Collaboration and Domination III

Brazilian experience has shown that external power was only sustained thanks to local networks of collaboration. This pattern is repeated in different empires: domination is never established solely by force, but by the ability to build strategic alliances with local elites who hold political, military, and economic power.

In India, British control did not begin with a direct colonial interest, but with dynastic circumstances: Catherine of Portugal married the King of England, bringing Bombay as part of her dowry. From this political concession, the British needed to convert possession into effective dominion over a complex territory. To this end, they established alliances with Maharajas and their armies, who held authority over vast regions, controlled tributes and internal trade, and commanded their own military forces. The collaboration of these Maharajas was indispensable; without it, the British would not have been able to maintain security, revenue collection, and administration. Strategic products such as indigo blue and tea became central, and the production of these goods depended on the active cooperation of local elites, negotiating concessions and limited autonomy to convert formal domination into a functional system.

In North America, cotton and tobacco producers played a similar role. They were not mere subordinates: they were essential economic partners, whose plantations and trade networks ensured the flow of wealth to London. At the same time, their growing autonomy generated tensions with the metropolis, culminating in the breakup of the thirteen colonies. Here, as in India, collaboration was indispensable, but it contained within itself the seeds of resistance.

In the Ottoman Empire, domination depended on provincial governors, tribal leaders, and influential merchants. The sultan entrusted them with tax collection, military recruitment, and maintaining order. The autonomy granted to collaborators was limited but necessary for internal stability; when these elites grew stronger or opposed the central government, revolts and crises arose.

In China, the situation was different: the economy was already industrialized, and the trade balance with England was in surplus, making it pointless to impose a captive market model like that of India or the American colonies. The British centralized poppy production in India and exported opium to China, creating a coercive relationship that did not involve internal Chinese collaboration. The lack of local alliances led to resistance and the Opium Wars, demonstrating that domination without collaboration is unsustainable.

Rome exemplifies the same pattern in another historical context. The Pax Romana depended on provincial governors, auxiliary armies, and local elites integrated into the Roman system. Domination was efficient as long as these collaborative networks functioned, but local autonomy could become a challenge, leading to revolts.

Therefore, the very need for collaboration is the structural limit of domination. Collaboration is the invisible force that sustains the empire, but it also defines its fragility: empires are not eternal, because depending on local actors always implies risks. Brazil, India, North America, the Ottoman Empire, China, and Rome illustrate a universal historical pattern: domination is always an unstable balance between collaboration and coercion, and the formation of local elites, although necessary, creates tensions that no empire can completely eliminate.

This pattern reveals a structural logic: central power, however absolute it may seem, can never do without the assent and cooperation of local elites. At the same time, any effort at excessive control or direct repression tends to generate resistance, showing that the life of an empire is conditioned by the ability to constantly negotiate with those it needs to govern.

In the next chapter, we will explore the role of rural landowners and Faria Lima in the intended maintenance of US domination in Brazil.