It's not lightning in a blue sky.

On November 26th, the National Directorate of the Workers' Party held a well-attended debate on the international crisis and its effects on Brazil, with Guido Mantega and Marco Aurélio Garcia as speakers.

Two other debates are scheduled, the first on December 2nd in São Paulo, jointly promoted with the PCdoB; and the second on December 16th in Salvador, jointly promoted with the PSB and the PCdoB.

The debate held in Brasília reaffirmed that the international crisis is a direct product of so-called neoliberal policies, particularly the deregulation of financial markets.

He also reaffirmed that tackling the crisis requires adopting measures that strengthen public investment, the domestic market, regional integration and, in general, the role of the State in the economy.

In other words, both the crisis and the solution point to the discrediting of the neoliberal worldview. This is an aspect that can never be overemphasized, especially since the spokespeople for neoliberalism remain at large, particularly in media companies, demanding that the Brazilian government cut investments and reduce the role of the State.

The debate promoted by the PT's National Directorate also showed that there are many controversial issues that remain open and require further exploration.

The first of these concerns the depth and duration of the crisis. There is a quite understandable tendency to highlight the comparative advantages of "developing countries," particularly Brazil, compared to the United States and Europe.

This tendency can lead to two misconceptions: on the one hand, minimizing the effects of the crisis in the "periphery"; on the other hand, failing to properly consider that the central countries will try to transfer the costs of the crisis to the "rest of the world." Even those who believe that imperialism is a "paper tiger" should take this into account and adequately prepare against this attempt.

The difference of opinion on these issues helps to explain the opposing attitudes that exist within our Party regarding the Doha Round: while some celebrate its failure, others advocate its revival. It also explains why some were enthusiastic about the G20 meeting, while others warned of its limitations and risks.

Another open question is the nature of the connection between the financial crisis and the economic crisis in the general sense of the word.

There is a tendency to view business closures and unemployment as a consequence of the financial crisis, failing to realize or properly consider that, ultimately, the financial crisis and the speculation that preceded it are themselves a result of the contradictory dynamics of capitalist production.

In other words: the contradictory "success" of capitalist expansion, including in the productive sector, is at the root of the financial frenzy.

Overemphasizing the financial aspect of the crisis leads to the adoption of countercyclical measures to support "productive capital," without considering (or without properly considering) that this "productive capital" itself, and not just the financial markets, also needs to be subjected to very strong controls.

Moreover, the very concept of financial capital presupposes what we know in the reality of large Brazilian and global companies: the intertwining of industrial and banking capital.

The difference of opinion on these issues underlies the disagreements regarding some measures adopted by the government, benefiting certain segments of the business community. And, on the other hand, it stems from the different emphases that we place on issues such as reducing the working day, agrarian reform, and the radical strengthening of universal social policies.

A third open question concerns the impact of the crisis on Brazil.

In this regard, there seems to be some consensus: a) the Brazilian economy is less vulnerable today than in the 1990s; b) we are stronger than we would be if we were implementing the policies of the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party); c) we would be even better off if, during part of Lula's first term, the Ministry of Finance had not been an auxiliary arm of pro-financial capital policies.

From these conclusions, which are apparently consensual (since the liberals within the left itself are rather silent), different lines of analysis and proposals unfold.

Among these lines, I note the tendency to overestimate the strength of the Brazilian economy and to consider the adoption of preventive and corrective measures sufficient.

Of course, some of these measures, such as interest rate reductions, are fundamental and cannot be postponed, and it's incredible to see how Henrique Meirelles insists, against almost everything and almost everyone, on delaying the inevitable. It's even more incredible that the government tolerates, within its ranks, an avowed and explicit saboteur of countercyclical policies.

But preventive and corrective measures, by themselves, do not seem sufficient to confront an international crisis of this magnitude, especially from the point of view of those who aim for levels of development and social equality far superior to those already experienced by Brazil in the 1980s and before.

We need to go further, reversing measures adopted throughout the 90s and implementing structural reforms, starting with tax reform (not to be confused with the partial and contradictory measures that are occasionally discussed in the National Congress). But for this to become a reality, a different approach is needed, one that considers the necessity of extraordinary measures, which require intense social mobilization and political-ideological struggle.

The biggest misconception, however, does not lie in the naiveté of some economic analyses regarding our strength and the measures to adopt. The greatest danger lies in a certain "economism," that is, in the view that reduces and confuses crisis management with the administrative management of the economy.

Note well: we faced the 2008 elections in a still favorable scenario and obtained a result below what was necessary. We will face the 2010 elections in a different and worse scenario, because even if we are completely successful in managing the economy, there will still be a slowdown, with all the resulting consequences.

This means that we will have to "compensate," in the political arena (ideological debate, social and party mobilization, legislative and governmental measures), for the losses resulting from the crisis.

In this respect, we are experiencing a contradictory situation, which becomes more evident in the ideological arena.

Namely: if it's true that neoliberals have been discredited (although Miriam Leitão hasn't realized this yet); and if it's true that "everyone has become Keynesian"; it's also true that past battles don't win the wars of the present or the future.

From now on and throughout the coming years, in Brazil, in the Latin American region and in the world, the nature of post-neoliberalism is being questioned. That is to say: what kind of world will be built after what some have called "the fall of their wall"?

It is expected of the left, especially a socialist party like our PT (Workers' Party) that it can offer a broader horizon and a different perspective from that offered by Lord Keynes. Who, let's remember, aimed to save capitalism.