extreme and strange influence of the United States' instruments of power projection on Brazilian federal judges, prosecutors, and police officers is evident.

Immediately after the coup was consolidated, fissures began to appear within the alliance that brings together these different interests and others.

Without strategic intelligence, all that remains are assumptions.

Unfortunately, the democratic camp has not structured intelligence mechanisms capable of thoroughly investigating the situation to ascertain what is actually happening behind the scenes. Not even the Lula and Dilma governments had reliable intelligence services, which certainly contributed to the weakness of the defense against the coup.

But it seems clear in this truckers' strike or lockout that there are important contradictions. The movement began with the demand for a reduction in fuel prices in general. Then it retreated to only the issue of diesel. Even so, Parente was intransigent and only yielded when there was a threat of airport shutdowns. Even then, he only accepted a 15-day suspension of diesel price increases. The impression is that the government and Petrobras are distinct and unconnected entities.   

The cracks in the coup's structure are the primary reasons to support the strike.

Social crises are, in themselves, educational.

Secondly, historical experience teaches that moments of heightened social conflict are in themselves educational. The coming together of striking drivers – especially employees who are exploited; self-employed drivers who struggle to pay for their vehicles; and also small business owners who need a fair fuel and freight pricing policy, as well as a strong and vibrant domestic market – can contribute to a shift in the level of awareness within this social group.

There is already a wave of regret in business circles regarding the support given to the coup, because the entire economy has worsened, especially due to the fact that small, medium, and even large businesses in the productive sector depend on the domestic market to survive and prosper. They, like the truck drivers, are already realizing that something is very wrong in Brazil. If the center-left and the left do not approach them to point out what is wrong, they could become victims of the worst alternatives currently available on the political scene.

Therefore, part of the strategy to combat the coup is to approach all movements that weaken and create problems for the consolidation of the project to dismantle and recolonize Brazil. The truckers' movement should be seen as part of the difficult war waged by the democratic, popular, developmentalist, and sovereign camp against the coup and for the rescue of our democracy.

Clearly, the target of the democratic, popular, and developmentalist camp will not be the owners of the large transport companies, but rather the approximately 70% of self-employed individuals, small and medium-sized business owners who greatly benefited from the Lula and Dilma governments and, with the coup, are extremely harmed – not only by the price of fuel, but also by the new structure of the economy.

The strategy of the democratic left should therefore combine combating the suicidal and fascist discourse of mega-business owners, in order to sensitize the majority of the category – the self-employed, small and medium-sized business owners.

It is necessary to know how to deal with this movement in a strategic, rational and constructive way, from the point of view of the greater objectives of the democratic field, and not just with emotion, prejudice and omission.