Expanding a left-wing front to combat conservatism

March 15th marks a complex moment in the Brazilian political landscape and therefore requires a thorough assessment of its origins and implications. In this sense, the analysis we present is preliminary, as it will certainly require a more substantial formulation over the coming days.

What we witnessed on this March 15th was a manifestation of the struggle between classes and values. A confrontation that reveals the interests of the most conservative sectors of society who, since the election of President Lula, have been devising strategies to defeat the democratic and popular project. This defeat did not occur in the last election, but the small margin of votes that guaranteed President Dilma's victory generated the prevailing idea that this result could be altered through political pressure and the destabilization of the Dilma government.

Therefore, we propose some central questions for analyzing the movement that is forming in opposition to the current government.

The first point refers to the understanding of the dispute over political projects for the country. The Lula and Dilma governments produced a process of social mobility never before seen in Brazil: millions of people were lifted out of poverty and 36 million entered the middle class. This frightens the elite and sectors of the middle class who fear the loss of their status quo. They feel threatened by a project that expands opportunities for access through social policies. What divides the country, bringing the elite and segments of the middle class closer together, is the reduction of social inequality that occurs with the guarantee of working conditions for the poorest sectors of the population (regulation of the domestic workers' profession is an example), the redistribution of income through the tax system, and the expansion of job competition with the entry of large sectors of the population into professional, technological and university education (Prouni, quotas, Mais Médicos, are examples).

The other issue for analysis concerns the conjunctural factors that contribute to this climate of ideological conflict. The middle class, now indebted, was one of the sectors most benefited by the counter-cyclical policies developed by the current government and, today, feels the loss of this condition. The worsening economic crisis is causing the government, in this first quarter, to resort to increasing tariffs and services, generating dissatisfaction among its citizens (electricity, fuel, health plans, school fees, etc.).

Furthermore, the lack of a strong signal from the plan to address the crisis, guaranteeing the continuity and expansion of actions to protect this social stratum, allows these sectors to move towards an elite that never saw itself represented by the Dilma and Lula governments. Moreover, the progress achieved has not been accompanied by a movement to politicize the popular classes in defense of a truly emancipatory political project. The groups benefiting from government programs such as Bolsa Família; Luz para Todos; Minha Casa, Minha Vida; or Prouni; for the most part, lack a social awareness of defending or recognizing the decision to implement them, which should be understood as part of a broader project of social transformation.

However, these issues raised cannot lose sight of the links between them all, forging the acts of March 15th as a major public expression of protest against the government and the PT (Workers' Party). It is about understanding the mechanisms of articulation that led segments of the population to the streets to exert political pressure. It is about vehemently refuting the thesis of spontaneity repeated by the mainstream media. The steps of this movement demonstrate a high level of professionalism and clarity of objectives on the part of the political adversaries of this government, who knew how to capture the existing dissatisfaction with the economic situation, fueling a climate of widespread corruption, starting with the crisis at Petrobras. It is important to remember that there is a selectivity in the indignation against corruption.

The mainstream media acts as a catalyst for this sentiment, giving it a veneer of spectacle, with the participation of the very actors from Globo (a major Brazilian media conglomerate) in calling for the acts. The massive daily broadcast on television channels, with a common-sense discourse that these were non-partisan, beautiful, and peaceful actions, functioned as an invitation to participate. A movement of this magnitude involves planning, investment, organization, and financing. Why are these facts omitted throughout the broadcast?

Furthermore, issues such as the HSBC scandal, allegations that irregularities at Petrobras began at least in 1997 during the FHC administration, or corruption cases involving PSDB and DEM, such as in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, the Federal District, Paraná, among others, do not gain partisan dimension and are always treated as individual actions. This is evident when, yesterday, the PP/RS led the demonstrations against, among other things, corruption at Petrobras, even though all the federal deputies from its delegation in the state of Rio Grande do Sul are under investigation.

All of this creates an anti-PT sentiment that transforms into a feeling of hatred towards democracy, bringing together other authoritarian, homophobic, racist, and reactionary sentiments that were expressed today through banners calling for military intervention, supporting femicide, praising Nazism, and even protesting against the great Brazilian educator, a symbol of popular education, Paulo Freire.

But the responses to the March 15th demonstrations will not be the result of a simple equation, as we face an adverse situation. These responses require the government to, in the immediate term, approve economic adjustment measures that will reduce the deficit in public accounts and, in the structural term, approve effective measures for the reform of the Brazilian state.

This requires building a new political consensus that will allow progress, especially regarding political reform, agrarian reform, tax reform, and media regulation. Herein lies the impasse: those who took to the streets yesterday did not demand such reforms. Those who bang pots and pans on their balconies in Alto Leblon are not proposing to fight for effective measures of structural reform of the Brazilian state.

Moreover, even our own allied base in the National Congress does not share our vision regarding the content of the reforms the country needs. One example is the PMDB, which holds the presidencies of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, as well as the vice-presidency of the Republic, and presents a political and electoral reform proposal diametrically opposed to ours on a central issue: the end of private financing of electoral campaigns. Furthermore, the PP, PR, PRB, PSD, and PTB are examples of occasional allies who make ad hoc agreements in the current context and, from a strategic point of view, defend causes and proposals that are completely different from ours.

The pact made by Lula and reaffirmed by Dilma with productive sectors of the Brazilian elite is coming to an end. This is partly due to the international scenario, but also to the internal impossibility of maintaining incentives and tax breaks that responded to the most immediate interests of these sectors.

Therefore, if all of this is true, a new form of governance is needed. The governance model based on a parliamentary majority sustained by the exchange of positions within the government is definitively outdated.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to re-establish relations between the government and the social base that elected Lula and Dilma. To this end, there are two key issues: maintaining the temporary nature of the adjustment measures and adding to them proposals that include the taxation of large fortunes, progressive income tax rates, and an implacable fight against major tax evaders and corruption. Furthermore, the PT itself needs to clearly define the measures regarding its members involved in the Lava Jato operation. The government's fight against corruption will not succeed if the PT is not relentless in its internal affairs, signaling this commitment to society.

Another issue that deserves highlighting concerns our government's inability to contest a vision for state management, dominated by a technocracy that has perpetuated itself since the PSDB governments. Technical figures with a political vision are always considered second-rate voices. Thus, our policies are increasingly in the hands of the so-called technocracy and allies with no commitment to the continuity of our project. The debate surrounding concepts and programs weakens, and actions are reduced to a results-oriented policy based on indicators, without any discussion of content or values.

Therefore, if we do not engage in debate with society about the foundations of our actions, we fail to prepare a defense of the values ​​and concepts that guide our policies, which extend far beyond our government.

Regaining the political initiative with a positive agenda in such a complex scenario becomes an immense challenge. The obstacles are immense, and the instability affecting Argentina and Venezuela further aggravates this political situation. Our adversaries are already signaling new demonstrations soon, which compels us to act swiftly and boldly.

It is up to us to engage in political activism, to mobilize democratic sectors, to dialogue with movements, and to form a left-wing front that engages in broad dialogue to confront growing conservatism.