The decline of l´Empire Américan

The decline of the Western Roman Empire began in the mid-4th century AD, primarily due to a series of problems that had plagued it since the 3rd century, such as barbarian invasions, economic crisis, and military power struggles.

From an economic standpoint, the Roman Empire entered a crisis primarily after the collapse of the slave system, which had to be replaced by the colonate system. This system consisted of a relationship between people with precarious living conditions and large landowners, who hired their services and, in exchange, offered protection and land for work. Many landowners who possessed slaves began to free them and also establish the colonate system with them. This process ultimately led to a decline in urban centers and commercial activity in the cities.

The US is also experiencing its decline.

At the end of World War II, the US possessed half the world's wealth; by 1970, the American share of global wealth was already less than 25%. Today, there is still no rival to its economic power, but we live in a world where global power continues to diversify, which would oblige nation-states, including Brazil, to seek to maintain and expand trade relations with as many countries as possible.

Aloísio Sérgio Barroso wrote in his book "USA, Empire and Multiple Specters of Decay" that the industrial centers of the USA have become "shells" of what they symbolized: Detroit lost 25% of its population, as did Gary, Indiana 22%, Flint, Michigan 18%, and St. Louis 20%! In another long and vehement analysis of "The Future of the United States Will Be Ruin," then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration, Paul Craig Roberts, stated that the USA has installed a level of corruption and manipulation in its economy, as well as its foreign policy, that would simply have been impossible in other times, when Washington's ambition was to contain the Soviet Union: "The greed for hegemonic power has made Washington the most corrupt government on the planet."

It is not difficult to assert that the current position of American imperialism in the system of international relations is largely due to its military power or its perpetual terrorist threat of triggering a global "nuclear war," but its decline is undeniable.

Regarding the military might of empires, Paul Kennedy, in his classic "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" (Campus, 1989), states that the history of the last 500 years of international rivalry shows that military security alone is not sufficient for the maintenance of an empire. It may function and "contain or defeat rivals" in the short term, but as it extends too far "geographically and strategically"—and even then, at a "less imperial" level, it focuses on "protection" and less on "productive investment"—it will likely see a reduction in its economic power, "with sad implications for its ability to maintain the long-term consumption of its citizens and its international standing."

On the other hand, the multifaceted decline of US imperialism is undeniable; only Olavo de Carvalho and imbeciles of that ilk deny historical dialectics.

This narrow-minded view will certainly diminish Brazil's participation in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which since 2006 has been working towards the formation of an economic bloc or a formal trade association, as in the case of the European Union, in addition to converting its growing economic power into greater geopolitical influence. Since 2009, the group's leaders have held annual summits. Let's wait and see what awaits us.

The decline is an integral part of the shift in global power geopolitics from the West to the East: "For the first time in history, world politics is simultaneously multipolar and multicivilizational. Economic and social modernization is producing neither a universal civilization of any significant kind, nor the Westernization of non-Western societies" (Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Objetiva, 1997 [1996], p. 19).

That's the premise.

Clearly, the US is in decline, but this is not a phenomenon that will occur "overnight." American power continues, sustained by terror and an immoral military budget (the Bush and Obama wars in Iraq and Afghanistan alone cost the American people $4,4 trillion), but the world continues to diversify, and the Americans are proving increasingly incapable of imposing their will. However, as Noam Chomsky points out, the average American is the one who loses the most, because "...what is decline for some may be unimaginable wealth and privilege for others...".

Brazil had been contributing to the advancement of a development agenda, the expansion of rights, and the promotion of equality in countries of the Global South, through the production of critical and relevant knowledge for the public debate about the transformations underway in the international system and their unfolding at the local, national, and regional levels. However, the government elected in October has a narrow view of Brazil's role and importance in the world.

The Bolsonaro government ignores the international scenario that has emerged since the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, in which the neoliberal model seemed to unify social, political, and economic values, based on the weakening of the State and the opening of national economies to free competition.

They seem unaware that the globalization of finance, information, and values ​​has intensified inequalities between states, simultaneously producing large economic asymmetries and a high degree of political interdependence. Perhaps they have never read Celso Lafer and Gelson Fonseca Junior, who in 2001 called the predominance of "centripetal forces," which, however, generated a governance deficit in the international system.

The occupant of the Planalto Palace does not understand that this reality has placed two challenges on the governments of the international community: (a) to correct the asymmetries of gains and advantages and (b) to develop policies aimed at building a more equitable globalization.

Bolsonaro, his sons, and those chosen by him to manage national interests seem to ignore that the beginning of the 21st century brought about some changes in the recognition of states, as well as in the type of relationships established between them, which is why multipolarity defines this new moment.

With the exception of the military sphere, in which the United States is still far superior to other countries, multipolarity has become a systemic reality, since other forms of power (such as soft power), beyond that conceived by the realist perspective (hard power), have become significantly relevant in the global system. Therefore, the realignment of forces, with the emergence of large developing countries such as Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa, paved the way for a new order that, in turn, would demand new operating mechanisms.
Unfortunately, we will face a period of obscurantism, the consequences of which will be felt by future generations.