Facts and figures: Bolsonaro will not fall.

Every journalist has the right to have an opinion and to express their political positions. More than a right, they have an obligation. But they cannot argue with the facts, nor confuse reality with desire.

The month of June ends with numbers and facts that are best left unadvised.

Fact 1: Bolsonaro is weaker.

Bolsonarism, which threatened coups and claimed that a rupture was only a matter of time, proved to be a bluff. Queiroz was arrested, Wassef exposed, the "300" encampment dismantled, the "hate cabinet" gutted, Weintraub fled, and the captain appointed a new Minister of Education closer to the military than to Olavism... This scenario shows that the possibility of an institutional rupture does not find support in reality.

Yes, we already have authoritarianism that authorizes police brutality, we already have 3 military personnel in the government, we already have the 2016 coup and the fraudulent removal of Lula from office. But Bolsonaro doesn't have the strength to advance his fascist project any further. He has been contained. That's a fact.

Fact 2: Bolsonaro maintains a one-third approval rating, which prevents any attempt to remove him from power now.

If the tragedy of the pandemic, with over 50 deaths, coupled with the exposure of Queiroz/Wassef and the shattered economy, wasn't enough to destroy Bolsonaro, it seems unlikely that his popularity will shrink significantly by the end of 2020 (especially with the emergency aid being extended until September/October).

We can't argue with the facts.

The DataFolha poll, published this Friday, shows that disapproval of the government (bad/terrible) has reached 44% (up from 43% a month ago). The excellent/good rating is at 32% (down from 33% in May). A similar trend was indicated by other polls throughout this week.

All of these indicators suggest that Bolsonaro is losing support among Brazilians with higher levels of education, but is gaining ground among voters earning less than two minimum wages and who only have a primary school education.

In the Poder360 survey, 63% of those with a higher education rate Bolsonaro as bad/terrible; among those with only elementary education, 38% say the president is bad/terrible, and 35% consider him to be excellent/good.

The reason for this, according to several experts, is the emergency aid of 600 reais.

It seems to me that it's not just that. Part of the population is receptive to the discourse of order and believes the claim that the "system" has prevented Bolsonaro from achieving better results.

This is what the research conducted by Fórum MagazineAlmost half of Brazilians identify as right-wing or center-right. In other words, there is a conservative hegemony in Brazilian society.

The situation, however, is extremely fragile for Bolsonaro, because this anti-establishment discourse tends to dissolve with the entry of the Centrão (center-right bloc) into the government. Despite this contradiction, the support of conservative parties and the military seems sufficient to prevent any progress in the impeachment process or the annulment of the ticket in the TSE (Superior Electoral Court). Bolsonaro has enough momentum to last until 2021.

When choosing where to stay, We have ruled out two scenarios: neither a coup/closure of the regime, nor impeachment/absolute defeat.

What would remain is what Congressman Orlando Silva (PCdoB-SP), in a great interview with Boa Noite 247, called the "Sarney-ization" of the government. This seems to be the most likely trend today.

Bolsonaro would continue, stumbling along, weakened, without his "hate cabinet," without Olavism at the center of his discourse: a kind of boneless Bolsonarism. But with a firm liberal agenda, pushing through controversial policies. 

It is also important not to argue with yet another fact of reality.

Fact 3: Bolsonaro maintains his 30% approval rating, shifting his target audience and now counting on the poorest voters, and in doing so, he is gaining ground on an electorate that had voted for the PT since 2006..

When assessing electoral options, the field today seems to be narrowing for the left:

- From the middle class upwards, there is strong support for anti-politics/anti-state sentiment; this electorate abandons Bolsonaro, but will not necessarily embrace a center-left project; it is more likely that they will migrate to Moro or something similar;

- In the income bracket below two minimum wages, Bolsonaro firmly insists on order, repression, and "aid" for those without formal employment contracts.

The country is currently dominated by anti-politics rhetoric coupled with violence and bombing. That's almost 70% of the population! It's no coincidence that... Quaest research showed that today Bolsonaro and Moro would be vying for the top spot in a presidential election (with Haddad and Ciro slightly behind in voting intentions).

Of course, Lula and the left are ignored by the media, which praises Moro and tries to portray him as a right-wing alternative. But the fact is that the situation is difficult for the left.

What still sustains Lula's support is the solidity of his backing in the Northeast – the region that most rejects Bolsonaro.

It seems to me that this picture points to a clear path: the left needs to vigorously contest the peripheries of the Southeast. This should be an absolute priority in the 2020 municipal elections.

Otherwise, the center-left project will remain restricted to a limited core – albeit a solid and respectable one.

That's what the numbers and facts show. It's best not to argue with them.