Lula and the challenge of reconciling the change demanded by the masses with national unity...

By Roberto Amaral 

The debate surrounding Lula's running mate, as well as the debate concerning party alliances, currently fueled by a stale dispute over positions, carries with it the drawback of any logical inversion, relegating to the background the essential, namely, the necessary, prior, and public debate around a minimum program that, upon completing the government's commitments, should constitute the central piece of a good electoral campaign, discussed with society and sanctioned by it, so that the vote for the candidate is also a referendum on his program, which will become, ipso facto, a program-commitment. 

If the starting point (for progressive forces) is the electoral defeat of Bolsonaro's regime, the end goal is the construction of a democratic, popular, and nationalist government. Anything outside of that would be reconciling with the status quo, which the nation wants to break free from.

 The foundation for a government of change—the appeal of national sentiment—transcends the limits of pragmatic alliances (partisan and institutional), which notoriously failed in Dilma's second government, as they had previously failed in the Vargas and João Goulart governments, a lesson that, it seems, has not been learned by contemporary popular forces. History shows that the security of progressive governments depends more on popular support, which is gained and lost independently of the composition of slates and party alliances, or military schemes, like those that deceived João Goulart's government. Older generations may remember General Assis Brasil's "military apparatus." On the other hand, popular support, the kind that Vargas lacked in 1954, Jango in 1964, and Dilma in 2016, is all the more significant and lasting the more it moves in defense of a program that the electorate knows, that speaks to its interests, and that it has sanctioned. 

This national-popular program is what is expected of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the crucible where the frustrations and hopes of the great masses are currently fused.

In a recent interview, Lula, aiming to disarm the resistance of his most ardent supporters, made it clear that the alliance with former governor Geraldo Alckmin has no electoral purpose, much less an ideological character, bringing together politicians with different worldviews; its scope is to ensure governability, the ghost that haunts the republic, so full of institutional crises and coups d'état, and which has frightened the PT since the overthrow of Dilma Rousseff's second government.  

Looking beyond the election, the former president, when discussing governability, was referring neither to the notorious ill will of Avenida Faria Lima, nor to the rumors of vetoes whispered on the street corners of military barracks, but to the need to promote a government of "national unity" (even if it involved changes), a need made imperative in the face of the legacy of Bolsonarism, a picture of national degradation (economic, political, social and ethical), countless times more serious than that found by Lula in 2003. 

How to reconcile change (demanded by the masses) with national unity, which suggests a freeze on spending and implies compromise with big capital, is something the former president has yet to explain. 

The main objective today, dictated by the facts, would determine the contours of the electoral campaign – to win support outside the progressive sphere – and the character of the government, which, being one of change, would also be one of compromise, with the ruler prepared to negotiate with all political and economic forces, but ceding power to none of them. The metaphor is from the former president: the poor need to fit within the Union's budget and the rich within their income tax. It remains to be seen how the rentier bourgeoisie will react.

Lula's difficult project of a national unity government, proposed at a time when class conflicts are so profound, risks becoming yet another conciliation, a tactic so common among us, by which the ruling class protects itself when confronted with advances from the social movement. However, it is known, as his biography clearly shows, that the former president would never endorse a political project that once again subordinated the interests of the workers to the dominant order. Hence the advisability of the candidate arming himself with a minimum program around which all negotiations would be articulated, whether those relating to the composition of his ticket or those concerning alliances. The discussion around this minimum program would set the tone for the electoral campaign, which, moreover, would favor raising the political level of the masses, something of utmost interest to the surviving left-wing forces. In this scenario, the foundations of a "national pact" would be clearly and transparently formulated, this time negotiated not only with institutions and political forces, but also with the electorate, and thus sanctioned by popular sovereignty. 

It falls to Lula to construct a pact that, aiming at "national salvation," reconciles the interests of opposing classes. 

In a press conference given to a network of independent websites on the afternoon of January 19th, the former president outlined a roadmap of proposals that could form the basis of a "minimum program" to be discussed with society: fundamentally democratic, which includes the defense of institutions and individual rights, and developmentalist and nationalist, which extends to the defense of national companies. Its central focus is the recovery of the State. Lula even used the expression "strong State," restoring its role as a vector of development. In short, although he doesn't explicitly state it, he promises the dismantling of the neoliberal project, initiated by Collor, consolidated by FHC, and taken to its extreme by the current government, which so enchanted the ruling class.   

Any project to recover the economy and resume development, a sustainable development aimed at combating social inequalities and eliminating the obscene concentration of income, must fundamentally be a project of industrialization policy, that is, of productive sophistication, which in turn promotes scientific and technological development, strangled by Bolsonaro's policies, which disorganized education and fought culture as if confronting a mortal enemy.

The work of true national reconstruction will involve the recovery of the BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) and the strengthening of public financial agencies, such as Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal (a state-owned bank), the recovery of Petrobras, the annulment of privatizations and the preservation of Eletrobras (a state-owned electricity company), in short, the resumption of the State's role as an agent of planning and development.

Developmentalist policy, which dates back to the 30s, is fundamentally a policy of industrialization that demands innovation, promotes scientific and technological development, fosters education and science, and ultimately creates jobs and ensures better wages.  

A minimum program is defined by its limitations, which require clarity and justification in a few items. It differs from a "government program," which can be a summary, listing the central points. On the other hand, there are "matters of state" that do not fit into electoral platforms. But there are issues, such as the military, that need to be discussed by the Brazilian people, who should be called upon to say what kind of armed forces they wish to fund. 

It is well known that one of the high points of Lula's two presidencies, alongside the emergence of the masses, was the defense of national interests and the exercise of an "active and assertive" foreign policy, in the summary of Celso Amorim, his main advisor. In the last 12 years, however, the international landscape has undergone radical changes, whether due to the rise of the right in the US and Europe, or the deterioration of international relations, which Joe Biden is taking to extremes by fueling the impasse with Russia (even more serious if the controversies with China are added), reminiscent of the climate of tension experienced by the world during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. This new world requires, more than ever, an assertive foreign policy, so that our country does not become, in the event of a dramatic solution, an instrument of the hegemonic policy of the atomic powers, in conflict over strategic and commercial issues that do not concern us. 

To fulfill the role of the armed wing of the bourgeoisie, the current training of our officers (whose quality is expressed in Captain Bolsonaro and General Pazuello) is sufficient, as are the weapons and equipment available to the uniformed personnel to intervene in civilian life. However, to fulfill their role as instruments of national defense, the Brazilian armed forces lack the retraining of their personnel, and weapons and equipment that they do not possess, because Brazil does not have an adequate industrial base, and even less the political will (civilian and military) to manufacture its weapons and equipment here, confining itself to the subordinate role of consumer of second-rate or clearly obsolete foreign artifacts, as we saw in the embarrassing parade of the Marine Corps armored vehicles in the August 10th parade last year in Brasília. 

This policy needs to be reviewed to ensure the autonomy of our armed forces, investing in research, innovation, and the manufacture of equipment necessary for national defense, its constitutional mission, far from its current role as the armed wing of the bourgeoisie against social movements. A country whose armed forces depend on foreign suppliers is a country without armed forces and without national security. 

Any democratic project must consider revising the current Article 142 of the Federal Constitution, drafted under military supervision, which no longer reflects the balance of power expected to emerge from this year's elections.

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Inglourious Remarks – Exactly 52 years ago, in January 1970, journalist Mário Alves de Souza Vieira, a humanist, a distinguished Brazilian, a patriot, and a leader, alongside Jacob Gorender and Apolônio de Carvalho, of the Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party (PCBR), was murdered. Mário Alves, imprisoned and in state custody, “was brutally tortured in a series of acts of torture that included scraping his skin with a steel brush and the medieval torment of impalement” (Brazil Never Again, p. 96). Impalement, according to Caldas Aulete, is “an ancient torture inflicted on a condemned person that consisted of impaling them on a sharp stake through the anus, leaving them there until death.” The military disposed of his body, and to this day, Mário, my dear friend, is listed as “missing.” The torture, abuse, insults, and murder took place at the Army Police headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, on Barão de Mesquita Street. According to the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, their perpetrators were Lieutenants Luiz Mário Correia Lima, Dulene Aleixo Garcez e Magalhães, Captain Roberto Augusto Duque Estrada, Major Valter Jacarandá, and Inspector Thimóteo de Lima. The President of the Republic at the time was General Garrastazu Médici; the Minister of the Army was General Orlando Geisel. The criminals, responsible for this and numerous other crimes, remain unpunished.