The new Brazilian political landscape: where might the country be headed?

The great contemporary political debate boils down to the following question: if democracy still exists in Brazil, can it coexist with a populist, moralistic, and authoritarian ultraliberalism that has emerged following the election and inauguration of Bolsonaro, Witzel, Doria, Zema, among others, and a Congress that is predominantly moralistic and conservative?

Two societal projects are at the heart of the political and economic dispute. On one side, political parties identified with groups, movements, and emancipatory political struggles have formed, whose programs focus on the continuity of the process of building a more democratic, inclusive, and egalitarian society, whose historical landmark was the 1988 Federal Constitution.

On the other hand, there are parties and politicians (boosted by the corporate media) who participate in a broad conservative ideological spectrum, representing the interests of economic power in its rentier and speculative phase, and who advocate for a minimal state that guarantees privileges for the elites (and segments of the conservative middle class), containment and penal control for the working class and the poor, and a return to a religiously based morality that implies the denial of diversity.

A brief historical overview is essential in this analysis. In truly democratic societies, governments serve the public and collective interest, working to provide and consolidate public policies capable of mitigating the overwhelming effects of an economy that increasingly precedes and dominates politics.

Historically, Brazil has never been a fully democratic country. Multifaceted violence – generated by social exclusion, selective justice, a slave-owning elite mentality, and patriarchalism that fosters multiple forms of oppression – has always prevented the realization of rights for all, on the one hand, and, on the other, unbalances sociopolitical disputes as the majority of the population is systematically crushed by this elitist social order.

The relationships of command and obedience, characteristic of the hierarchical structure of Brazilian society, are present in the daily lives of families, churches, work relationships, schools, and in almost all areas of life, defining a citizenship marked by privileges for a few and a sub-citizenship—characterized by the non-realization of rights—for the majority of the population.

The creation and implementation of rights is a recent phenomenon in Brazil. The 1988 Federal Constitution and subsequent governments took some important steps towards building a minimally egalitarian and just society. However, just when we were on the path to civilization, moving from a merely formal and very low-intensity democracy to a true democracy, another institutional rupture occurred violently and overwhelmingly in 2016 with the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, consolidating a period of acceptance of conservative and elitist demands that had begun more explicitly with the so-called June 2013 protests.

The historically resistant and violent segments of Brazilian society (the economic elites of business, banking, and agribusiness; the reactionary sectors of the middle class, represented in Congress by the "Bullet, Bible, and Beef" caucus; the anti-democratic corporate media; and privileged segments of the justice system) have united to undermine the gradual construction of a truly democratic society. This occurred within the context of a very serious economic crisis that has befallen the country, further weakening the central government—already worn down by the belligerent 2014 electoral process, the June 2013 protests, and the various selective police and judicial operations that brought to light endemic processes of political corruption in Brazil.

The important thing is to realize that behind the group of conservative social and political actors who led the impeachment process are the interests of economic power. To effectively annihilate democracy, economic power works with these segments, in society and in politics, to create conditions for a governance model that removes sovereignty from the people and transfers it to the god-market.

The global context must also be considered. The subordination of politics to economics, characteristic of neoliberalism, helps to explain the crisis of legitimacy of public institutions, the centrality of the market as a god, and the media-judicial war against popular governments.

Thus, we can speak of a state of exception – a requirement of neoliberalism – that reconfigures the structures of power and the State based on a logic of exception, even eroding the assumptions of liberal democracy.

This is a state of exception because we are living with a democracy without the people, at the service of the market, and sustained by authoritarian measures from the three branches of government amalgamated into a single system against the people and the Nation.

Therefore, the rupture that occurred in 2016 was based on an ideology according to which public power, and therefore the State, should be managed like a company. The State is conceived from the perspective of private interests; it ceases to have as its foundation the public interest, supported by popular sovereignty, and instead focuses on and guarantees the interests of a select few. In these terms, the politician ceases to be an elected representative mediating the various legitimate social, political, and economic interests and conflicts, and becomes a mere manager, occupied and concerned with the efficiency of an entire public structure that, in neoliberalism, is geared towards maximizing the economic and financial interests of those who hold economic power at the expense of the rights of the majority of citizens.

In the neoliberal state, the private sphere of the interests of the powerful is expanded, while at the same time, the public sphere of citizens' rights is shrunk. Under neoliberalism, a true democracy is impossible. Only a democracy overseen by the owners of capital or their representatives in positions of power within the state is acceptable.

With the 2018 elections, a cycle of expanding rights and attempting to consolidate a welfare state in Brazil, inaugurated with the 1988 Federal Constitution, came to an end, and a new cycle began, which will be marked by the voracious dismantling of the social state, restriction of rights, control and persecution of social, ecclesial and cultural movements and leaders, and the implementation of policies aimed at increasing the "economy that kills," in the words of Pope Francis.

Three groups within the Bolsonaro government will be in charge of these agendas: in the economic sphere, the ultraliberal group, led by Paulo Guedes, which enjoys the support of Vice President Mourão; in the legal sphere, the punitive group, led by Sérgio Moro, who, paradoxically, is the "cherry on top" for the president and his clan; and in the realm of customs, the moralistic and conservative group with a religious base, led by Damares Alves, Ricardo Velez, and Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo, inspired by the former astrologer Olavo de Carvalho, the guru of the current government.

It is important to note that the Bolsonaro government also emerges as a totalitarian threat. Besides Bolsonaro embodying, to some extent, the stereotypes reminiscent of a dictator (communicating directly with the people, disregarding institutional norms, and imposing himself as the sole possessor of truth), what is most frightening is that the core of totalitarianism lies within social and political institutions when they become homogeneous. And the alignment of the other branches of government with the authoritarian ideals of the new president, as seen in the current Congress and part of the Judiciary, may indicate this ominous totalitarian perspective.

It should also be noted that the economic policies announced by the Bolsonaro government are ultraliberal, and ultraliberalism is a contemporary form of totalitarianism: everything is conceived as if it were a private company, including the State. Managers are elected as rulers, and meritocracy is paramount. Now, if the State and public institutions are companies, how will it be possible to deal with conflicts, diversity, and social exclusion, for example?

It is interesting to observe the "new" government and its disputes in the religious field. Briefly, it is necessary to note that neo-Pentecostal segments within Protestantism and Catholicism remain active and shamelessly employ guerrilla tactics to defend a worldview based on conservative and reactionary values. They will continue to attack segments identified with transformative socio-political actions and will increasingly contest the narratives about the meaning of Christianity in a time of increasing exclusion, fake news, hate speech, and violence – all in the name of morality and the good customs of the traditional Christian family. These are worldviews and values ​​that cannot be disregarded because, for these segments, they represent the foundation of their faith.

Finally, in the political-institutional spectrum, there are immense challenges ahead for the democratic and popular camp. Among the main ones are the formation of a broad democratic center-left alliance; the rapprochement of social-democratic and socialist-inspired parties with the grassroots of society; and the refounding of the left to confront, with a consistent opposition, a government with a clearly authoritarian bent.

In the short term, Brazil is rapidly moving towards dismantling the social welfare policies that came with the 1988 Federal Constitution, starting with the so-called "pension reform." Punitive measures and a tightening of a selective penal state were blatantly revealed in Moro's "anti-crime package." On the moral and social level, the actions of Minister Velez and Minister Damares leave no doubt about the moralistic and conservative agenda that will spread across multiple sectors of society. And in the realm of international relations, Foreign Minister Araújo, despite being overseen by members of the Armed Forces, continues to believe that Trump is the savior of Western civilization, signaling that conflicts of multiple kinds could isolate the country from international cooperation.

This is without even considering the visceral intra-government disputes: between the president and his clan with the vice-president; the groups that want to stand out, led by Paulo Guedes, Moro, Onix, among others; the low-level politics that are being inaugurated in both houses of Congress; and the action or inaction of the justice system in the face of very serious accusations weighing on the presidential clan, ministers of his government, and those who behave as if they own the power. Not to mention the participation (action, complicity, and/or omission) of the Armed Forces in this veritable mess.

Let's wait and see...