From negative ontology to the reform agenda.

The watchword of the moment is political reform. A topic on which everyone seems to agree, but on which there is no consensus whatsoever on how to implement it. Everyone has a different proposal regarding the content of these reforms. And there are those who also disagree on how it should be carried out: an exclusive Constituent Assembly or a congressional reform? – Would it be possible to have an Assembly specifically elected to deal with the matter, or is every Constituent Assembly plenipotentiary to change the Constitution? – This reform is no easy task. It concerns the very survival of Brazilian political actors: parties, candidates, the Executive Branch, parliamentarians, etc. And cutting into their own flesh is not exactly what the honorable deputies usually do. Political reform should not be done "à la carte," thinking only of their own interests or the interests of their party. Ideally, the illustrious parliamentarians should think only of the public interest, of what would be best for the Brazilian Republic, not for themselves and their party.

Brazil doesn't have a tradition of "institutional engineers"—statesmen and thinkers concerned with the form of political institutions. It has political operators. The disregard for the quality of institutions stems from a certain resentment of republican politics, associated sometimes with the market and sometimes with the army. The formative matrix of the Brazilian state is the patriarchal family, the Big House and its hierarchy of power. Our political experience is that of a patrimonialist or neo-patrimonialist state, where the public and private spheres are confused. According to sociologists, we had 300 years of the Big House. Only in the 19th century did the formation of the public sphere begin in Brazil, and even then, with a bureaucratic body originating from the landowning elite of the former colony.

The origin of Brazilian political thought is linked to negative political ontologies, the idea of ​​Brazilian political misery, and the inadequacy of political doctrines imported from other countries (liberalism, socialism, democracy, federalism, presidentialism, etc.). The reflections of Tavares Bastos, Paulo Prado, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, and Oliveira Vianna on "the idealism of the Constitution" and the need for "an instrumental authoritarianism" show the poverty of our reflection on politics and the Brazilian political model. Added to this is the curse of the (bureaucratic and patrimonialist) Iberian heritage, understood as an inevitable source of corruption in administration.

It was necessary to wait until the 90s and the agenda of institutional reforms – announced by Collor, but carried out by FHC – to clumsily introduce the discussion about Brazilian political engineering. The inadequacy of the institutional model to the historical, social, and cultural characteristics of Brazil began a debate (of Anglo-Saxon inspiration) about which electoral, party, and federal model would be most suitable for the country. This initiated a debate about the current state of institutions, their pathology, and their inadequacy. An electoral system (proportional representation) that did not help voters control and access their representatives. A very liberal party system that encouraged congressional fragmentation and political corruption. A system of private financing that allowed the blatant abuse of economic power. Hypertrophy of the Executive Branch, judicialization of politics, anomalous federalism, and mandatory voting, responsible for political apathy and the selling of voters. From election to election, the defects and problems of political representation in the country became more pronounced. in the functioning of political parties and in the financing of election campaigns.

The high point of this crisis occurred with the "June Days" of 2013, which forced the President to promote a political reform, with an exclusive Constituent Assembly, supported by popular mobilization. Naturally, such a proposal provoked reactions in various fields: in the Judiciary, in the Legislature, in the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB), etc.

Following the deepening investigations of "Operation Lava Jato," where Petrobras's multi-billion dollar contracts with Brazilian construction companies for major public works served as a source of indiscriminate campaign financing, the reform agenda became imperative. In the National Congress, there are three proposals to change the rules of the political game in the country: one from the OAB/CNBB (Brazilian Bar Association/National Conference of Brazilian Bishops), one from the Workers' Party, and another from the PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party). The first two have points in common...

Common, especially with regard to the exclusively public financing of electoral campaigns. The PMDB's proposal maintains private financing, although companies can only donate to a single party or candidate. The most republican proposals are the first two, since private financing of electoral campaigns has been the main source of abuse and corruption by economic power in proportional and majoritarian elections in Brazil.

Maintaining the current model for financing campaigns turns elections into a shady and clandestine business of exchanging favors for public works and fraudulent schemes, which fill the police reports on TV news and in print media. According to an estimate by the former president of the TSE (Superior Electoral Court), Minister Dias Toffoli, 50% of candidates are elected by companies and large economic groups in Brazil. A conservative estimate, certainly.

The OAB's proposal also defends other points, such as: voting on closed lists and not on individual candidates; the prohibition of coalitions in proportional elections; the elimination of alternate senators, among others. No proposal for institutional re-engineering in the country will succeed without a profound change in Brazilian political culture, the adoption of a true civic culture, the exposure of good examples, the exemplary punishment of the corrupt and those who corrupt, and, above all, the generalization of social opportunities for the poorest and most vulnerable.

One cannot be under any illusions about the miracles that "legal messianism" will work in Brazil, despite economic, educational, and regional inequalities. As long as we fail to address this profound picture of inequities upon which we intend to build the edifice of institutional reforms, we are doomed to the vicious cycle of misery and corruption. And to the transformation of victims into defendants destined for dungeons and public slaughterhouses, called prisons and jails, and not for schools of resocialization and democratic coexistence.