Joesley is the loose wire in Lava Jato.

The arrest of Joesley Batista and his associate Ricardo Saud this weekend deserves more than a minute of reflection.

In words that would be confirmed by the facts, in a recorded conversation four months ago, Joesley told his loyal advisor Ricardo Saud: "We're not going to be arrested," he announced and repeated, suggesting that everything was settled for an agreement that would only be announced two months later.

At the time, Joesley seemed so convinced of what he was saying that he instructed Saud to communicate the news at an internal meeting to be held shortly afterwards. The idea, as can be deduced from the recording, was to reassure those present and dismiss any suggestion of imminent danger. Maintaining a certain mystery about what was happening behind the scenes, Joesley spoke words of confidence to his interlocutor, including on a personal level ("I'm not suffering"). He also said that he was a "teacher" at the school where the Attorney General was a "student".

The March dialogue would have been pure bravado, à la Delcidio Amaral, a conversation enlivened by shots of whiskey and backstage talk about women, if the main facts hadn't been confirmed.

In June, when the most awarded plea bargain in our history was celebrated, Brazilians discovered that the Public Prosecutor's Office had guaranteed Joesley, his partners, and family the right to freedom and comfort in New York, in a unique case for a convict of his stature and responsibility. Exactly as he had said would happen. 

In a country where the recording remained secret, the preferential treatment aroused unease and suspicion, quickly dismissed by the ideological juggernaut of the present day – it was nothing more than another attempt to sabotage Lava Jato. At that moment, Joesley's credibility was so great that, with Globo's endorsement, based on a recorded conversation at Jaburu Palace, he could have become the protagonist of the second impeachment in just twelve months.

In short: if Michel Temer hadn't opened the coffers to save his own skin, the most recent prisoner of the Federal Police would be entitled to a medal for his role in the fight against corruption. Most likely, due to a lack of interested parties, the tape wouldn't even have been made public. Both the recording and the near-impeachment involve instructive episodes about the uncertain nature of decisions made by authorities who, in the name of fighting corruption, day after day take possession of a larger share of the powers of a Republic in which the Constitution states, in its article 1, that all powers emanate from the people and their representatives.

Joesley's arrest led to the suspension of the plea bargain agreement, an inevitable measure given the scandal within the scandal. Resolved unilaterally by the reporting judge, Edson Fachin, of the Supreme Federal Court (STF), the decision highlights another exposed wire in Brazilian institutions.

In June, at the initiative of Justice Marco Aurélio Melo, the full court debated the prerogatives of a Supreme Court justice in conducting and approving plea bargains. Recalling that plea bargains involve agreements that can have great relevance for the country and not just for the parties involved, Marco Aurélio believed that all eleven justices should have the right to debate the agreements, review their terms, and even undo anything they found to be wrong. The other side argued that the reporting justice should have full autonomy to supervise the agreements, with the full court only having the power to comment at the time of the final sentence.

The result was a majority of 7 votes in favor of the individual decision. Supported by Rodrigo Janot and defended, in court, by one of Joesley's lawyers, Pierpaolo Bottini, the decision was based on a particular argument. It was stated in plenary that the Supreme Court should guarantee "loyalty" to the informants and fulfill what had been agreed upon.

The argument is that it is unimaginable that those citizens—corrupt individuals—would be willing to cooperate with the State if there was a risk of the agreement being broken. The word "loyalty"—addressing confessed wrongdoers—was said and repeated on several occasions. "The Supreme Court swears eternal loyalty to repentant corrupt individuals," I wrote here at the time, recalling that the Supreme Court has a duty to be loyal to the entire Constitution, including articles that defend education, public health, and the fight against poverty, and does not usually employ arguments of this nature to make such particular decisions.

Taken to jail, Joesley and his partner go to prison without the company of prosecutor Marcelo Miller, the likely identity of a character repeatedly referred to simply as "Marcelo" in the recorded conversation. Although his arrest had been requested by Janot, Facchin considered it unnecessary.

According to the two interlocutors on the tape, "Marcelo" provides guidance on strategies for approaching the Public Prosecutor's Office, offering useful advice for a successful approach. In a piece of advice of an ideological nature, reflecting the mood of the times of criminalization, he says that they will be more successful in their efforts to approach the Public Prosecutor's Office if they start treating politicians as "criminals".

Occurring on the eve of Lula's second deposition to Sérgio Moro, Joesley's arrest is a useful choreography for the already tarnished image of Lava Jato at a time when attempts are being made to close the net and stifle a candidacy strengthened by the polls and with renewed energy after the caravan through the Northeast.