Neoliberalism, high cost of living, and the theology of prosperity: the vicious cycle that haunts Brazil's future.

By Cesar Calejon, for 247

Since yesterday, several analyses have been produced in order to understand the current Brazilian situation and the reasons that led Bolsonarism to perform better than predicted by polls from all the main research institutes in the country. 

In my view, the core of this debate lies not in the current situation, but rather in the structural expression of three fundamental dimensions of how Brazil is organizing itself at the beginning of the 21st century: neoliberalism, the high cost of living, and the theology of prosperity. 

These three dimensions, interacting dialectically, form the mechanism of a vicious circle that has been leading the country towards the formation of a kind of evangelical militia theocracy.

In short, neoliberalism, by worsening the situation of the vast majority of the national population, as exemplified by the pension and labor reforms, etc., after the 2016 coup, generates a situation of scarcity and state absence, especially with regard to basic services (education, health, food, and civil infrastructure) in the poorest communities of the nation. 

This high cost of living and the state's vacuum in the most vulnerable areas of the country generate a proportionally increasing adherence to prosperity theology and neo-Pentecostal proposals, which are based on the moral agendas widely used by Bolsonaro's supporters. Of the five most voted-for deputies in the country, four are Bolsonaro supporters, and the Liberal Party (PL) elected the largest blocs in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. All these candidates were elected based on moral agendas concerning "family," "God," "Christian values," and so on.

In other words, the greater the hardship orchestrated by neoliberalism, the greater the population's adherence to such ideas and to the churches that promote them. In turn, these churches begin to recruit followers in a simple way and encourage the multiplication of new cells using guerrilla tactics. 

As discussed in the books The Rise of Bolsonarism in 21st Century Brazil (Kotter) and Perfect Storm: Bolsonarism and Covid-19 in Brazil (Contracorrente), religious dogma, more precisely considering the notorious adherence of different evangelical currents and groups, was fundamental to the election of Jair Bolsonaro in October 2018. 

Since then, the expansion of these evangelical groups into all dimensions of social, political, and economic life has been further catalyzed. Several key points help to reflect on this shift: the hierarchy, the cell multiplication, and the ease of social ascension present in the neo-Pentecostal model as it is organized in Brazil at the beginning of the 21st century. 

Evidently, the hierarchical organizations of evangelical churches vary according to each group and historical branch. In general terms, however, there is a rigid structure determined in this sense by order of importance: apostle, bishop, pastor, elder, minister, coordinators and cell leaders, workers, and the faithful. 

Although the top positions in this pyramid are invariably occupied by the central figures of each movement, and offer few possibilities for successional mobility, the lower positions in the arrangement can be accessed much more easily, which enhances the cellular multiplication character of the groups. 

In Brazil, the Catholic Church, for example, gathers its followers only within its churches. The priests are clergymen, with theological training, and speak a language increasingly distant from the general population. In the evangelical church, any citizen can become a cell leader within months of joining the organization. 

This new member, who in most cases needs no prior training, begins to gather the community within their own home and promotes the multiplication of this cell as a formal guide for the development of the doctrine. Adding to the equation is the fact that televangelism is much more a phenomenon of mass social communication, political and economic, than of a strictly religious nature. 

In Brazil, all the major evangelical pastors who promoted the rise of Bolsonaro in 2018 transmit their ideas through broadcast television and the internet. Some own hegemonic media outlets and are featured on Forbes magazine's list of billionaires. 

Thus, no other area of ​​Brazilian social action offers such a quick, safe, and promising opportunity as a life project, especially in the poorest regions of the country, where the state is completely absent, as highlighted. 

Furthermore, churches are exempt from taxes, collect tithes through the decision of the faithful who pay them, and are able to establish, without any form of contestation or openness to debate, the sociopolitical narratives that most interest them on a given occasion. 

For these reasons, several studies project that Brazil could become a predominantly evangelical country within this decade, organized in an increasingly homogeneous and intolerant way towards the diversity of its own people, especially considering how these philosophies reject the participation of the LGBTQIA+ community, women, Black and mixed-race people in positions of power. 

Yesterday's result, in which Bolsonarism emerged strengthened despite Jair Bolsonaro's defeat to Lula in the first round, is largely a product of this broader structure, which ultimately establishes the current socio-political situation in the country.

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