China: one country, two sessions, three threats
Returning quickly to internal matters is of essential importance for a fresh start on the grand chessboard.
By Pepe Escobar, for the Asia Times
Translation by Patricia Zimbres, for 247
The main conclusions of the Two Sessions of the 13th National People's Congress are now public knowledge.
In summary: no GDP target for 2020; a budget deficit of at least 3,6% of GDP; one trillion yuan in special treasury bonds; a 2,5 trillion yuan cut in corporate taxes; a 6,6% increase in the military budget; and a commitment to "tighten belts" undertaken by all levels of government.
The focus, as expected, is to get China's domestic economy back on track after Covid-19, in order to allow for solid growth in 2021.
Equally predictable was that the focus, in the Anglo-American sphere, fell on Hong Kong – for example, on the new legal system to be approved next week, designed to prevent subversion, foreign interference, or "any act that seriously endangers national security." After all, as an editorial in [publication name] points out... Global TimesHong Kong is a national security issue extremely delicate.
This is a direct result of the information gathered by the Chinese observation mission based in Shenzhen regarding the attempt, by a heterogeneous group of fifth columnists and armed black blocs ...to destroy Hong Kong last summer, which almost happened.
It's no wonder the Anglo-American "freedom fighters" are livid. The half-measures are over. The free lunches are over. The paid protests are over. The black blocs are over. The hybrid war is over. Daddy Beijing has invented a new dance.
The three threats
It is absolutely essential to situate the Two Sessions within the incandescent broader geopolitical and geoeconomic context of the new and real Cold War – including hybrid warfare – between the United States and China.
Let's therefore focus on one insider American: the former White House national security advisor, General HR McMaster, author of Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (Battlefields: The Fight to Defend the Free World), to be released soon.
The book couldn't be clearer in terms of how the "free world," in Pentagon, perceives the rise of China.This could be called the perspective of the military-industrial-media-security complex.
According to McMaster, Beijing has been adopting a policy of "co-optation, coercion, and deception" centered on three axes: Made in China 2025; the New Silk Roads or Belt and Road Initiative; and a "military-civilian fusion," which can be seen as the most "totalitarian" vector, aimed at creating a global intelligence network for espionage and cyberattacks.
These would be the three threats.
Whatever the malicious tongues of the Beltway may say, Made in China 2025 is still alive and well - even if the terminology has been omitted.
The goal, to be achieved through a $1,4 trillion investment, is to profit from the accumulated knowledge of companies like Huawei, Alibaba, SenseTime Group, and others, with the aim of creating a continuous Artificial Intelligence environment. In this process, China must reinvent its technological base and restructure the entire semiconductor supply chain so that it is headquartered in China. All of these points are non-negotiable.
Belt and Road, in Pentagon-speak, is synonymous with "economic clientelism" and "ruthless debt trap." But McMaster gives the game away when he describes China's cardinal sin as "the goal of supplanting the influence of the United States and its main partners."
"Military-civilian fusion," in Pentagon terminology, means the rapid transfer "to the military of stolen technologies in areas such as space, cyberspace, biology, artificial intelligence, and energy." In other words, "espionage and cyber-theft."
In short: it is essential to "prevent" these Chinese communists from becoming "even more aggressive in promoting their statist economy and their authoritarian political model."
The Chinese diaspora with the word
Despite this binary and rather mediocre assessment, McMaster raises an interesting point: "The United States and other free nations should view expatriate communities as a strength. Chinese people living abroad—if protected from interference and espionage by their government—can represent a significant counterweight to Beijing's propaganda and disinformation."
Let's compare this stance to the insights of a true master of the Chinese diaspora: the formidable professor. Wang Gungwu, born in Surabaya, Indonesia, who will turn 90 next October and is the author of a delightful and insightful memoir, Home is Not Here.
For foreigners, there is no better explanation for the prevailing mentality throughout China:
"At least two generations of Chinese have learned to recognize that the modern West has valuable ideas and institutions to offer, but the turbulence of much of the 20th century has also made them realize that Western European versions of democracy may not be as important for China's national development. Most Chinese seem to approve of policies that prioritize order and stability over freedom and political participation. These people believe that this is what the country needs at this stage and resent being constantly labeled as backward and politically unliberated."
Wang Gungwu emphasizes that the Chinese think very differently from the "universalist" trajectory of the West, thus getting to the heart of the matter: "If the People's Republic of China manages to offer an alternative route to achieving prosperity and independence, the United States (and other Western countries) would see this success as a fundamental threat to their (and Western Europe's) dominance over the world. Those who feel threatened would then do everything possible to stop China. I believe that most Chinese people think that this is what American leaders are prepared to do."
No assessment of the American Deep State has the slightest chance of standing if it ignores the richness of Chinese history: "The nature of Chinese politics, whether under emperors, feudal lords, nationalists or communists, has always been so deeply rooted in Chinese history that no individual or group of intellectuals could offer a new vision capable of appealing to the majority of the Chinese people. After all, the majority seems to have accepted the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China's victory on the battlefield, coupled with its ability to bring order and renewed purpose to a rejuvenated China."
A long, remixed telegram
Federal prosecutor Francis Sempa, author of America's Global Role and adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes University, compared the assessment of the "Chinese threat" From McMaster to the legendary "long telegram" written by George Kennan in 1947, under the pseudonym X.
The "long telegram" outlined the subsequent strategy for containing the Soviet Union, even leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was the culmination of the Cold War project.
The current lengthy telegram, a remix of the original, despite all its mediocrity, may also have a long life. Sempa—which speaks in his favor—at least admits that "McMaster's timid political recommendations will not lead to the gradual overthrow or weakening of the power of Chinese communism."
He suggests – what else would it be? – "containment," which could be "firm and vigilant." And he acknowledges, which also works in his favor, that this containment must be "based on an understanding of Chinese history and the geography of the Indo-Pacific." But then, once again, he gives the game away, in true Zbigniew Brzezinski style: the most important thing is "the need to prevent a hostile power from controlling the main power centers of the Eurasian continent."
It is no wonder that the US Deep State identifies the Belt and Road Initiative and its extensions spread throughout Eurasia, such as the Digital Silk Road and the Health Silk Road, as manifestations of a hostile power.
The crux of US foreign policy since World War II has been to avoid the integration of Eurasia – now actively pursued by the Russia-China strategic partnership. The New Silk Roads crossing Russia – part of Putin's plan for the Greater Eurasian Partnership – will inevitably link to the Belt and Road Initiative. Putin and Xi will meet again in person in mid-July in St. Petersburg for the twin summits of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and will continue discussions in greater detail.
Hovering silently over the Two Sessions, therefore, we have the conviction of the Chinese leadership that a swift return to internal affairs is of essential importance for a new surge on the grand chessboard. These leaders know that the military-industrial-media-surveillance complex will have no scruples whatsoever in employing every possible geopolitical and geoeconomic strategy to sabotage Eurasian integration.
Made in China 2025; the Belt and Road Initiative – the postmodern equivalent of the ancient Silk Roads; Huawei; Chinese manufacturing superiority; the great advances in the fight against Covid-19 – everything becomes a target. And yet, simultaneously, nothing – neither the remixing of the long telegram nor the stale ruminations on Thucydides' Trap – will prevent a rejuvenated China from achieving its goals.
* This is an opinion article, the responsibility of the author, and does not reflect the opinion of Brasil 247.
