Between resistance and complicity: The Brazilian Foreign Ministry and the military dictatorship.
Foreign policy appears to be an exception when it comes to the differing narratives about the authoritarian regime.
By Ismara Izepe de Souza and Bruno Fabricio Alcebino da Silva
The rise of the far-right in Brazil in recent years has been accompanied by recurring attempts to alter the narrative surrounding the military dictatorship (1964-1985). While the period immediately following the country's redemocratization in the 1980s highlighted the negative legacy left by the military, the Bolsonaro government, along with constant threats to democracy, has intensified its efforts to promote a positive image of that period. The controversies surrounding the undeniable success of "I'm Still Here" are a striking example of this. The film portrays, from the perspective of Eunice Paiva, the disappearance of her husband, former congressman Rubens Paiva, who was killed by the authoritarian regime. On March 2nd, the film made history by winning the Oscar for best international film, an unprecedented achievement for Brazil. Amidst effusive celebrations from the progressive and moderate right and the production of fake news by the far-right, the fact remains that the memory of this period continues to be the subject of disputes.
Foreign policy seems to be an exception when it comes to the different narratives about the authoritarian regime, as there is an almost universal perception of its successes during this period. During the 21 years of military rule, the profile of Brazil's international engagement changed considerably, making it impossible to speak of a single "foreign policy of the military regime." After all, the automatic alignment with the US promoted by the Castelo Branco government (1964-1967) was gradually replaced by a developmentalist foreign policy, culminating in the responsible pragmatism of the Ernesto Geisel government (1974-1979), which, in its autonomous and assertive character, shares similarities with the foreign policy of the first two governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), also known as Itamaraty, has specific characteristics within the Brazilian public administration. The esprit de corps that marks the sociability among diplomats has led the institution to preserve a positive memory of its performance during the military governments, conveying the idea that the MRE remained aloof from the most abject aspects of the dictatorship. The idea, disseminated and corroborated by scholars, diplomats, and the press, was that Itamaraty continued to base its actions on the interests of national development, without being influenced by what was happening in domestic politics.
However, in the last decade, research conducted in academic circles and that which resulted in the Final Report of the National Truth Commission has demonstrated that the supposed detachment of Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) from domestic politics, and particularly from the repressive apparatus, did not exist. While the official stance was one of indifference to what was happening internally, behind the scenes Itamaraty participated in the repressive machinery, assisting in the surveillance and repression of exiled Brazilians. But there was also the other side of the coin, that is, diplomats who were unwanted and persecuted by the dictatorial regime, either for not presenting a posture consistent with the ideal profile of a diplomat, or for threatening the corruption schemes involving the military and the high-ranking government officials, as denounced in the case of José Pinheiro Jobim.
Between connivance and support
Inspired by the experiences of Chile and Argentina, the National Truth Commission (CNV) was established in Brazil during the government of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) with the objective of investigating and clarifying the serious human rights violations committed by the military dictatorship (1964-1985). The former president herself was a survivor who was imprisoned and tortured during the regime. Among its most relevant contributions, the CNV dedicated a specific chapter to crimes committed abroad with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), demonstrating the direct involvement of Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in transnational repression and the persecution of political opponents outside of Brazil. final report, released in 2014, provides documentary and testimonial evidence that is fundamental for the institutional recognition of these violations, reinforcing the need to preserve historical memory and hold the agents involved accountable.
The Foreign Information Center (CIEX), created in 1966, was one of the main mechanisms of espionage and repression used by the Brazilian military dictatorship against regime opponents who had left the country due to political persecution. Linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Information Service (SNI), CIEX was a clandestine center that played a crucial role in monitoring Brazilian political exiles and in repressive cooperation with other authoritarian regimes in the Southern Cone, especially within the scope of Operation Condor. Brazilian researchers from the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and the University of São Paulo (USP), along with the Norwegian Institute of International Relations, conducted research that resulted in a database with approximately 8 documents demonstrating that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs monitored more than... 17 thousand Brazilians abroad. Although Brazilian diplomacy traditionally presents itself as neutral in the face of internal security policies, these documents reveal that Itamaraty was directly involved in the repression, providing detailed information on the activities of exiles, hindering the issuance of passports and granting strategic data to other intelligence services (PENNA FILHO, 2009, p. 44-45).
CIEX did not operate in isolation. It was part of the Intelligence Community of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CI/MRE), interconnected with other repressive bodies of the Brazilian State, such as the CIE (Army Intelligence Center), the Cenimar (Navy Intelligence Center) and the CISA (Air Force Security Information Center) (NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION, 2014, p. 179). These centers exchanged data on the location, activities and contacts of Brazilian exiles in Europe and Latin America.
The existence of the espionage agency demonstrates that the military regime possessed a systematic and structured repressive apparatus, with Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as a key element in political persecution both within and outside the country. According to Balbino (2023, p. 11), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only collaborated with the military regime but also integrated itself into the repressive apparatus, providing logistical and bureaucratic support for surveillance and repression actions.
Among the targets of CIEX were well-known figures, such as the deposed former president João Goulart and the former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola. Goulart's case is one of the most emblematic. Documents indicate that he was closely monitored by CIEX and by intelligence services from neighboring countries, such as Uruguay and Argentina. The authoritarian regime's concern was that the former president was orchestrating a political return to Brazil, which led to his constant surveillance and the restriction of his movements (NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION, 2014, p. 192). Brizola, in turn, became a priority target of Brazilian espionage abroad, especially in Uruguay. Records indicate that Brazilian agents monitored his activities, sending detailed reports on his political meetings and public speeches (PENNA FILHO, 2009).
Another relevant aspect was the repression of exiles with less public expression, but equally considered “subversive” by the regime. CIEX documents reveal that students, artists and trade unionists were also targets of constant monitoring. Many were denied passports and were prevented from returning to Brazil, while others were arrested and handed over to Brazilian authorities in joint operations with the military regimes in the region (COMMISSÃO NACIONAL DA VERDADE, 2014, p. 194).
CIEX also played a key role in the so-called Operation Condor, the network of repressive cooperation between the dictatorships of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay), which allowed the exchange of information about exiles and facilitated kidnappings and murders (PENNA FILHO, 2009, p. 48-49). According to documents analyzed by the National Truth Commission, Brazil actively participated in this scheme, providing data on political refugees and assisting in the capture of opponents in neighboring countries (NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION, 2014, p. 220).
Furthermore, Brazil's support for the 1973 coup in Chile was articulated through the Itamaraty and other organs of the repressive apparatus. Ambassador Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto played a crucial role in this process, providing strategic information and logistical support to the Brazilian military who were planning the deposition of Salvador Allende. According to Roberto Simon (2021), Brazil, under the command of military president Emílio Garrastazu Médici, not only assisted the Chilean conspirators in the months leading up to the coup, but also actively contributed to consolidating the dictatorial regime of Augusto Pinochet.
Thus, CIEX represented one of the pillars of political repression abroad, demonstrating that the Brazilian military dictatorship did not limit its actions to national territory, but expanded its surveillance and persecution internationally. By actively collaborating with other authoritarian regimes and by continuously monitoring its opponents, CIEX contributed to the perpetuation of a system of terror that marked Brazil’s recent history. The analysis of its archives and its activities is essential to understanding the extent of political repression during that period and reinforces the importance of preserving historical memory to prevent such episodes from happening again. The dictatorship is not a “closed chapter.”
Unwanted diplomats
There was another side to the coin: the repression suffered by many diplomats who did not conform to the behavior considered ideal by the dictatorship. Smaller in quantitative terms compared to other ministries, the purge also occurred in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). Soon after the military coup, ministries were authorized to initiate internal investigations to identify ideological suspicion and remove employees critical of the new regime. In 1964, Itamaraty gained specificity by being able to create its own commission, the Summary Investigation Commission (CIS), led by Vasco Leitão da Cunha, a diplomat chosen by Castelo Branco to head the MRE. The CIS resulted in 97 diplomats being investigated and 20 being dismissed (CARMO, 2018, p. 60).
In 1968, at the height of internal political repression, a new commission was formed to investigate conduct considered deviant and recommend the dismissal of homosexuals. According to Gessica Carmo, medical examinations were required to confirm intimate habits and actions, placing these diplomats in humiliating conditions (2018, p. 65). Others were dismissed for being too bohemian and for having behaviors considered inappropriate. The best-known case is perhaps that of Vinicius de Moraes, who was dismissed and later integrated into the staff of the Ministry of Education and Culture.
Some considerations are also warranted regarding the diplomat José Pinheiro Jobim, a victim of the military regime for outlining his intention to document a corruption scheme related to the construction of the Itaipu Dam. In the early 1960s, Jobim was appointed by President Goulart to speak with Paraguayan authorities about the hydroelectric development of the Paraná River. The project was implemented during the military governments, but the amounts invested in the lavish undertaking were absurdly high. larger than initially anticipated. In 1979, already retired, Jobim stated to a small circle of acquaintances that he was preparing a book about irregularities in the construction of the binational hydroelectric plant. Days later his body was found, and even with evidence of the staged hoax, the official version was suicide. In 2014, the National Truth Commission, upon reopening the case, acknowledged that the regime was responsible for Jobim's torture and death. The Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances (CEMDP), in 2018, determined that his death certificate should be rectified, recognizing the violent death caused by the regime. Brazilian state.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) stands between government and state policy.
Career civil servants at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed to the repressive apparatus through a bureaucratic structure of enormous proportions; however, many of them were victims of the abuses committed by the military dictatorship. The cases presented here demonstrate that polarized explanations, which generically point to the entire Brazilian diplomacy as either a victim or a participant in the repressive apparatus, fail to account for a complex and multifaceted reality.
Therefore, it is not a matter of demonizing or excessively praising the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As with any institution, diplomats are susceptible to assimilating interests from different political and ideological spectrums, and there are certainly some among them who were satisfied to contribute to the repression and others who were indignant and risked fighting the abuses committed by the military.
The Itamaraty is internationally recognized for producing excellent professionals who have demonstrated their ability to masterfully represent Brazilian interests. In this sense, the institution has its merits in the arrow of time, by preserving some traditions, such as the defense of multilateralism and the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, along with the actions of a State policy, there are decisions that are consistent with the priorities of the governments in power, which proves that foreign policy is also a government policy. The idea that the Itamaraty is an institution that is not very permeable to interactions with the domestic political universe is unsustainable in the face of the evidence.
References
BALBINO, Camila Estefani de Andrade Simphrônio. Itamaraty and its connections with the repressive apparatus during the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985). Final Course Work (International Relations) – Federal University of São Paulo, Osasco, 2023.
CARMO, Gessica Fernanda do. Soldiers in suits? Rupture, crisis and restructuring of Brazilian diplomacy (1964-1969). Dissertation (Master's), State University of Campinas – UNICAMP, Campinas, SP, 2018.
NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION. Final report. Brasília: CNV, 2014.PENNA FILHO, Pio. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry during the "Years of Lead" - the Foreign Information Center (CIEX) and repression in the Southern Cone (1966-1979)Brazilian Journal of International Politics, vol. 52, no. 2, 2009, pp. 43-62.
SIMON, Robert. Brazil against democracy: the dictatorship, the coup in Chile and the Cold War in South America🇧🇷 São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2021.
* This is an opinion article, the responsibility of the author, and does not reflect the opinion of Brasil 247.



