The successes and failures of the PT (Workers' Party).

The Workers' Party (PT) is right to maintain Lula's candidacy. The correctness of this argument stems from several reasons: it is the arbitrary and persecutory Judiciary that should exclude Lula from the elections, not his party. It would be a breach of loyalty for the PT to exclude him. Furthermore, if the Judiciary (including the Electoral Court) is coup-plotting, as it indeed is, it is necessary to confront it, to push its arbitrariness to the limit. Maintaining Lula's candidacy represents a correct tactic to pressure for his freedom. Finally, there is a possibility, however remote, that the registration of Lula's candidacy and his name on the electronic ballot could be maintained, a factor that could represent his release, electoral victory, and a halt to the destruction of Brazil.

But the art of politics is not like a mathematical sum. Politics is full of paradoxes, where opposing pairs constantly exchange positions. The PT (Workers' Party) errs when it maintains Lula's candidacy without occupying political and electoral spaces in the present and without building an alternative in the face of the possibility of failure in maintaining and registering Lula's candidacy. This construction would imply indicating a vice-presidential candidate now to occupy these spaces and present the program of what Lula will do in government, enhancing the fight for his freedom and putting pressure on the Judiciary. Prudent politicians are those capable of anticipating future adversities and acting in the present either to avoid them or to reduce their harmful effects. And they are those who know how to measure the consequences of each decision and each political act, taking measures in relation to them.

The PT leadership has failed to guide the party, its members, supporters, and voters effectively. It has been promoting the depoliticized "Lula or nothing" thesis. This thesis means the following: sticking with Lula to the end, even if he is excluded from the elections by the Judiciary, which is equivalent to saying that if Lula's candidacy is legally unviable, it will be transformed into an anti-candidacy. An anti-candidacy is electoral abstentionism, at least for presidential elections.

If withdrawing from the presidential race is an option, the party leadership needs to announce it so that candidates for other positions, party members, and voters can prepare for this situation and not be caught off guard. And if this is the chosen option, prudence dictates that one should consider what the consequences would be. One foreseeable consequence would be the weakening of the party's electoral potential, with increased difficulties in electing deputies, senators, and governors. The PT would not be able to occupy the TV and radio airtime allocated to presidential propaganda. It would also be unable to use this airtime to denounce the coup, defend Lula's freedom, present a program for the country, etc.

The slogan "Lula or nothing," encouraged by sectors of the PT leadership, has generated a depoliticized, sectarian, religious, and aggressive militancy, similar to the radical right-wing militancy, whose only argument is to offend those who disagree with it. Based on the motto "Ciro won't get through the PT even with fervent prayers," this militancy, including some analysts, dedicates itself more to attacking Ciro Gomes than to attacking the government, the right wing, Bolsonaro, the PSDB, and the centrist bloc. Part of this militancy also directs its sectarianism against Guilherme Boulos and Manuela D'Ávila, suggesting that they are playing into the hands of the right wing or that they are irresponsible leftists, demanding a consistency that is far removed from the PT itself.

This petty and irresponsible arrogance may stir desolate and resentful spirits, but it does little to help the task of defending democracy, fighting the coup, and confronting the neo-fascists. What right does this arrogance have to demand consistency from others? Didn't the PT ally itself with a horde of coup-supporting parties, with Michel Temer at the helm? Isn't the PT now allying itself in 15 or 16 states with coup-supporting parties, such as the PSD, PPS, MDB, PRB, PP, etc.? The PT leadership has its reasons for making these alliances, but one cannot demand consistency from others when one lacks consistency at home. Ciro is criticized for wanting to put a businessman as his running mate. But didn't Lula have José Alencar, one of the country's greatest businessmen? What could be worse than Temer?

Maintaining Lula's candidacy until the end, or until a decision by the Electoral Court, should imply an awareness that the PT (Workers' Party) will be alone in this endeavor, even if it replaces Lula in the final stretch of the campaign. It is a choice that needs to be respected, just as the candidacies of Ciro, Boulos, and Manuela must be respected. These candidacies must be respected in the name of coherence, responsibility, and ethics, because the progressive field needs to strengthen the democratic front in the fight against the coup and against fascism, creating the prospect of unity in the second round.

Those who prioritize the interests of the people over partisan interests need to understand that the progressive camp should not emerge weakened at the polls, as this would deepen the anti-social and anti-national character of the coup. Attacking candidates from the progressive camp means playing into the hands of conservatism, a game against the interests of the people. It is worth asking: should the PT (Workers' Party) be at the service of the people or of itself? Should the sacrifice of Lula, unjustly imprisoned, be an instrument of struggle in service of the people or in service of the PT leadership? The PT leadership does not have the right to prohibit legitimate internal debate in the name of an embarrassing argument: "whoever wants to debate alternatives is a traitor to Lula." The fight for Lula's freedom cannot be instrumentalized for the purposes of internal conflicts and interests within the PT.

Lula had been self-critically acknowledging the PT's mistakes since 2014. José Dirceu, two days before being arrested again, offered self-criticism in an interview with Rede Brasil Atual. Even if partial, it was a significant self-criticism. It is unacceptable that the mandarins of the party bureaucracy continue to perch on their pedestal of arrogance, issuing edicts and condemnatory sentences against allies, encouraging the aggressive outbursts of those who lack arguments.

Sectors within the Workers' Party (PT), aiming for political survival, have now created a new illusionary tactic: verbal radicalism in demanding Lula's freedom, but inconsequentiality and immobility in practice. Isn't it true that from Lula's conviction on January 25th until his imprisonment on April 7th, there was no significant mobilization to defend the president? Isn't it true that since Lula's imprisonment, with the exception of the São Bernardo event and the vigil in Curitiba, there has been no mobilization for Lula's release? They seem to believe in a mystical, saving light: the 35% of voting intentions for the president. But for these intentions to become something concrete, it is necessary to overcome terrible impasses and make correct mediations with reality so that voting intentions are not merely illusions slipping through their fingers. It is astonishing that Argentinians are demonstrating in the squares demanding Lula's release, while nothing similar is happening in Brazil.

PT militants and sympathizers need to face reality, the hard truth of things: 1) the PT does not have the strength to mobilize millions of people to demand and enable Lula's release; 2) the Judiciary will not release Lula before the elections and it is unlikely that it will release him in the short term; 3) despite the existence of legal loopholes, it is unlikely that the TSE (Superior Electoral Court) will accept Lula's candidacy registration, even if sub judice. The PT's tactics need to address and indicate paths to these issues, or it will be a tactic that sells illusions to buy defeats.