Amnesty among friends prepares for a new political order.

     Without a shred of propagandistic spirit, one could say that the power of a ruling class works in this way.  

     After conducting a selective process of criminalizing and imprisoning political adversaries, Michel Temer's allies, accused of involvement in the same corruption crimes investigated in Lava Jato, decide to prepare an exclusive perk – to end the operation and guarantee amnesty for the friends who had the misfortune of being caught in it. After the adversary's forces were severely damaged, their ranks are scattered, and a large part of the leadership is imprisoned, a predictable course correction is being sought.

     Michel Temer's interview published in today's Valor newspaper is part of this effort. Caught in a plea bargain by Marcelo Odebrecht, Temer admitted that he received the money. It wasn't 10 million reais. It was 11,3 million, he clarified, with professional prudence, since this is the number that appears in the "accountability report for the period." Temer speaks of a period in which, as Vice President of the Republic and president of the PMDB party, there was a "flood of businessmen wanting to collaborate" and that, at the time, in 2010, this was perfectly legal. Touching on the crux of the discussion, he stated to journalists:

     "These donations are being criminalized. Why? Not because of their formal aspect, but because of a more inductive aspect, assuming that the money entered the party because of bribery. So, it will be necessary to prove that the money that entered the party and for which there was an accounting is the result of bribery. It's a matter to be examined."

      This is the point under discussion. It involves the fate of investigations that are beginning to close in on prominent figures in the Temer government -- in addition to the interim president himself, José Serra and Eliseu Padilha are mentioned, not to mention the perennial Aécio Neves.

     It also concerns those interested in debating ways to rebuild the democratic system, which has been battered by harsh convictions. It also involves debates about leniency agreements, which protect a company's employees—and the entire country's GDP—from abuses and excesses committed by executives and managers accused of corruption. We can move towards a democratic solution. Or we can open the door to an authoritarian regime that excludes the participation of popular leaders.

     The interim president's argument helps to remind us that the core of the Lava Jato convictions was constituted by this change in nature. The perspective on the so-called object of investigation changed. What was seen as campaign donations, and which were perfectly legal at the time, constituting at most tax irregularities known as "cash 2," came to be classified as bribes. It was not an easy path, however.

 In March of last year, when impeachment was nothing more than an obscene project by Dilma's opponents, defeated five months earlier in the presidential elections, Folha de S. Paulo noted the difficulty of separating one thing from another. "Donation or bribe," the newspaper wrote in an editorial, which reported: "In reports sent to the Supreme Court, the Federal Police say that, in some cases, it has 'initial elements' indicating that the electoral donation was used as a form of corruption." According to the newspaper, in some cases the "Federal Police itself stressed the need for further analysis."

   Even then, investigations pointed to a remarkable balance in the distribution of campaign donations, which would never be matched later by investigations and punishments. A survey by the Estado de S. Paulo newspaper showed that between 2007 and 2013, the PMDB, PSDB, and PT received a total of R$ 571 million in donations from companies, of which 77% came from companies with business ties to Petrobras, a target of Lava Jato. According to the newspaper, the Workers' Party received the largest share, followed by the PSDB with another 42% of the donations. In the 2014 campaign, the large construction companies involved also made donations to their major competitors, sharing equivalent but not equal sums. While OAS donated R$ 30 million to Dilma, leaving R$ 10,7 million for Aécio, the PT candidate received R$ 16,8 million from Andrade Gutierrez, compared to R$ 20,2 million for Aécio.

    As I noted in "The Other Story of Lava Jato": "We're talking about people who negotiate billions of reais, back and forth. Pure money, without ideology. Shall we talk about courtesy and good manners?"

    Interpreting the spirit of the legislation, I wrote: "The game has always been this way and is meant to be this way: to ask and promise, to pay and wait."

    What separates one thing from the other? Politics.

    In an interview for this space, Professor Sidne Chalhoub, who teaches Brazilian History at Harvard, clarifies the point:

    "Today, the Judiciary has immense power, unparalleled. The prevailing idea is that 'everything is corruption and everyone is corrupt.' From there, arbitrariness is created, which is the path to selectivity, to the political use of Justice."

      Expanding on this point of view, Chalhoub explains that the nature of the legislation contributes to this discretionary power of the magistrates:  

     "Our legal system has multiple, contradictory, and inconsistent rules. This situation creates an infinite space for arbitrary action, because every day you can change the interpretation of a particular law, of a rule, and apply it selectively."

    Politics entered the scene, in the early days of Lava Jato, to blame and criminalize. Now it returns to the scene to exonerate and exonerate.

    That's the point. Things couldn't be clearer.

    After the destruction of the political system built upon the 1988 Constitution, which established the broadest and most enduring regime of public liberties in the country's history, the plan is to consolidate a new republican order.

    Broad, general, and unrestricted, the 1979 amnesty paved the way for the democracy of the following years. It rejected objections against Leonel Brizola, Miguel Arraes, and other leaders considered undesirable by the powerful of the time. A way was found to open the prison doors for those convicted of armed actions. A country was born where freedom of expression and the right to organize were absolute values. Communist parties, kept illegal since 1947, were legalized before the Constituent Assembly. The labor unions, the target of harsh persecution by the 64 coup plotters, were able to organize.

   Today's debate concerns the country's future, where the impeachment vote against Dilma will be a turning point. Amnesty among friends humiliates those who believe that all are equal before the law. It establishes inequality as the preferred method of political treatment.

   The agreement being sought in 2016 is based on preserving cronies and excluding popular leaders, whose greatest expression is the Workers' Party, whose extinction is already on the radar, and the consolidation of a conservative political monopoly, immune to power shifts, such as the one initiated by Lula's arrival at the Planalto Palace in 2003. Recovering a position of strength lost at the end of the military dictatorship, the ruling class does not want risks.