FrenCyber: The Big Tech Bench and the Risk for 2026

By Sara Goes and Reynaldo Aragon While Jair Bolsonaro occupied the plenary of the Supreme Federal Court during the historic trial of the central figures of the coup d'état, the National Congress, far from the spotlight, established the Parliamentary Front for Support of Cybersecurity and Cyber ​​Defense (FrenCyber). This seemingly technical gesture opens an urgent discussion about the real interests behind the initiative. At first glance, FrenCyber ​​presents itself as a response to the growing concern about digital security in the country; however, a closer look reveals a more complex – and dangerous – scenario.

Composed mostly of far-right parliamentarians directly linked to Bolsonaro – such as Esperidião Amin (PP-SC), Damares Alves (Republicanos-DF), Hamilton Mourão (Republicanos-RS), Jorge Seif (PL-SC) and Sergio Moro (União-PR) – and, by extension, to the interests of international conservatism, especially Trumpism, this front illustrates a strategic movement towards the direct influence of large digital platforms on Brazilian politics.

The creation of the Front appears to be part of a strategy already tested internationally, especially since 2016, when the election of Donald Trump in the United States highlighted the political use of Big Tech – such as Google, Meta, and Twitter – in hybrid warfare operations aimed at destabilizing governments and favoring authoritarian projects. In Brazil, this logic deepened from 2018 onwards, with the massive instrumentalization of disinformation and digital polarization, shaping a fragile, conflictive political environment highly susceptible to algorithmic manipulation. In this context, the FrenCyber ​​signals a new stage in this offensive: institutionalizing, under the pretext of cybersecurity, an apparatus geared towards surveillance, narrative control, and technical preparation for even more sophisticated digital interference operations – especially with a view to the 2026 elections. Therefore, it is essential to understand how this group can act, from a political and technical standpoint, favoring external interests and undermining Brazilian informational sovereignty. 

This institutional alignment creates space for the far right to operate freely in the digital environment, protected by the rhetoric of "freedom of expression" and the legislative shield offered by the Front. With legal tools at their disposal, ultraconservative figures can promote, from within Congress, practices that facilitate large-scale informational manipulation. 

How FrenCyber ​​can operate politically in favor of the platforms - The political power of the Cyber ​​Front lies precisely in its pursuit of influencing the creation and approval of legislation on the internet, privacy, and digital security. In practice, parliamentarians within this front could propose regulations that, under the guise of strengthening national cybersecurity, would ultimately directly benefit foreign Big Tech companies, guaranteeing their almost unrestricted operation in Brazil. An international example that serves as a warning is Section 230 of the United States Communications Decency Act, which exempts digital platforms from liability for content published by their users. Similar measures could be replicated here through projects with complex technical wording that hinder the accountability of platforms for extremist content, conspiracy theories, or disinformation campaigns.

Furthermore, this group can actively block initiatives that seek to limit the power of large platforms—for example, bills aimed at algorithmic transparency, restricting the indiscriminate collection of data, or creating rules for content moderation. International experience shows that, in several countries, supposedly neutral legislation has been drafted to protect the business model of these platforms, which is based on the massive collection of personal data, user profiling, and highly precise political targeting—decisive factors in electoral campaigns marked by polarization.

This is, therefore, a coordinated project: by guaranteeing an extremely favorable regulatory environment for foreign digital platforms, FrenCyber ​​simultaneously strengthens the conditions for far-right groups to continue using these same tools to spread polarizing and destabilizing content—especially in the context of the 2026 elections. The direct result is the weakening of Brazil's regulatory sovereignty and the deepening of technological dependence on Big Tech, expanding its power to interfere in national political direction.

Beyond the political field, the Front also brings direct algorithmic consequences for Brazil's informational sovereignty. One of the most immediate risks is the encouragement of technological partnerships with international platforms such as Google, Meta, and Amazon, under the seductive argument of cooperation in digital security. In practice, these partnerships could pave the way for a technical deepening of mass surveillance and systematic collection of Brazilians' personal data by foreign companies—now with legislative approval.

With the backing of legislation drafted by the parliamentary group, the collection of sensitive information can become virtually unrestricted. This includes geolocation data, browsing patterns, personal interests, content consumption, political stances, and even emotional behavior. This data is captured through persistent cookies, invisible tracking pixels, device fingerprinting, and cross-referencing information between applications and platforms. A simple browsing session on social media, a click on sponsored links, or the use of virtual assistants can result in a detailed behavioral profile—later used to target voters with personalized messages, manipulate emotions, and reinforce ideological bubbles.

A prime example of this type of operation was the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which used data collected via Facebook to interfere in electoral processes in the United States, the United Kingdom, and countries in Africa and Latin America. The company accessed detailed psychological profiles to micro-target political content and manipulate electoral decisions with high precision—without the explicit consent of users. The case revealed the devastating potential of the political use of personal data and how it can operate outside the confines of traditional democratic systems.

By reducing the Brazilian state's capacity to regulate the collection, use, and circulation of its own citizens' data, FrenCyber ​​will weaken national autonomy in the face of foreign digital platforms. The result is the erosion of informational sovereignty, the dilution of individual privacy, and the weakening of democracy as a practice based on pluralistic, transparent, and accessible information.

Concrete consequences and risks of FrenCyber ​​for Brazil

For a country that has already lived under high polarization and institutional instability for more than two decades, the creation of this parliamentary front means exacerbating these vulnerabilities to the extreme. In a scenario where foreign platforms have technical freedom and legislative protection to manipulate information, democracy itself becomes compromised. In terms of informational sovereignty, this represents an unprecedented structural vulnerability: Brazil surrenders its capacity to regulate the flow of information to foreign companies motivated by profit and transnational political alignments. Crucial political and social decisions are shaped by opaque algorithms, designed to maximize engagement—not democracy.

The risk posed by FrenCyber, therefore, is not a future abstraction: it is real, concrete, and urgent. Confronting it means defending Brazil's democratic integrity, political autonomy, and informational sovereignty. With the 2026 elections on the horizon, understanding and exposing the practical implications of this parliamentary front is an indispensable step to prevent the country from plunging into an irreversible cycle of digital manipulation and technological dependence. The time to react is now.