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Denise Assis

Journalist and Master in Communication from UFJF. Worked for major media outlets such as: O Globo; Jornal do Brasil; Veja; Isto É and O Dia. Former advisor to the president of BNDES, researcher for the National Truth Commission and CEV-Rio, author of "Propaganda and Cinema in Service of the Coup - 1962/1964", "Imaculada" and "Claudio Guerra: To Kill and Burn".

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GSI military officials forward their "demands" to Lula.

"In an attitude of complete arrogance, they dictate rules and establish the 'conditions' to 'create a climate of confidence in the 'country's destiny'," says Denise Assis.

The Minister of the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI), General Augusto Heleno (Photo: Antonio Cruz/Agência Brasil)

By Denise Assis, for 247 

It didn't work now, just as it didn't work in the past. The worn-out and faded method used by the far-right in the dying days of the dictatorship – when officers from the Army's Center for Investigations (CIE) tried to detonate bombs during a May 1st show honoring workers, in order to incriminate the left and attribute the authorship to them – failed. The bomb exploded beforehand, killing one of the soldiers, Sergeant Guilherme Pereira do Rosário, and brutally injuring his colleague, Captain Wilson Machado. Just as in 1981, the attempt to blame the acts of terrorism perpetrated against the hotel of the president-elect, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in Brasília, on the night of his inauguration at the TSE (12/12), was yet another piece of fake news from the gang of fascists who refuse to leave the gates of the barracks, where they are protected by the leniency of the command, and with the connivance of a moribund government, which not only encourages them, but also welcomes them for friendly snacks on the premises of the Alvorada Palace.

But while in the past the military relied on the cover-up of the Army leadership and the dictator in power, this time the government that protects them is agonizing, and the minister-appointed for Justice, Flávio Dino, is acting in unison with the president of the TSE (Superior Electoral Court) and Supreme Court Justice, Alexandre de Moraes. There will be no amnesty, they assured.

The statement was made after the GSI, which came to power with Lula, drafted a document that goes against the policy proposed by Dino and practiced by Moraes. To leave "everything as it is to see how it turns out," the GSI team sends the incoming government the "script" on which roadmap to follow if it wants peace in the barracks, "including those in reserve and those retired," they emphasize.

In an act of utter arrogance, typical of those who are certain of the power of arms, they dictate rules and establish the "conditions" to "create a climate of confidence in the country's destiny" and ensure that "democracy and the rule of law" are "respected" and that the Armed Forces will play an important role in this historical process, motivating all active and reserve/retired military personnel to participate in this journey.

For this to happen, they indicate the "maintenance of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency subordinated to the GSI until its restructuring," which they do not detail how it will be done or what it will look like.

To ensure that all the "change" keeps everything the same, they establish a "menu" which they title: "Proposals to the Lula Government". From then on, they proceed to unravel their "suggestions" in the following terms: to begin, they "approve" the Minister of Defense, describing his profile and praising his name.

"The choice of Minister of Defense should fall on a civilian or military figure with good political connections and well-accepted by the Armed Forces. The military is not opposed to the appointment of a civilian minister, but they value one who is committed to and defends matters of military interest. Politicians with extreme ideologies, of any stripe, are also not well-regarded. The choice of Minister José Múcio is perfectly consistent with this proposal and was very well received by the military." The question here is: what if they hadn't accepted it?

They dictate that: “the choice of Force commanders should be made observing the principle of seniority. The choice based on a list of three candidates presented by each Armed Force is also very well-regarded by the Armed Forces, even if the chosen candidate is third on the list. Respect for the Forces' nomination reinforces the credibility of the institutions. In the same way as the choice of the minister, the choice of future commanders perfectly fulfilled this proposal.”  

In other words, if the minister and the commanders have won him over, we can proceed with the advancements and boldness of their "proposals." For example: "Respect the military culture, characterized by military traditions, beliefs, and values." If anyone considered that they are talking about the dogmas of the "1964 revolution," they were absolutely right.

But they didn't stop there. In the following passage, they even call them "entrenched clauses," which they are not, since entrenched clauses are only found in the Federal Constitution. But let's go:  

Certain areas considered important (fundamental clauses) are aspirations of the military community and should be highlighted for the Armed Forces, such as:  

- Teaching (How can we change the curriculum if, by doing so, we stop passing on to young people the history of the "1964 revolution" and the culture of anti-communism?)

- Promotions system

Military Statute

- Law restructuring the military career and (icing on the cake):

- Legal, normative and regulatory framework in force regarding the Armed Forces. It was a difficult achievement since 1985, going through the 88 Constitution, complementary laws, ordinary laws, etc.; everything is well consolidated.

For those who didn't understand what they mean by the last paragraph, yes, it's about: don't you dare tamper with Article 142! The one that serves as a mantra for those camped outside the barracks and was imposed by General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves on the constituent assembly members at the end of the drafting of the 1988 Constitution.

And, so as not to tire them with so many demands, I will cite this crucial point of the claims: “Maintaining the Institutional Security Office (GSI) under the leadership of an Army general, due to its complexity and interoperability with other government bodies (replacing all military and civilian personnel in leadership, management, and advisory positions). Ah! Good! It's a good thing they made that reservation...”

And finally, they send this: “A shift in the government's control of the Armed Forces will certainly lead to an environment of distrust and disunity, worsening the existing situation and strengthening Bolsonarism within the military.” Any resemblance to a scenario of blackmail is not a mere coincidence.

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* This is an opinion article, the responsibility of the author, and does not reflect the opinion of Brasil 247.