Boulos is right to put reelection aside and bet on the Lula 2026 project

In politics, as in life, sometimes it is necessary to be bold and make decisions that, in principle, go against the easiest and safest path. Federal deputy Guilherme Boulos' decision not to run for any elected office in order to accept Lula's invitation and assume the general secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic deserves applause.

Boulos traded a guaranteed reelection – as one of the top vote-getters, having obtained over 1 million votes in 2022 – for a ministry in Lula's government, where he will be responsible for liaising with social movements, a role that suits him perfectly due to his prominent activism in this area.

It made no sense for Lula to remove a trusted figure from the general secretariat, such as Márcio Macedo, only for a replacement to remain in the position until April 2026, when he would have to resign if he wanted to run for re-election to the Chamber of Deputies.

We know that political agreements often have a part that can become public and another that is best left between those who participated in the agreement. But, everything suggests that, depending of course on his performance as minister, Boulos negotiated with the president his continued presence in the top ranks of Lula's cabinet in the fourth term.

The official invitation to Boulos comes in the wake of Lula's conviction that it is necessary to prepare the government machinery for the tough electoral contest of 2026. Although Lula has been consistently recovering popularity, we cannot lose sight of the fact that Brazil has a strong far-right, the Faria Lima [a wealthy financial district in São Paulo], agribusiness, neo-Pentecostal churches, the military, media groups, the police, and militias. 

It is no coincidence that in all five elections won by the PT and its allies, the election went to a second round.

The relatively recent appointment of Gleisi Hoffmann to the Ministry of Institutional Relations and the cuts in positions held by Centrão appointees in the government follow the same logic of prioritizing preparation for the election.

It is evident that the dismissals are also driven by the votes of Centrão parliamentarians against the government in the National Congress on matters important to the Planalto Palace. 

Even though they are a clear minority among deputies and senators, the government's objective is to reflect in its composition the real base it has in Congress. It was no longer possible to passively watch the conservative parties, who helped defeat government projects but maintained political cronies in various areas of the federal administration, enjoy the best of all possible worlds.

The Centrão (a group of center-right political parties) ends up in a "tight spot," since the occupation of positions and the consequent political use of the ministerial structure has always been the lifeblood of this group. So much so that two of its ministers decided to remain in the government even in the face of imminent expulsion from their parties. 

Moral of the story: the government is experiencing a good moment and knows how to take advantage of it.